**Chapter Four**

**Grand Apartheid as a “Development” Model?**

**Avoidance Strategies, Bureaucratic Structures, and the Local State**

**“`n Boer maak `n plan”**[[1]](#footnote-1)

**The Historical Context**

The years 1910 to 1948 illustrate the continuity of many of the debates about racial segregation in South Africa that occurred during this period. The coming to power of the purified National Party of D.F. Malan in 1948 marks a convenient dividing line between segregation and the more rigid policies of apartheid. Analytically, however, the use of 1948 as a dividing point in South African history is not as useful as one might expect in that "much of the least attractive part of the present South African political economy stems directly from its earlier history as part of the British, and, before that, Dutch empires" (Wilson & Ramphele 1989, p. 230).

By the 1920s, the colonial state in Africa and Asia had entered a period of guided hegemony in which the term “development” had begun to enter the “doctrinal pantheon of the colonial state, and the reproduction of hegemony alone was not a sufficient goal" (Young 1994, p. 150). In Britain, domestic critics of the colonial system argued there should be colonial "development for its own sake" in Britain's Empire (Rich 1984, p. 37). The passage of the 1929 Colonial Development and Welfare Act marked the beginning of a shift towards a development-oriented administration within the British Empire. Follow-up acts were passed in 1930 and 1940. However, it was only after World War II that Britain began to direct significant resources towards the African colonies.

Liberal intellectuals, mostly white, all shared a modernizing impulse. They believed that modernization was the key to economic development, social change and the reduction of unemployment. In the reserve areas of South Africa, trusteeship policies in the 1930s and 1940s and early ideas about modernization also planted the seeds of a developmental model in the minds of some National Party leaders. The evolution of South African policies on rural and agricultural development in the African reserves (later homelands/bantustans) was coterminous with the debates leading to the creation of the Colonial Development Corporation.

Many development theorists after World War II had rejected a pure market model for a more state-centric approach to economic growth. By 1950, following from the writings of John Maynard Keynes, a high degree of consensus had developed throughout the world that the state should be interventionist in the promotion of social and economic development. In both Europe and North America, there had been significant government involvement in the economy throughout the 1930s and 1940s. In the post-war world, colonial governments adapted these state-centric doctrines of development planning and absorbed elements of the European welfare ideology. Development activities fostered a far more elaborate administrative apparatus in Asia and Africa in the decade before independence from their respective colonial powers than was the case earlier in their history (Evans 1997).

Prior to African independence, "the colonial state had gradually accumulated an institutional capacity that positioned it to seize the developmental initiative" (Young 1994, p. 212). The Keynesian state-centric view of development, and the assumptions which stood behind it, were passed on to political elites in the successor regimes. In much of Africa, state-managed development activities were used to legitimate elite decision-making after independence.

The situation was more complicated in South Africa. Transfer of authority to the Union of South Africa[[2]](#footnote-2) meant "the Reserves system, pioneered by Shepstone in the 1850s to ensure cheap labour supplies to the settler farmers, became an integral part of the unitary state structure established in 1910" (Slovo 1976, p. 136). A corporatist approach to government, adopted by the National Party in the late 1920s after the 1922 miners' strike, saw the white central government as the coordinating body for all public and private economic activities within the country and at all levels of government.

Development activity in South Africa, however, was directed at only one segment of the population, the white Afrikaans-speaking group. As a result, South Africa came to practice a form of state capitalism that was not paralleled in other industrial countries: "[i]n some aspects, particularly with regard to economic planning, the ruling Nationalist Party with its state capitalism might well be regarded as being to the left of the opposition United Party” (Adam 1971, p. 58). Within the reserves, the National Party had long adopted a strategy that saw the state continually modernizing racial control. Over time, in the black areas, some aspects of development management gradually came to be a part of that modernization process promised by the apartheid regime.

**Modernization and Rural Development Experiments**

As early as 1894, the Cape government established an experimental farm in the Transkei which trained African demonstrators who shared in the cost and benefits of dipping, for which cattle are immersed in chemical disinfectant in order to kills diseases (Beinart 1994). In 1927, the then Director of Native Agriculture, R.W. Norton, had 155 African agricultural demonstrators working in the field throughout the African reserves. In their work with farmers, these demonstrators were practitioners of what would later be called development administration. After 1931, government officials in the Department of Native Administration dabbled a kind of “developmentalism” in the reserve areas.

Prior to World War II, the Hertzog/Smuts government took a developmental position that combined environmental preservation with the segregation and protection of the African reserve areas. The goal was to improve productivity in the black rural areas through the use of agricultural demonstrators, soil conservation, and instruction. However, the low level of financial commitment ensured that for most Africans in the rural areas, "the material impact of the policy was insignificant" (Lester 1998, p.79).

In 1930, the South African government created a Native Economic Commission (NEC) designed to provide central guidance for its economic development policies in the reserves. The goal of government was to get "Natives" to "shoulder the burden of their own advancement" (Rich 1984, p. 59). In some cases, chiefs initially agreed to give the betterment scheme their support. By the late 1930s, the white controlled South African government had aligned itself “with more global, intellectual, and political trends in its enthusiasm for a larger, more effective and more interventionist central state” (Posel 1999, p. 102).

The South African NEC report, released in 1932, projected a far-reaching program for the future that incorporated "the ideas of liberal segregationalists [of] the 1920s." The NEC concluded that most Africans would have to stay in the reserves, but the reserves would have to be developed and made ecologically viable and productive agriculturally. "Development and social modernization," the Commission concluded, "should come from within the 'tribal' system under the chiefs" (both quotes Beinart 1994, p. 119).

The 1936 Native Land and Trust Act was an early attempt to introduce conservation into the reserves. The Act contained a package of development programs that were designed to stop the depletion of soil in the reserves. For many in the rural areas, however, development meant at the least inconvenience for rural dwellers and at the best "seemed indistinguishable from... impoverishment" (Evans 1997, pp. 197-198). Response to the Act in the reserves was mostly negative. There was little consultation in the implementation of the program.

During the depression in South Africa, the size and function of the bureaucracy increased in both white and black areas. The Department of Native Administration established a program to provide state aid to African agriculture. Within a few years, those who had originally "agreed to stock limitations were extremely discontented... and there was a resentment... toward government regulations among rural peasants" (Lewsen 1988, p.143).

Unfortunately, a few years after conservation measures were introduced, many peasant farmers were left more impoverished than before while deforestation and land degradation continued. In the end, the "betterment schemes" introduced under the program had the primary effect of improving the position of tribal elites which had been "by then incorporated into the central apparatus of the Native Affairs Department as petty administrators of government policy" (Stadler 1987, p.42).

Despite these efforts, conditions in the African reserve areas deteriorated throughout the 1930s and 1940s. A 1938 Report of the Native Affairs Commission noted that the reserve areas were “congested, denuded, eroded, and, overall in a deplorable condition” (Fine & Davis 1990, p. 15). Government policy according to Rich (1989, p. 289) to address this problem was to be

…based on the continuing extension of territorial segregation, the removal of the remaining legacy of Cape liberalism in the form of the Cape African franchise, an extended programme of reserve consolidation and economic "development" based on soil conservation, and the teaching of scientific farming techniques through agricultural demonstrators.

Government policies before 1948 had been designed to create a class of independent agriculturalists, traders, and small businessmen in the reserve areas. This development model from the 1930s would later inform assumptions after 1966. By 1948, when the purified National Party came to power, the Department of Native Administration had become tinged by an aura of "developmentalism" and the role of the South African government in homeland social and economic development was debated through the 1960s.

**An Agronomist from Cornell**

Upon coming to power, Nationalist leaders above all sought to protect the group needs of the Afrikaner. Apartheid, and specifically the creation of homelands, was the keystone to that process. In 1948, both the United Party and the Nationalists agreed on the need to develop the African reserves administratively and politically. However, they diverged on one point, the issue of white investment in the homelands. Because National Party leaders in the 1950s argued that the separation of blacks and whites had to be complete, the apartheid government concluded that homeland policy should be divorced from any ideas or promises of African economic development. investment should not be used to develop the reserve economies (Walshe 1987). Scarce resources, according to Henrick Verwoerd (then the administrator of the Bantustans), would be needed for white education and economic development efforts. The National Party leadership argued.

It was the rejection of economic investment that separated Verwoerd from the leading apartheid theorist in the 1950s, Prof. F.R. Tomlinson. In 1951, in order to justify the development of the Bantustans (reserves), the then Minister of Native Affairs, E.G. Jansen, appointed a commission of inquiry headed by Prof. Tomlinson. The Tomlinson Commission, Davenport (1987, pp. 270-271) writes, was assigned

...to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into and to report on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and based on effective socio-economic planning – terms which appeared to be open-ended, but which precluded proper correlation in the Commission's Report of policy proposals for African life in both the white areas and the Reserves.

Dr. Tomlinson and his commissioners developed the framework for South Africa's Bantustans and the economic and social development model that would eventually come with it.

Professor F.R. Tomlinson was an agricultural economist who taught for many years at the University of Pretoria. Tomlinson was American trained with a Ph.D. from Cornell University. As chairman, Tomlinson made his Commission play it straight. His analysis of the partition option occurred a scant five years after the partition of British India into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India and the partition of Palestine. The freshness of those developments might in part explain the seriousness with which Tomlinson took his responsibility. Economically, partition seemed a viable option from the Commission's perspective. For Tomlinson and his fellow commissioners, the key to separate development was investment in the homelands. Without massive investment, both public and private, there would be no possibility of success.

The Tomlinson Commission, which defined the apartheid policy (of complete separation), operated with assumptions on the nature of racial and ethnic differences that in 1956 were still too common throughout the world. The Commission concluded that ethnic sentiments were primordial and irrational and not amenable to change or shifts in intensity as a result of social interaction. These primordial sentiments were thought to distinguish the higher from the lower level races throughout the world. To quote the Commission Report, "The way in which the tribal unit originates, [is] by continual biological and spiritual cohesion around an inner core” (Tomlinson 1955, p. 175).

The report was published in Afrikaans in 19 volumes in 1955. The English Summary, numbering over 200 pages, was released in 1956 and remains, from a socio-economic perspective, underutilized as a research document. Whatever one might think of its conclusions, "[n]o remotely comparable study [of rural development] has been conducted since, leaving a hiatus of more than fifty years in reporting” (Butler, Rotberg & Adams 1977, p. 159). The recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission are worth a detailed examination for they defined a different sort of partition than was found acceptable by white politicians. More importantly, the Commission’s assumptions defined the debate in South Africa for 25 years.

**The Tomlinson Commission as a Blueprint?**

The Tomlinson Commission called for an extensive development program in the reserve areas including the creation of more than 100 new urban townships. The Tomlinson Commission's assessment of the expenditures required to partition South Africa were later said to be quite realistic at the time (Schlemmer 1987, p. 52). As the Commission would reiterate, massive state investment and socio-economic planning (a vast development program) was needed "if the policy of separate development was to have any chance of success" (Hepple 1967, p. 190; See also Harrison 1987; O’Meara 1996).

For apartheid to be successful, a total of £104,486,000 (South African pounds) would be needed; of which £49,230,00 would be committed by the South African government and £55,246,000 would come from private business investment. The Commission presented a blueprint for employment creation in the homelands[[3]](#footnote-3) and argued that 50,000 jobs would have to be created annually for the reserves to be sustainable with their existing population. Tomlinson noted that at that point (1955) that less than 4,000 jobs per year were being created in the reserves and border areas, at "' iniquitously' low wages" (Benson 1985, p. 270).

As a part of its brief, the Commission tried to determine the extent to which the homeland areas were capable of carrying a majority of the country's Bantu-speaking population. Urbanization was a reality, Tomlinson warned, and in spite of government restrictions, Africans were leaving the reserves in increasing numbers and were settling permanently in "white" areas. Rather than simply moving people in order to achieve the government's political goals, Tomlinson called for the redeployment of "half the population of Transkei [then one million people] in industry and in the urban centres, to relieve the extreme pressure on the land" (Desmond 1971, p. 79).

Only after development processes were in place in the homelands could Africans be resettled from the urban areas. Tomlinson’s predictions of population growth, however, came considerably short of reality. Using the 1950 census as a basis, Tomlinson had predicted a total African population of 21 million by the year 2000. By 1990, projections had suggested that 35-40 million was more likely. The population was 44 million people in 2000.

In the reserve areas, the report called for a vigorous program of rural development and argued that "technicians in agriculture, reclamation, and construction [should] become the first line of contact with Africans" (Butler, et al. 1977, p. 161). The Commission put in a plea for improved marketing methods for farmers, better credit facilities, better farm‑planning, and stabilization of land tenure.

Government policy should be to encourage successful black farmers to buy a second plot if they had finished paying for their first. It should also ensure an adequate capitalization of funds through the establishment of a development corporation for the introduction of viable plantation crops such as sugar, fibers, and timber. The Commission underlined the need for industrial development both in the African areas and on their borders. In the homelands, the Commission wanted to encourage entrepreneurs who showed promise of initiating new economic activities (Davenport 1997b).

Tomlinson placed separate development within the context of an economic development framework for South Africa and the Southern African region as a whole. The Commission Report qualified apartheid as a political doctrine by “firmly linking it to a programme of “development” in the reserves which contained a future vision of an approximately equal proportion of whites and Africans in the ‘European territory’ within fifty years” (Rich 1989, p. 294). Critical to the scheme would be the creation of very large blocks of territories with a commitment to the "large scale sustainable development of the black areas, according to Sir Percival Liesching (1956), the British High Commissioner in South Africa (1955-1958) and a contemporary observer of the political process.[[4]](#footnote-4) It was this developmental view of the homeland areas on which the National Party government failed to follow through.

The Tomlinson Report recommended that the reserve areas be consolidated into seven integrated blocks that would be more economically viable. Each partitioned unit would be "an organism that, like the Afrikaner veld, would gain maturity through evolutionary growth" (Butler et al. 1977, p. 25). In assuming that contiguous blocks of territory could be set-aside for the different ethnic groups in South Africa, the Commission Report reflected an ethnic view of African society that was not unique to Afrikaans speakers or even South Africans as a whole.

The seven blocks of African territory in South Africa: Tswanaland, Zululand, Vendaland, Pediland, Swaziland, Xhosaland, and Sotholand would be the basis of the new partitioned states. The British High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland were to be added as well.[[5]](#footnote-5) In recommending the incorporation of the British Protectorates, the Commission assumed a greater South Africa. According to Hepple (1967, p. 195) the incorporation of the High Commission Territories was necessary

… so that all land in Africa south of the Limpopo could be divided into separate white and black states. To overcome the objection that South Africa's Blacks were allotted a mere 13.7 per cent of the land in the republic, Verwoerd hoped that the protectorates could be included as additional "Bantu" areas, bringing the African share of the land to forty-five per cent.

Accepting these assumptions, the Commission argued that, if its guidelines were followed, it would be possible to partition Southern Africa on a roughly 50/50 basis between Africans and the country's other ethnic groups. Ignored, even by Tomlinson, was the fact that the black area would include the very harsh environment of the Kalahari Desert.

In support of development efforts in the reserves, the Commission recommended that Native Commissioners and other administrators in the Department of Native Administration be given training in economic and social development. All European personnel who were employed in the Department of Native Administration or any development organization in the reserves should attend courses in Bantu sociology, anthropology, and native administration (Tomlinson 1955). The Commission called for the creation of a nucleus of European development officials (district development officers) for the homelands that would promote future social and economic development in the rural areas.

The Tomlinson Commission gave a detailed analysis of the financial implications of a policy of radical separation that was simply ignored by Prime Minister Verwoerd and the National Party. Tomlinson took apartheid seriously as an ideology and tried in his report to project the real economic costs for the partition of South Africa. Tomlinson's position was that there must be a real division of South Africa, along the lines of India and Pakistan, (or the Jewish and Arab sections of Palestine) for apartheid to work. The implementation of the report’s recommendations, without financial commitment, made integration inevitable, the Commission concluded (Mandy 1984).

Whether the Tomlinson Commission provided a realistic model of partition and homeland development is questionable. However, the developmental framework it provided, despite an initial rejection by the apartheid regime, led to the creation of an image and myth of development administration within the spatial framework defined by the homelands that was to influence Afrikaner academics and practitioners for more than a quarter of a century. While Tomlinson's figures on investment needs were realistic, the Commission's assumptions about the carrying capacity of the reserves for human residents were overly optimistic. As Cosmas Desmond (1971, p. 182) has noted:

The Tomlinson Report estimated that once the Released Areas had been added, the African Reserves in the whole of South Africa could support 2,142,000 people. There are almost this number in the Reserves of the Northern Transvaal alone.

The concept of the homelands was accepted as policy, but without the policy conditions expressed by the Commission. Tomlinson commented twice on the differences he had with the National Party government in the 1950s on the issue of economic and social investment. In a speech given in 1972, he pointed to the government's half-hearted response to the Commission's economic assumptions. He stated that the essence of the problem of developing the homelands had been speed. Bearing in mind that the numbers involved, no small-scale programme would have been adequate. What was required were “economic weapons applied with inspiration, with sacrifice, and with force” (Harrison 1987, p. 180). It was critical to build up an economy in the home areas that did not depend solely on agriculture. Border area development was not enough. The government's refusal to use white capital had lost them "fifteen valuable years" (Harrison 1987, p. 180).

Tomlinson, in a second rare public statement in 1980, reiterated that without massive private investment in the homelands, apartheid inevitably would fail. White or international private capital was essential (Reilly 1980). Without this massive investment, he commented, "the inevitable consequences of the integration of the Bantu and European groups into a common society, must be endured" (Tomlinson 1955, p. 211).

**Verwoerd’s “Theories” of Economic Development**

There was a meanness to the National Party government that went beyond ideology. One of the first acts of the new government after 1948 had been to suspend the school-feeding program for African children in the townships. The rejection of Tomlinson’s economic development recommendations confirmed apartheid policy’s parsimony in the homelands areas throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

It would be misleading to see apartheid only as a political solution to the African numerical predominance in South Africa. Distorted though it was, the concept, at least as presented by Tomlinson and other academics, provided an overall blueprint for the social and economic transformation of the African territories within the context of a broad partition solution. Though the policy shifted over time, separate development was designed to halt the movement of black South Africans to the urban areas and into an integrated national economy and divide the territory into several polities (Christopher 1994).

Development management and the social services that it spawned in the urban centers and in the homeland reserves were directly related to the need for a cheap healthy work force available for mining and industry that could be returned when redundant to the reserves. The strategy was to improve the opportunities of urban Africans but at the same time ensure the unemployed remained in the homelands until needed (Hill 1983; Claasens 1979). Urban dwellers living inside the homelands boundaries could be available for labor purposes, but without the need to be conscious of their political or socio-economic aspirations.

Both urban and rural social planning was directly linked to patterns of economic discrimination. The South African government, in rejecting the investment of white capital in the homelands, opted instead for a state-centric approach from government development corporations and industrial enterprises. Under the homelands system, there were both economic and political divisions within the country. The goal was to stop urban migration and the need for influx control by rolling back job creation to the edges of the homelands (Interview with Bethlehem, 1990).[[6]](#footnote-6)

Early development efforts within the homelands, diverging from Tomlinson, focused on agricultural development, self-sufficiency, and the fashioning of a system of development through the creation of border industries outside of the homelands. From a National Party perspective, rural development would be difficult enough since a "primary reason for the backwardness of the homelands was said to be the lack of African motivation. This was a recurrent theme in discussions with white officials ranging from homeland field staff to officers of the developmental agencies” (Butler et al. 1977, p. 168).

Spatial economic development required the establishment of white-owned and controlled industries on the borders of the African reserves, the establishment of government statutory bodies, and the granting of limited self-rule to blacks within their allotted 13 percent of South Africa. Significant private enterprise was excluded from the homelands since the private sector should not be involved in the creation of the homelands. " According to Hepple (1967, p. 27) "Verwoerd saw poverty not as the common distress of the poor but as a problem requiring a racial solution.” The expulsion of white business people as part of the establishment of the homelands, such as the Transkei, “dealt a hammer blow to the economy and infrastructure of the whole territory because blacks hadn’t had the working capital to run the [trading] stations properly and few of them had been able to succeed” (Woods 2000, p. 54).

As early as 1952, Verwoerd, as Minister of Native Affairs, had sought to establish economically viable farming units in the reserves. The state supported units of full‑time stock‑farmers or agriculturists that would produce food for the local market and export to the urban area for resale in the black townships. In reality, the methods used were more authoritarian than developmental and government policies led to a sense of deprivation in the rural areas. At the grassroots level, apartheid development policies continued to be regulatory and conservationist. Controls were introduced to regulate soil usage, water utilization, grazing, and overall environmental degradation. The impact of apartheid on the economy of the homeland areas was devastating.

Verwoerd proposed the creation of a pyramid of Bantu authorities in towns and the countryside, rooted in tribal custom and promoting an African style of economic change. Starting from the Stallardian position that blacks in white towns could not have political rights, he assumed that blacks "could not complain if they were given adequate residential areas, adequate housing, and conditions for an orderly social life" (Davenport 1997b, p. 269). Political development would be limited to the homeland areas.

Government control over stock (cattle and small stock such as goats and sheep) intensified in the 1950s and strict limits were placed on the number of reserve cattle. In particular, cattle dipping caused much discontent in the rural areas (particularly among women who had responsibility for the process) since dipping was thought to weaken the animals (Lodge 1983). In the homelands, the positioning of poverty and commercial wealth added to a sense of deprivation when many black traders refused to have their stock culled on the grounds that the number of cattle they maintained had been fixed by negotiation with the South African government. The result, Kotze (1982, p. 140) writes, was predictable:

Within a time span of about two decades...the betterment policy and related matters, such as Bantu authorities, were the object of rural resistance in several South African Black territories, such as Sekhukuneland, the far northern Transvaal, Nqutu, Pondoland, the Bahurutshe area at Zeerust, and Witzieshoek. It demonstrated the inadequacy of the government's approach to developing these areas. Authoritarian paternalism, inadequate opportunities for popular participation, failure to demonstrate the value of the betterment policy to the people directly involved, and the dismissal of all forms of opposition and objections, persisted for a long time and can, at least in part, be held responsible for the underdevelopment of the homelands.

Some administrators were skeptical about the need to initiate and sustain socio‑economic progress, much less to advocate these matters for themselves (Kotze 1982). Debate over the apartheid development policies of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (as the Department of Native Affairs had been restyled) was muted and discussions of race policy occurred largely within South Africa's cities where there was resistance to the policy from urban Africans, elements of the business community, and white liberals. Since the Department of Bantu Administration and Development had a lack of experience in the urban black townships, the members of the Association of Administrators of Non-European Affairs, who administered black urban areas, played a particular role in influencing apartheid policy.

From the beginning, the National Party government and the Tomlinson Commission worked at cross-purposes in terms of economic development and Prime Minister Verwoerd rejected the Tomlinson Report when it was released. From a political perspective, the purpose of the Commission had been to justify, under apartheid, the denial of the vote to Africans and the decision not to provide for their social and economic development. Tomlinson instead had presented an apartheid-based developmental framework. While the style of the Tomlinson recommendations were implemented, there was no commitment of the kinds of monies suggested in the report. The most significant failure of separate development (apart from the obvious moral failures) was the failure of the state to accept the economic costs of the apartheid system as defined in the Tomlinson Report.

The government responded to the Tomlinson Report with a Government White Paper (*White Paper on the Tomlinson Commission Report* 1957). The paper rejected the recommendation that white investment be allowed to enter the homelands themselves, preferring investments to occur in the border areas. White investment in the homelands themselves was prohibited. The White Paper further dissented from Tomlinson in rejecting the establishment of individual land tenure in the reserves. Verwoerd also rejected the proposal that mining enterprises in the homelands be developed (Glaser 1987a). What was accepted by the Strijdom Government[[7]](#footnote-7) and by Verwoerd was the vague decision to reorganize the economy in order to enable the reserves to absorb the "surplus" black population from the white urban areas and from the white farms (Davenport 1997).

Black capital, almost non-existent at the time, would have to be used to develop the reserve areas. At the same time, blacks were restricted in the type of business activity that they could start in urban townships. Little assistance was given to Africans to help launch their own businesses and government policy ensured that no secondary economic development would occur. Apartheid ideology in economic terms contrasted with earlier trusteeship assumptions about the need to promote economic and social development in the reserve areas. Modern, defined as Western, enclaves in the white cities were to be socially, politically, and economically distinct from traditional societies in the rural hinterlands and linkages between the two should be minimal.

Down to the late 1960s, South African policymakers continued to see a dichotomy between urban Africans who would have to be brought into the country's socio-economic system, albeit in a subordinate position (and perhaps eventually be brought into the political process), and rural Africans in the country's ten homelands who were to remain indefinitely separated from the South African economy. Prior to 1968, the goal was an almost total economic separation of the reserve areas from white South Africa. Though the government rejected most of its economic provisions, for many of the modernizers who would work in the homeland bureaucracies, the Tomlinson Commission Report remained, according to Butler et al (1977, p. 160)

...a working blueprint… Its facts, idioms, and recommended procedures remain[ed] part of the parlance of white developmental bureaucrats. In the context of the 1950s and 1960s the report's aim was to effect a major change in the structure and performance of the white bureaucracy governing the African areas. A recognized prerequisite to putting into action the specific programs set out in the plan was to activate the African affairs bureaucracy and to add to it such new organizations as might be required.

**Development Administration: An International Excuse**

**“Positive” Apartheid and an End to Domestic Colonialism?**

With the publication of the Tomlinson Commission report and the introduction of the homeland system, the South African government presented the world with its policy of "positive apartheid." Positive apartheid referred to the creation of new institutions of self-government for South Africa’s African population within the framework of the homelands system (Butler et al. 1977). According to the South African government, what was meant by “positive apartheid” was that new political, social and educational institutions were being created for Africans. Apologists for apartheid claimed that no political and economic rights were being taken away (Carter, Karis & Stultz 1967). According to government propaganda, homelands would allow "the Tswana and the Zulu [and the other Bantustans]...to draw upon their own traditions of incipient modernization...while avoiding the danger of serving the needs of the Republic more than those of black South Africans" (Butler et al. 1977, p. 23).

By the late 1960s, many apartheid theorists and development practitioners came to be influenced by the development administration and planning literature, and in particular the modernization assumptions of the U.S.-based Comparative Administration Group. Internationally, modernization theory came to dominate development administration and later development management strategies.[[8]](#footnote-8) From the beginning, however, strategies and theories of development management and development economics in South Africa were distorted by its historical identification with apartheid and the homeland system.

Development management, as it came to be applied in South Africa, often had an apolitical, almost scientific management approach to development. However, some development management scholars in South Africa ultimately took note of the impediment to development that the apartheid system was.[[9]](#footnote-9) An elaborate system of development banks, technical assistance, and development management and planning networks evolved both intellectually and in practice as the South African government moved to promote political, economic, and social development in its homelands. Development management should be a grassroots endeavor. According to D. A. Kotze (1983, p. 110):

Through joint participation by the public and field staff at local level, communications are improved between government institutions and the public, as well as among government institutions in the field. It can also lead to a better motivated public and the optimum utilisation of local resources. Popular participation in decision making can also lead to improved political and administrative penetration of rural areas which again implies greater support for government policies, greater political stability, and greater equity in the distribution of the benefits of development.

Solutions to racial problems through a management approach became the focus for groups such as the Urban Foundation and the Human Science Research Council in the 1980s. Under a development ideology, "[t]he legitimation for White overlordship [stood] on the type of authority relationship that [was] the most bearable and benign form: technical expertise" (Adam & Moodley 1986, p. 166). Gradualist approaches to reform meant that shifts of ideology used to maintain white support resulted in a spectrum of strategies from an almost totalitarian "Total Strategy" under P.W. Botha on the one hand, to the use of techniques developed in the United States during the New Deal period.[[10]](#footnote-10)

One technocratic vision of society was the so-called "social actuality” concept based on relative deprivation[[11]](#footnote-11) Social relationships could be managed technocratically and scientifically without the pain of political mobilization. For technocratic reformers, "[a] policy of depoliticization seem[ed] the logical alternative when democratic participation is blocked and genuine political involvement inevitably [led] to resentment and resistance." Decision-making and rationalization operated in a functionalist tradition and "[i]n this functionalist tradition, only superficially enhanced by conflict theories, consensual support of the basic rules still constitutes the normal order, to be interrupted by periods of strife caused by relative deprivation or loss of legitimacy” (Both quotes above from Adam & Moodley 1986, p. 167).

It was National Party govern­ment policy to encourage African "political participation and self-determination, with the homelands as focal points, but not [to] acknowledge the permanent residence of about eight million Africans in White areas" (Kotze 1975, p. 23). The argument supporting apartheid was the paternalist assumption that Africans could not fit into urban society. Partition would separate Africans with their low levels of motivation from whites who had high motivation and a strong sense of competition. Critics, not surprisingly, saw homeland leaders as little more than minor clients in a patronage-based class system.

**Creation of the Bantustans**

During the 1959 session of Parliament, Verwoerd's government introduced the Promotion of Bantu Self‑Government Act making

…provision for the restructuring of the Bantu Authorities system on a framework of eight Territorial Authorities.... Verwoerd allowed the suggestion of eventual independence for these Territorial Authorities to creep into his introduc­tory and second reading speeches.... He saw analogies between the direction South Africa could take and that being taken by Europe - a combination of national sovereignties with economic interdependence (Southall 1983, p. 282).

With the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, the National Party hoped to deliver a positive message about apartheid (Barber 1999). The 1959 Act created mechanisms for apartheid government in the reserve areas and created a system of homelands throughout the country. In the reserves, the South African government began the process of converting a patchwork of native reserves into "self-governing" homelands. When given their "independence," the homelands would rid South Africa of its African problem since blacks would become citizens of one of the independent black ethnic nations created out of the reserves and they would cease to be South African citizens. The goal was "the extinction of the Black political presence in the country" (Christopher 1994, p. 13).

In the early period focus had been on urban separation. Focus in the second period was in the creation of self-governing homelands beginning in 1959 focused on the role that the reserves would play in the future South Africa. Bantustans, as they were established after 1959, were new political institutions (Lester 1998). The 1959 Bantu Self-Government Act established eight (later ten) distinct Bantu homelands or national states which would be given a degree of self-government and establish a comprehensive separate development regime. Butler (1997, p. 37) describes that The legislation provided that,

[w]ith any grant of self-government under the act, a territorial authority's executive council automatically becomes a cabinet, councilors become ministers and the chief councillor a chief minister, and directors of departments [at that point all white] become secretaries~~.~~

The move to grand apartheid, in large part, had to do with South Africa's relationship with the outside world. With the decolonization of black Africa in the 1960s, reforms were introduced at the regional and local level in South Africa. The South African government reacted to the end of colonialism in other parts of Africa after 1960 with an intensification of homeland development. With the decolonization process well underway in Africa, a South African ethnic national state could replicate a process of "decolonialization" within South Africa. The comparison with decolonization was intentional. The homelands system became South Africa's response to the "Winds of Change."[[12]](#footnote-12)

The idea that homelands, once established, should move towards some form of “independence” only crystallized about 1960 (Evans 1997). In May 1959, Verwoerd first announced that what he then called Bantustans could advance to self-government and ultimately "independence" (Sparks 1990). Verwoerd's regime began two major changes in the politics of South Africa. The first was a clear commitment to some kind of autonomy for the Bantustan areas, creating some political space and economic opportunity for a rural-based African elite (Davenport 1997b). Secondly, the regime undertook to remove large numbers of Africans from the urban areas and rural black spots of freehold territory and to shunt them into the Bantustans. In consolidating the homelands, the Verwoerd regime began a process of removing black tenants and squatters from white-owned land.

From a political perspective, the homeland structures represented an unsuccessful attempt to partially "externalize the colonial relationship in the shape of ethnic states, eventually having all attributes of formal political independence" (Slovo 1976, p. 137). The creation of the homeland system began a process of political incorporation and subsequent administrative development that locked millions of black South Africans into poverty and the totality of a South African administrative system created by and controlled through the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.

Verwoerd adapted the overseas colonial model of decolonization almost from the beginning and sweetened it by articulating his vision of a South African Commonwealth style federation that might evolve out of the apartheid system. Those who advocated "positive apartheid" saw the states of Southern Africa forming a common market or commonwealth with the “white part” of South Africa. The National Party defined a "decolonization" process that saw first a devolution of power and then “independence.” While many both within South Africa and internationally treated the homelands as a sick joke, the tragedy was that the Bantustans were real and, according to Johnson (1977, p. 29)

...the Government pushed doggedly ahead with its Bantustan policies, the fruits of which began to assume a dubious political legitimacy. However poverty-strick­en, however nonsensical in political and geographical terms, Bantustans did come to exist. Africans voted in their elections in large numbers and on a universal franchise.

Though in the early 1950s complete “independence” had been unthinkable, ten years later South African policy makers took the issue of self-government seriously and argued they had an obligation to prepare the homelands for “independence” (Stultz 1980). Ponderous statements were made about the significance of homeland self-government. To one advocate of “positive apartheid,” "this venture [self-rule] towards responsible local self-government and administration will ultimately determine the capability of the South African political system to absorb peaceful change" (Jeppe & Kotze 1974, p. 50).

By granting “independence” to the homelands, the path of separate development was to give the South African government some credence among South African liberals and internationally. By choosing the "decolonization" option, the National Party government in South Africa could act "in a role analogous to that of the metropolitan power in colonial society, the individuating interracial processes [provided] a basis for relatively peaceful democratic change" (Adam 1971, p. 162).

In 1963, the first “self-governing” Legislative Assembly came into being in the Transkei (Hammond-Tooke 1975). That year, the South African government announced that eventually all of the homelands would become independent. Throughout the apartheid period, the Transkei was the first to be developed and was the model for the other homelands to follow. What was to achieved constitutionally was the extension of the Transkei model to the other former reserve areas.

Taking this to its logical conclusion meant that the Transkei and the other independent homelands should ultimately be considered the same as other weak states in the Southern African region. South Africa would consist of the "white core" within some kind of a vague federation of Southern African states. The Transkei was considered the most logical choice for independence because it was less fragmented than other homelands and similar in size to internationally recognized Lesotho. This was to be the fruit of “domestic decolonization” in South Africa.

**The Apartheid “Non-Development” Model and a Return to International "Development"**

Beginning with the creation of homelands, the South African government had tried to impose a pattern of a homeland political development model to parallel the rest of Africa and Asia through a process of homeland "independence." Ten years later, a strategy of apartheid based economic development, based on white capital investment, would be adopted after the death of Verwoerd.[[13]](#footnote-13)

In large part, economic limitations were linked to the fact that only 12 percent of South Africa was suitable for arable agriculture, despite the high amounts of technology applied in the less fertile areas. The cost of expanding agricultural production could not be justified and the result was to subsidize white farmers on unproductive farmland. South African agriculture, as practiced under apartheid, severely degraded the environment. Even in the homelands, there were massive state subsidies for agriculture and particularly agribusiness, from which poorer residents of the homelands were excluded. Most homeland blacks were not part of an elite group even within small-scale schemes.

While apartheid leaders at first rejected the modernization assumptions of the United Party, as reflected in the Fagan Commission report, after 1968 they came to adapt a more “liberal” concept of modernization with its cultural assumptions of dual economy. From a modernization perspective, it was the cultural divide, not government policy, which divided the black homelands from "white" South Africa. Debates about modernization would influence thinking on South African social and economic development well into the twenty-first century.

The overall development of the homelands moved very slowly during the first two decades of apartheid. According to South African government sources, because of the failure to change tenure and traditional agricultural methods, agricultural yield turned out to be one-fifth of what the government estimated and, in fact, there were many more people to feed by 1980 than the Tomlinson Commission had proposed.

There were two identifiable stages in homeland development policy after 1959, 1960-74, when it was government policy not to allow white investment in the homelands (though after 1968 only controlled investment on an agency basis), and the period after 1974, when the Transkei and the other homelands were opened up for direct white investment. During the post-1974 period, homeland administrators became aware of the economic limitations on homeland political development and began to search for economic development models they could use.

Before 1968, the National Party policy on economic and social development continued to keep white investment out of the homelands and white business out of the townships, preferring to promote border industries. The ban against white investment in the homeland areas was formally rescinded in 1968 when the South African government under Prime Minister B.J. Vorster reluctantly recognized the need for white capital in the homelands. In this area, there was often conflict between the National Party and the leadership in the Department of Bantu Administration over the total segregation of the reserves, especially with regard to economic development (Greenberg 1987).

Government's opposition to white investment in the homelands disappeared by the late 1960s as economic decline in the Bantustans forced new strategies of homeland development and the South African state expanded in the 1960s on a much grander scale than most other developed and under-developed states. Under Vorster, the dominant ideology evolved from a separation to a separation-with-development model. This led to considerable changes in the administrative framework governing the homelands (Posel 1999). However, significant investment in the homelands did not begin in earnest until the early 1970s.

**“Development” Management in the Homelands**

After 1969, the apartheid government returned to the Tomlinson premises and allowed private investment into the homelands. Strategies of social and economic development, it was hoped, would allow for the successful political devolution of power within the Bantustans and the development of an African middle class (*Southern Africa: Seven Articles* 1950). Some development management scholars in South Africa ultimately took note of the impediment to development that the apartheid system represented.[[14]](#footnote-14) Only successful social and development strategies could justify the creation of the Bantustans. Most concluded that the model was good, but implementation often was unsuccessful.

Development management was not a grassroots endeavor in South Africa. As strategies of homeland development evolved in the 1970s, however, there continued to be "a strong bias in favor of state-led development, guided by development agencies and reinforced by development banks." Economic programs in the homelands were supported by pleas for "nationalistic fervor and the promise of a new day" (Both above quotes from Butler et al. 1977 p. 160). Development policy was at best paternalistic.

Contemporary observers of the homelands blamed financial and bureaucratic failures on government bureaucracy, corruption, incompetence, and inefficiency within government departments and development corporations. From the beginning there were difficulties in dealing with the homeland government bureaucracies. There were particularly high levels of corruption, incompetence, and inefficiencies in the development corporations (Wellings & Black 1987). Little blame was explicitly linked to the homelands structure however by South African academics and practitioners advocating development management activities.

By the 1970s, South Africa’s white academics began to speak of a special “first world”/“third world” dichotomy that characterized their country. Development in the "third world" areas would improve the lot of South Africa's black people. This value shift would occur both in the homelands and in "white" South Africa and became a part of many middle-class discussions of solutions to South Africa's "special" problems. The solution was for South Africa, through bold innovation, to enlarge the reserves, improve agriculture in them, and foster secondary industry in the Bantustans.

Apartheid in the late 1970s led to a strategy of development administration targeted at the "third world" portion of South Africa lodged in the ten homelands. Butler et al., (1977, p. 162) defined this development administration in 1976 as "development from above," they went on:

The white-directed, African-oriented institutions are the critical ones at this stage…. The major developmental impetus in agriculture, industry, commerce, and infrastructure is guided by the Bantu Investment Corporation, the Xhosa Development Corporation, and, in a specialized way, the Bantu Mining Corporation."

Throughout the homelands, a group of white dominated Development Corporations were identified as the primary vehicles for homeland economic development. As Gann and Duigan (1978, p. 61) have noted:

Industrialisation depends on a blend of public and private enterprise, promoted through bodies such as the Corporation for Economic Development (formerly the Bantu Investment Corporation, set up in 1959), South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation, and local bodies such as the Transkei Development Corporation (TDC, formerly the Xhosa Development Corporation, established in 1966), and the Bantu Mining Corporation (created in 1969). The corporations (encouraged) white entrepreneurs to set up factories on an agency basis at selected 'growth points', at townships such as Umtata and Butterworth.

The result was a new set of white-directed, African-oriented institutions that focused on agriculture, industry, commerce, and infrastructure (Moll 1989). These organizations would be part of the bureaucratic weight that would be inherited by the post-apartheid state in 1994.

While the politics of apartheid were conservative, the public sector in the 1970s began to search for technocratic solutions even as it began to expand as a result of patronage. For example, budgetary systems analysis of a most sophisticated type was introduced within the homeland administrations which required "a relatively high degree of economic and management expertise" (Butler et al. 1977, p. 177). When these sophisticated models failed, critics in Pretoria concluded that the problem was a lack of black educated professionals in the homelands. To many South African administrators, all failures of development were African problems. To apartheid administrators, problems in South African homelands were no different than similar problems in Uganda, Chad, or Zambia. A survey in 1984 suggested that most civil servants had little knowledge of development concepts or of the social and economic development needs of South Africa (Sacks 1984).

Schemes abounded under “development apartheid”. It was during the 1970s that white development experts from the University of Potchefstroom, with an eye on the tourist potential of the Bophuthatswana homeland, came up with the scheme to transform the Pilanesberg black reserve and grazing area into a game park and casino. The infamous Sun City complex (and the casino model of development) resulted (Onselen 1990). The whole apparatus of state-directed development management came to be applied to South Africa's rural areas.[[15]](#footnote-15)

The history of the homelands as political entities can be encapsulated in a 20 year period between 1965 and 1985. This period was characterized by the transfer of power of sections of South Africa to a group of conservative political leaders with "the backing of an entrepreneurial group many of whom have done well out of the system, and of growing civil service bureaucracies" (Streek 1984, p. 259). This entrepreneurial group included African traders, as well as petty bureaucrats, administrators, professionals, occasional investors and traditional chiefs, all of whom benefited from the homeland system. According to Roger Southall (1983, p. 286):

[B]antustan regimes [were] perceived as conservative and stabilizing elements which, unlike in other African states that had a significant settler presence, [were] prepared to share power with local whites within a fragmented polity, while leaving the structure of white domination in the core area undisturbed; and to the extent that they [sought] to retain their political independence, they [would] in consequence be explicitly aligning themselves against the liberation movements whose philosophy remain[ed] predicated upon the notion of a united and undivided South Africa.

There is now little support for the proposition that apartheid led to exceptional economic growth after 1948. Instead it was psychologically dysfunctional to economic growth and social development. South Africa's overall growth was consistent (for an immerging nation) over the decades of the apartheid years with no change after 1970 when economic apartheid was gradually abandoned. The ending of political apartheid would not have a long-term impact on economic patterns either.

Discussions of a post‑separate development scenario began almost immediately after 1959 and although “not a stated objective, the post‑separate development federation of Southern African states [was] possibly the ‘final solution’ in the minds of the homeland leaders" (Kotze 1975, p. 146). Post‑separate development referred to a federal state where constituent territories, which would include white South Africa, were equal units ‑ implying some form of consociational black majority rule and the end of separate development.

The realities in the Bantustans were stark. Homelands were poor, isolated, and dependent upon the South African regime. More than half the African population, some nine million in 1965, had permanent residence in the urban areas outside of the homelands. For this reason, many homeland leaders in the Transkei, as well as the other homelands, opposed “independence” and called for provincial status. In January 1966, Victor Poto, leader of the opposition Democratic Party in the Transkei, called "for provincial status for the African homelands within the South African union” (Kotze 1975, p. 150).

By the early 1970s, Transkei political leaders, as well as those in other homelands, had acquired new leverage from their vast patronage power over development funds. This was facilitated by the influence which their positions in government gave them in respect to access to licenses, contracts, and information, all of which were extremely valuable in the context of development projects, building programs, and the other activities stimulated by “independence" (Stadler 1987).

As a result of the forced movement of people, the homeland population grew rapidly in the 1970s and the 1980s despite their poverty. What little economic activity that existed in the homelands was dependent upon migrant labor. That has always been a sore point among Transkei political elites who claimed that the Transkei paid the social costs for the provision of Transkei migrant labor to “white” South Africa. This point was made by the Transkei regimes of Kaiser Matanzima, and continued to be claimed by the Bantu Holomisa regime (which had overthrown Mantanzima in the Transkei) down to the eve of negotiations (Interview with Barry, 1990). Some in the rural areas of the Eastern Cape still make the same point.

The crux of the economic development issue in the homelands was clear. In the best circumstances, with a fully developed agricultural policy and with open private investment, the homelands could support less than half (47 percent) of its population economically according to the Tomlinson Commission. After 1976, a new group of "realists" within the National Party and government turned their interests to the economic development of "Bantustans, UBCs (Urban Bantu Councils), and other government created institutions of `separate development'" (Gerhart 1978, p. 259). Despite this more aggressive developmental approach, the homelands were doomed to poverty.

In the homelands’ short history, revenues in the homelands were difficult to come by since the homeland could only obtain revenue from two sources: 1) taxes, fees, and licenses directly under their control and collectively referred to in the homeland estimates; 2) subsidies voted by the South African Parliament. After 1994, regional and local authorities would face similar dilemmas.

It must be kept in mind that the entire total income of each of the South African homelands was smaller than that of an American small town or medium-sized business firm. In the end, although half the cost of incentives was met directly by the South African government, the fiscal burden on the “independent” Bantustans was even more onerous “than in white South Africa since the homelands had such a low level in their tax base” (Wellings & Black 1987, p. 196).

The Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning claimed in 1988 that 145,000 new jobs had been created by South Africa’s decentralization program since 1982.[[16]](#footnote-16) Despite South African government grants in aid to the homelands (See Table 4.1 for grants to the Transkei), the homelands remained desperately poor rural slums. In the nominally independent homelands, it could be said in 1980 that the benefits of independence accrued to only 35,172 people, just 1.5 percent of the de facto population of the country. Critics suggest that this was in part because South African trade unions found it difficult to operate inside homeland borders. As a result, businesses that relocated to the homelands were able to transfer excess profits to their headquarters in urban South Africa. In 1990, the homelands accounted for less than 4 percent of South Africa's economic output (Saunders & Southey 1998).

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| **Table 4.1** South African Grants in Aid to Transkei, 1976-80(Transkei Government, 1990. All figures in SA Rand)  |
| 1976 | 134,000,000 |
| 1977 | 169,710,000 |
| 1978 | 190,700,000 |
| 1979 | 211,960,000 |
| 1980 | 231,040,000 |
| **Total** | **1,025,410,000** |

**Conclusion**

The decline in the respectability of colonialism internationally after 1956 meant that the apartheid government would have to adjust its control mechanisms to both the security imperative and demands for political parity. They responded with a parody of decolonization that envisioned the creation of ten "independent" polities that would permanently remove all Africans from South African citizenship and solve the vexing problem of black numerical superiority within the country. In the end, Under the National Party, there would “be no black South Africans” (Welshe 1999, p. 18).

A development ideology for the homelands crystallized within government and the academic community by the middle of the 1960s. By the time B.J. Vorster came to power in 1966, apartheid theories had begun to decline

...in importance as state policy became increasingly directed by a politicised civil service and from the middle 1960s, a burgeoning security policy and military apparatus. Racial ideology in its purist form began to give way before the exigencies of praetorianism in South African politics (Rich 1988, p. 295).

Former State President F.W. de Klerk makes it clear in his auto-biography that by 1968 the National Party’s political leadership and policy specialists had no faith in apartheid theories. By the late 1960s, many in the National Party had recognized the failure of apartheid as both a political model and an economic experiment. However, "we continued for some time to include the independence of the homelands as an option-at least for the solution of part of the problem of extending the political rights to Black South Africans" (De Klerk 1999, p. 100).

Apartheid, by 1969 had become instrumental rather than ideological. One might assume that the decline of ideology and changing economic patterns would compel a changed political response. However, abandoning apartheid in practice, and the economic and administrative dependency it fostered, would only deepen the white fears that had led to apartheid two decades before. Though the leadership of the National Party understood that the homelands were not economically viable, it would be another 20 years before they abandoned the political model.

Some Marxists have argued that homeland policy contributed to the functionality of apartheid, however, there is now little support for the proposition that apartheid led to exceptional economic growth after 1948 (Lester 1998). Rather, as we have seen, apartheid was dysfunctional to economic growth for the country as a whole. South Africa's overall economic expansion has been consistent across the decades and there was little change after 1970 when economic apartheid began to be abandoned. South Africa remained a middle-income country throughout the apartheid period ranking close to the center of middle-income countries.

The 1970s and 1980s saw a loss of government control over the urban areas. Urban revolt and international sanctions threatened regime survival. After 1985, the government began secret negotiations with the African National Congress culminating with the unbanning of black organizations and the release of Nelson Mandela in February of 1990. However, within a decade of the creation of the Bantustans it was clear that they would be neither economically nor developmentally sustainable.

Ultimately, the homeland political system collapsed between 1990 and 1994. Three factors explained the failure of South Africa's homelands policy. First, no country had recognized the legitimacy of the homeland regimes. Second, there were no viable economies linked to homeland boundaries. Finally, KwaZulu and Lebowa, two large homelands, simply refused the constitutional independence offered by the South African government (Bekker & Humphries 1985).

While politically the homelands were a failure from the beginning, structurally, bureaucratically, and institutionally, as we will see, they would remain important long after 1994. Most of the problems of the new provinces, after the establishment of non-racial government, were embedded in the homelands. The creation of the homeland system in South Africa was a sad chapter in the country's history.

1. "A farmer [read Afrikaner] must make a plan." This well-known Afrikaans saying is quoted from Leach 1989, p. 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This was the linkage, under the British Crown of the four south African territories, the Cape, the Orange Free State, Natal and the Transval, May 31, 1910. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The black areas of South Africa were known as reserves until 1948, are generally referred to as Bantustans in the 1950s, and finally named homelands after 1960. The terms became somewhat interchangeable over time. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The British were interested observers in the 1940s and 1950s in South Africa since they had vested interests in central Africa and the High Commission Territories. A look at these archives could prove to be useful in understanding the intellectual history of that period. The Colonial and Dominions office no doubt influenced South African thinking on indirect rule, trusteeship, economic integration, and development during the 1910-1948 period, in particular when they were very close to the United Party governments. The archives are now opening up for this period and it is possible through them to get a sense of the political actors (individuals and groups), their motives, and values with regard to South African Blacks and majority rule. The archives contain views on economic development vs. political development and participation as seen through the eyes of British and Dominions Office observers. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Batswana, Swazi, and South Sotho speakers were and are divided between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Regrettably Bethlehem was murdered outside his home in 1996 by unknown assailants. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. National Party Prime Ministers prior to Henrick Verwoerd were Daniel Francois Malan, 1948-1954, and Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom, 1954-1958. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See, for example: Gant 1979; Montgomery & Siffin 1966; Riggs 1971; Swerdlow 1963; & Waterson 1969. More contemporary approaches include Bryant & White 1982; Staudt 1991 & Esman 1991. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. We are grateful to Prof. Dirk Kotze of the University of South Africa on this point and for numerous insights into the reform period after 1979. Discussions and written correspondence with Picard, 1984-1991. Picard’s Research Diary. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The concept of a total strategy to win the hearts and minds or rural and urban South Africans through a combination of military force and development projects was taken from U.S. policy in Vietnam. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. As defined by Ted Gurr 1970, pp. 24-25 relative deprivation is a perception than an individual has higher expectations of what he or she is entitled to than they are capable of getting and keeping. This expectation, according to Gurr, often will result in violence. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Harold MacMillan’s famous phrase used in a speech to the South African parliament in 1960. See James 1997, pp. 615-616. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The next few paragraphs are based on material found in Picard 2006; Picard & Mogale 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. We are grateful to Prof. Dirk Kotze of the University of South Africa on this point and for numerous insights into the reform period after 1979. Discussions and correspondence with Picard, 1982 to 2000. Picard’s Research Diary. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. For example, in Kotze's view, the prefect's duty should have included security work. Given some relationship between security and development, the District Commissioner should have an important voice in local security affairs. D.A. Kotze, personal communication with Picard, 1985. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. "145,000 Jobs Created by Decentralization" 1988. Decentralization was the label given to the homelands policy in the late 1980s. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)