**Chapter Eighteen**

**The Tragedy of Jacob Zuma’s South Africa:**

**A Fragile State in Transition?**

**The Overthrow of Thabo Mbeki**

**Jacob Zuma: Revolutionary and Opportunist**

The rise of Jacob Zuma to the presidency in South Africa brought about noticeable changes in governing patterns in South Africa, albeit with less dramatic change in actual policy initiatives (Booysen 2011). However, in order to fully understand the shift from Mbeki to Zuma, it is useful to start with the then new president’s personal background. Unlike Thabo Mbeki, who came from a politically engaged family and a formal British higher education, Jacob Zuma came from a poor family and a rural area of Zululand and had almost no formal education (Gordin 2008). This fact reflects much of the difference in leadership style of the two presidents.

Where Thabo Mbeki was often characterized as controlling every aspect of the governing process, the Zuma approach was often seen as “anti-intellectual.” He has little interest in the details of policy and is content to look to others for advice. (Calland 2013; Johnson 2015). On the other hand, “His popularity [was] also rooted in a public persona constructed as a sometimes slightly gormless [stupid, dull or clumsy], but warm and accessible human being in personality and political belief” (Piper & Matisonn 2009, pp. 143-157). He was “viewed as a master of political theatre which appeals to ‘the masses’, his rallies a colourful mixture of homilies, parables, dancing and song” (Southall 2009, pp. 317-333).

There is little written about Zuma’s early years. Gordin (2008) provides us with the only Zuma biography to date and includes some information about his early years with the ANC. He was born into the Zulu clan at Nkandla and was an “impoverished son of the soil – from a family of peasants” (p. 3). Zuma’s involvement with the ANC began in 1959 when he was 17 and started working with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), the forerunner to Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). After trying to cross the border to Botswana (then Bechuanaland) in 1963 with the ANC military group Umkhono weSizwe (MK), he was arrested and sentenced to ten years on Robben Island for conspiring to overthrow the government and for sabotage. It was in prison that his relationship with the ANC was strengthened. Gordin continues (2008, p.22):

Zuma might have come to Robben Island informed only by general political notions learned at trade union meetings in Durban, but he left the island with a clarified and focused political understanding; a resolute belief that only the ANC had the right solutions to the problems bedeviling South Africa; and an unshakable commitment to the ANC and to the discipline and ways of dealing with the struggle to which the party subscribed.

This commitment to the ANC above all remained evident in Zuma’s actions as military cadre, political leader and president and continued to fuse the notion of party and state in his persona (Booysen 2015).

After his release from prison in 1974, there is less information on Zuma’s ANC activities. Most important for understanding his rise to power, however, Zuma went in exile first in Swaziland and then in Mozambique. It was during this time that he first worked with Thabo Mbeki, who trained Zuma both in combat and diplomatic skills. Zuma, actively involved with MK, also became a part of the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) in 1977. He participated in meetings with academics and activists along with Mbeki between 1987 and 1990, leading up to the February 2 announcement (Gordin 2008).

Upon returning to South Africa in 1990, he was elected as the ANC chair of the southern Natal region. Here, he worked to quell the violence in the region and bring the Inkatha Freedom Party(IFP) and ANC together in number of peace accords. He was seen as having an influence in bringing many “ordinary rural folk” in the region over to the ANC, using “the symbols of Zulu culture for political ends” (Ibid, pp. 52-55). According to Tom Lodge, his rural upbringing and polygamous household was actually an advantage, allowing him to convince Inkatha leaders that Zulu culture would be respected within the ANC (Lodge 2009). Zuma rose through the ANC ranks over the next years, beginning with his role as Deputy Secretary General of the ANC in 1991, moving to National Chairperson in 1994, then Deputy President in 1997, and finally President of the ANC in 2007 (Booysen 2015).

Zuma’s rise in power was also related to the ethnic differences between him and Mbeki (as well as many other ANC leaders) which became increasingly important after the 1999 elections. Indeed, Zuma was handpicked by Mandela to be Mbeki’s deputy in the ANC in 1997 and Deputy President of South Africa in 1999 because the leadership under Mandela (and Mbeki) was perceived to be heavily Xhosa, while Zuma was Zulu (Johnson 2015). When Mbeki made Zuma his Deputy President, the goal was to build a new consensus with the rural based Zulu monarchists. Zuma was also seen as not inclined to oppose Mbeki’s policy ambitions or to challenge his presidency (Gumede 2007). However, Zuma’s role as deputy, followed by his dismissal from this position, set him up as a potential successor, or (to his critics) usurper, to Mbeki. Indeed, Mbeki in many ways may have underestimated the power of ethnicity and regional influences over the ANC (Johnson 2015).

Already in 2001, the distrust Mbeki had of Zuma was well-known (Lodge 2009). The relationship between Zuma and Mbeki quickly soured, according to Gordin, particularly after there was suggestion of Zuma’s involvement in a reported coup plot in 2001. When Schabir Shaik was convicted of corruption in connection with Zuma (Gordin 2008) in July of 2005, President Mbeki sacked his Deputy President, who had also been accused of taking bribes. The incident resulted in intensified divisions within the ANC (Timberg 2005a; Timberg 2005b) and the dismissal of Zuma in 2005 allowed disgruntled ANC members to rally around the issue (Gumede 2008). The Zuma case confirmed to many that the country’s reputation had been sullied by a series of corruption scandals as far back as 1994. It was this sacking that set up the grab for power that resulted in the over throw of Thabo Mbeki in 2008 and the coming to power of Jacob Zuma, in May of 2009 as South Africa’s third elected post-apartheid president.

**Jacob Zuma, Julius Malema and the Intra-Party Putsch**

Jacob Zuma’s challenge to Thabo Mbeki has been portrayed, on the one hand, as the overthrow of an authoritarian personality, the rising up of the poor, disposed, and marginalized, and a revolt from below. On the other hand, it has been described as a communist (South African Communist Party - SACP) putsch or, in a third way, a battle over resources and power with little actual ideological difference (Southall 2009). There is also debate as to whether the events at Polokwane represented an enhancement of democracy in South Africa (Lodge 2009; Booysen 2011) or just an unequaled level of factionalism and the search for patronage within the ANC (Booysen 2011).

Twelve years after majority rule in South Africa, the country debated whether or not authoritarianism or patronage and corruption would dominate the leadership of the ANC. Liberal and social democratic values would play little role in the transfer of power to South Africa’s third president elected by a non-racial electorate. Ethnic identity and access to patronage were more important motivators. The political contest between Mbeki and Zuma represented a challenge to established policy and party authority and a more clearly defined ethnic split in South Africa from a civil society perspective. The SACP and COSATU both favored the candidacy of Jacob Zuma, who is Zulu, as did Julius Malema, the then head of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) and a North Sotho. While Malema’s and Zuma’s relationship would change dramatically in 2010, the Limpopo born former ANCYL leader was a staunch ally of Zuma at the time of his election. Malema infamously declared that he would “kill for Zuma” and defended him amidst rape allegations (Gaffy 2016).

Julius Malema began his involvement with politics within the ANCYL at a young age, becoming an unofficial child fighter for the MK in 1990. He rose through the ranks of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the ANCYL, becoming the president of COSAS in 2001, the Provincial Secretary of the ANCYL in 2003, and the President of the ANCYL in 2008. Alongside, and because of, his rise to power, the ANCYL found an influential place within the ANC (Forde 2011). Malema is said to be a master of the political process and specifically of inciting the involvement of young Africans in politics. He used populist rantings against the white population of South Africa to draw in young and increasingly unemployed voters and called, specifically, for the nationalization of the mines, in spite of the ANC continual denial of this as government policy ("The rise of Julius Malema” 2011). Malema’s ability to draw in young voters was a support for Zuma at the time of his campaign and during his court battles on racketeering and corruption, but the relationship between Malema and his followers and Zuma, in particular, would sour soon after the election, resulting in a new type of opposition for the ANC.

In April of 2007, Zuma stated that he would stand for the ANC presidency if asked. In addition to “enemies” Mbeki had made in terms of the alliance partners and the accusations that he was out to get Zuma, the major issue that year was that of the so called “two centers of power.” Mbeki could not run for a third term as President of South Africa but sought a third term as president of the ANC. There was question within the ANC as to whether the head of the ANC should be different than the head of the country and the concern that if Mbeki remained the head of the ANC, the presidential candidate would be handpicked by him. Despite consensus that both roles should be held by the same person, Mbeki ran for a third ANC presidential term (Gordin 2008).

In November 2007, much to many people’s surprise, Jacob Zuma was elected as ANC president by the party’s province and branch delegates. The media seemed to be caught off guard by the decision, having assumed that Mbeki had more political maneuvering power than he did. In a true “man of the people” fashion, the ANC’s 52nd Annual Conference in 2007 in Polokwane was overwhelmed with Zuma supporters singing and cheering in droves. Zulu describes the conference as displaying an “ill-discipline and chaos”, uncharacteristic of ANC conferences up to that point (Zulu 2013, p. 125).

On December 18, 2007, Zuma was chosen as ANC president. Gordin argues that the election of Zuma was a surprise to observers for many reasons. For one, the Mbeki administration was extremely out of touch with ANC delegates and the ordinary ANC membership and he had made himself inaccessible to the party cadres. Moreover, there was general discontent over the fact that most delegates had not benefited from the new South Africa and high levels of unemployment and poverty remained determining issues in the anger targeted at the Mbeki administration. Indeed, it has been said that the election of Jacob Zuma was in many ways more of an anti-Mbeki campaign than anything else (Gordin 2008). Gumede (2008) reiterates this point stating that, “Zuma’s success in capturing the ANC presidency has been based on carefully riding the wave of popular dissatisfaction.”

Additionally, there was an underestimation of the decisive role of the alliance partners (SACP and COSATU) in the election. Malema’s ANCYL influence was extremely significant (Gordin 2008). These groups had long rejected Mbeki’s pro-market economic strategy, seeking a return to the principles of the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) (Southall 2009). In many ways the presence and role of the alliance partners in the ANC conference mimicked broader multiparty democratic competition within the ANC. Essentially, non-electoral forces or interparty pluralism/factionalism aided in the “overthrow” of Mbeki and “[t]he advent of Zuma, and especially his backing by COSATU and the SACP, represent[ed] the renaissance of the [tripartite] alliance which was marginalized under Mbeki” (Piper & Matisonn 2009). As Tom Lodge (2009) points out:

Zuma’s victory at Polokwane was a consequence of Thabo Mbeki’s disinclination to manage his own succession and nurture his own preferred candidate… In delegating to Zuma the task on keeping the left onside as a sympathetic ‘listener’ Thabo Mbeki allowed his deputy to build a personal following [with the SACP and COSATU]. Zuma’s dismissal from public office made him uniquely available to the left-wing groups as a champion against the ANC leadership… Finally, Zuma’s victory is probably a reflection of a shift in the demography of ANC activism, as young unemployed school-leavers assert themselves within an organisation in which branch-level activism remains vigorous and lively.

Indeed, the battle at Polokwane reinvigorated the ANC and its relationship with its supporters, effecting elections in 2009 and 2011 (Booysen, 2011).

NEC membership quickly came to reflect high levels of support for Zuma and the Mbeki camp was largely marginalized. Many of Mbeki’s supporters eventually left to form the new Congress of the People (COPE) party (Piper & Matisonn 2009). Moreover, resignations or departures (sometimes voluntarily) by almost a dozen cabinet members and several provincial leaders followed Thabo Mbeki’s departure (Lodge 2009).

The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) recharged Zuma for money laundering, racketeering, tax evasion, and corruption and fraud ten days after he was elected ANC president. To Zuma, the timing was peculiar and strengthened the idea that Mbeki was out to get him. The courts were seen as having a pro-Mbeki bias and incited anger by ANC members such as Julius Malema and his Youth League Followers. The “two centers of power” issue also left uncertainty during the period between the ANC election and the 2009 South African elections.

On September 12, 2008, the court declared that on procedural grounds, the charges against Zuma were unlawful. The judge of the case added that he thought there was political influence on the case, lending credence to the belief that Mbeki had led a political conspiracy against Zuma. This gave the NEC of the ANC the space needed to act. On September 20, 2008, Mbeki was “recalled” as president of South Africa and Kgalema Motlanthe was made the interim president until elections were to take place in 2009 (Gordin 2008).

**Jacob Zuma and the Leadership Deficit**

The election of Jacob Zuma did not come without baggage. The Zuma affair, a collection of loosely connected incidents, severely divided the ANC and its alliance groups, COSATU and the SACP, during the second Mbeki administration. Zuma’s supporters in 2008 saw Mbeki’s actions as a conspiracy to retain political power (Timberg 2005d). Though politically wounded by the criminal charges, and despite the accusations of sexual impropriety and corruption, much of the ideological left rallied behind Zuma (Wines 2006).

Prior to Polokwane, two major scandals surrounded Zuma. The first was the trial of Zuma’s close acquaintance and collaborator, Shabir Shaik, who was convicted of fraud in 2005. A KPMG report described the extent to which Zuma has been dependent on businessmen and other politicians to maintain a standard of living above his personal means throughout his career (Conway-Smith 2012). But, the conviction of Shaik, in particular, had caused Zuma to be ousted from the deputy president position. The judge in the Shaik trial alluded to the very close relationship between the Shaik and Zuma, where Shaik performed financial favors and expected benefits in return. Zuma was charged with two counts of corruption and fraud in June 2005, but the trial was continuously delayed (Gordin 2008).

In 2006, Zuma again found himself in the spotlight when he was charged with the rape of a family friend’s daughter. Supporters of Zuma surrounded the court buildings singing and cheering for the soon to be ANC president. Ethnicity again played a role here, with many of the supporters believing that Xhosa speaking ANC leaders were blocking Zuma’s rise to power. Playing on these attitudes, Zuma delivered his testimony in Zulu at the trial.

One of the most memorable aspects of this trial was Zuma’s comments about HIV/AIDS. He asserted that he knew the women he was accused of raping was HIV positive but thought that it was not a risk because it was difficult to pass HIV from a woman to a man (Lodge 2009). Moreover, the world was shocked by his comments in 2006 that he had taken precautions not to transmit the disease by taking a shower after intercourse (Gumede 2008).

Zuma, after his acquittal from rape charges and after the corruption charges were dismissed by the court on technical grounds, announced that he would continue his libel lawsuit against members of the media and, implicitly, would pursue his political conflict with President Mbeki (Keet 2007). Zuma claimed that his run in with the judiciary was part of a vendetta by his political enemies within the ANC and named President Mbeki as the perpetrator in the engineering his legal and political problems (Esipisu, 2006; Timberg 2006b).

With Zuma’s ascension to the South African Presidency, the scandals that compromised his leadership credibility continued. However, he was able to use his new power to deal with aspects of his previous scandals. Not only were his previous charges dismissed, now being easily fended off because of his position in government. Shabir Shaik was released from prison and his brother was made head of the intelligence services. His new position in power was also seen as benefiting those close to him. Zuma’s family also began to set up companies, using the Zuma’s name to push for Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) contracts.[[1]](#footnote-1) Zuma failed to disclose his and his family’s financial interests on time after becoming president (and after having claimed the Executive Ethics Code himself), resulting in his being taken to the Public Protector for noncompliance (Calland 2013).

His home region, KwaZulu-Natal, was also seen as benefiting from his rise to the presidency, seeing an increase in budgets and pork barrel projects (Johnson 2015). As a City Paper correspondent commented in 2010, “Only a few can be misled to believe that there is no link between Zuma’s rise to the presidency and his families rise to riches” (Zulu 2013, p. 159). Johnson argues that during his presidency there was a criminalization of the state and Zuma viewed himself as a traditional chief rather than a president of a modern democracy. He became a “virtual Zulu monarch with his multiple wives, palatial establishment at Nkandla and many cattle” (Johnson 2015, p. 36).

In 2016 he came under fiercer criticism over the R246 million in security upgrades to his home in Nkandla. The court found Zuma had violated the constitution in using government money for his Nkandla home upgrades. He was ordered to pay back part of the amount spent (something the Public Protectors office in its “Secure and Comfort” report had asked him to do since 2014, but he refused) (Onishi 2016a). This prompted parliament to attempt to impeach the president in April 2016, an attempt which failed. In June of that year, the amount he was to pay back was set at R7.81 million, some of which he finally paid back in September 2016 (Mahr 2016; Toyana & Macharia 2016).

In 2017, Zuma was again involved in scandal related to high-level corruption involving the well-known Indian-born family, the Guptas. The scandal became known as “Guptagate” when over 100,000 email were leaked revealing interactions between the Gupta family and Zuma for government contracts, bribes and kickback and money laundering. The family allegedly offered key government jobs to those who supported their various major business interests. Even as President Zuma was resigning, police were raiding the Guptas home in relation to the investigation (Mcintosh 2017; “South Africa’s Zuma Resigns” 2018). National prosecutors estimate more than $4 billion was lost in corruption related to the Gupta families influence on Zuma’s administration (Onishi & Gebrekidan 2018).

Moreover, in October 2017 the Supreme Court of Appeals announced that Zuma could in fact face 18 counts of corruption, money laundering, racketeering and fraud committed between 1995 and 2000 (Ibid). In November 2018, Zuma is expected to face trial for 16 counts of corruption, linked his alleged involvement in a still controversial arms deal in the 1990s (these charges were set aside in 2009 when we became president) (South Africa: Sweeping 2018).

Despite having 783 charges levied against him by the courts and pushing the institutional checks on democracy to an almost breaking point (Nantulya 2017), throughout all of this, Zuma often played the innocent and simple victim from rural South Africa, persecuted and conspired against by his enemies (no doubt in hopes of disarming critics) (Booysen 2015). Southall (2011, p. 625) writes that:

Zuma, unencumbered by either ideological concerns or moral principles, combine[d] his role as president with that of head of a shadow state, his political influence percolating downward through government structures to facilitate the allocation of tenders and contracts to his family, friends and those who can serve their financial interest. As such, he disown[ed] responsibility for crimes seemingly committed under his protection, and there is no person or institution willing or capable to point a finger directly at his culpability.

**South Africa and the ANC Under Zuma**

**The Compliance State**

One of the main differences in the role of the ANC under Zuma compared to the Mbeki administration was its relationship to the state. The party had more power over the state compared to under the Mbeki administration, but power within the party was also fractured under Zuma (Booysen 2015, p. 57). The difference was that under Zuma the acquisition of power was more aggressive; the ANC asserted its power over the state (as well as civil society the private sector and the media) with a goal of creating greater compliance.

Mbeki used his power in office to assert influence over the ANC. The ANC under Zuma felt it had the right to direct government; thus Zuma injected himself into an ANC power system (Booysen 2011) and “ensured that his primary power base …remained [within] the party rather than the state (although increasingly these have become intertwined)” (Southall 2016, pp. 73-88).

While state capture, crony capitalism, and the compliance state had emerged under Mbeki and even Mandela, it was greatly expanded under Zuma. The increased ballooning of the public service sector (the salary bill for civil servants rose from R300 billion to R450 billion from 2009-2013 under Zuma) was also an insurance tool for the ANC, creating a larger and often loyal black middle class (Booysen 2015). R.W. Johnson (2015, pp. 50-51) argues that the capture of all state institutions began under Mandela and has led to the ANC’s “slide into corruption and warlordism.”

Another difference in the ANC under Zuma emerged from his leadership style. Instead of the all controlling management style of the Mbeki presidency, according to Calland, Zuma was in many ways, “a vacant space”, not making any direct decisions in term of policies, impementation and/or ideologies (Calland 2013, pp. 33 and 49). He was also seen as open to interest group pressure (Johnson 2015).

The Zuma administration also ushered in an era of anti-intellectualism within the ANC, where the role of the ANC as the sole liberators of society was made a dominant theme. Moreover, the ANC was seen as using government processes to avoid answering questions about the ANC accountability, instead moving its focus to the opposition parties in parliament. On the other hand, Booysen (2015; 2011) argues that, even though the rise of Zuma brought a sense of newness, in terms of governing and policy, there are not many significant differences between the Mbeki and Zuma administrations. Moreover, the ANC still often spoke “left” but actually walked “right” with policies that are largely capitalist and not as radical as rhetoric would suggest. Zuma’s policy leadership, much like his overall strategy, was seen as minimal. Policy challenges would ultimately lead the ANC to rely more on propaganda to maintain popular support

Another characteristic of the ANC under Zuma is the trouble it faced in terms of party cohesion and image. As will be elaborated upon below, the rise of service protests and the worsening election results over time put pressure on the party. While the alliance partners were brought back into the ANC inner circle under Zuma, this was in many ways destabilizing (Booysen 2011).

The ANC was made more vulnerable by the fact that their power was less coherent, focused, and centralized. Ideologically, within the ANC there are still two distinct camps comprised of the democratic socialists and the African nationalists focusing on black economic empowerment. Under Zuma, these two camps were not brought together; instead the ANC expanded in both directions to better accommodate both sides. Zuma was often reluctant to go too far in either ideological direction for fear of alienation of supporters (as was the case for SACP under Mbeki), and this often resulted in policy incoherence and unpredictability within the party (Calland 2013).

Moreover, the disassembly of COSATU and the breakaway of the core of the ANCYL to form the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), mostly due to attempts to contain criticism of Zuma within the ANC, led to a precarious fractionalization. While the ANC slowed its crumbling through pushing its characterization as South Africa’s liberators, attempting to bring real socio-economic change to South African lives, and restricting or directing information to promote a positive perception of the ANC (Booysen 2015). The fractionalization did not stop under Zuma and the problem was inherited by the new President, Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018.

**Policy Choices and Initial Successes**

**Social Policy, Inequality, and HIV/AIDS**

While significant socio-economic gains have been made for historically disadvantaged South Africa since the transition in 1994, and some policy improvements took place while Jacob Zuma was in power, serious issues concerning poverty, healthcare, inequality, and unemployment remained on the table as the Zuma administration limped towards its end (Booysen 2015). The early Zuma administration had a plan to focus on poverty, unemployment, and inequality. As Booysen comments, “[Zuma] openly and defiantly offer[ed] a desirable alternative to the Mbeki regime, with promises of more accountable and accessible government and more left-leaning, caring policies” (2011 p. 83). While the social welfare function of the state increased after 2004, it was unable to keep up with unemployment and poverty issues. However, while the Zuma administration claimed they would usher in radical change, most changes were in reality very incremental (Booysen 2011).

Compared to the Mbeki administration, the Zuma administration was seen as taking a much more proactive stance on the issue of preventing and treating HIV/AIDS, renouncing much of the HIV/AIDS denialism that characterized Mbeki’s time in power. Independent studies have shown that the Mbeki era policies of limited access to antiretroviral treatment resulted in more than 300,000 avoidable deaths and 35,000 babies being born with HIV (“Zuma’s Aids shower” 2016). Already by 2009, the Zuma administration had a more rational approach to the HIV/AIDS epidemic compared to Mbeki. This was made obvious by the appointment of Barbara Hogan[[2]](#footnote-2) as Minister of Health (Lodge 2009). In March 2017 more than 3.8-million people were receiving antiretroviral therapy (Department of Health 2017) and, while still dysfunctional, new governance structures were put in place in the health system under Zuma (Booysen 2011).

Data from the World Bank display some of the trends in HIV infection in South Africa. Of note is the dramatic drop in the number of children with HIV since 2008. Increased use of HIV treatment medications (as promoted by the Zuma administration) improved the prevention of mother to child transmission (AVERT). The then deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, stated that “SANAC [South African National Aids Council] has achieved great success since 2009 when we turned the whole issue of AIDS around and began to distribute antiretrovirals” (“Zuma’s Aids shower” 2016).

The percentage of AIDS related deaths also declined over the Zuma period, with 43.6 percent of deaths being related to AIDS in 2002, rising to a peak of 50.8 percent during the Mbeki administration in 2005, and lowering to 31.1 percent by 2014 (Statistics South Africa 2014). Campaigns to increase testing, an increase in infants tested for HIV and a decrease in infants infected with HIV under Zuma contributed to this outcome (Wilkinson 2014).

**Figure 18.1**[[3]](#footnote-3)

On the other hand, the bizarre comments made by Zuma during his rape trail about prevention of HIV/AIDS through taking a shower (mentioned above) and his sexual promiscuity undermined some of the legitimacy Zuma had to tackle the issue and led to allegations of the administration still confusing the population about HIV/AIDS transmission (“Zuma’s Aids Shower” 2016; Wilkinson 2014). HIV/AIDS in South Africa effects not only individual health, but also social development and fiscal costs. Infection is not evenly spread across the population, with prevalence of the disease in the African population at around 16 percent in 2008 and only 6.8, 2.7, and 5.6 percent in Colored, Indian, and white populations, respectively. Moreover, infection rates are higher in some regions compared to others, with over 15 percent of the population infected in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga and only around or less than 5 percent in the Western and Northern Cape (Lule & Markus 2011). Statistics also show that there is a disproportionate burden and fear of HIV/AIDS among the poor and women, as well as less information and testing for these populations (Wabiri & Taffa 2013). Thus, the successes in terms of combating HIV/AIDS in South Africa are still very skewed.

Access to social grants, healthcare and household services such as electricity, tap water, and the internet, increased on the whole in South Africa after 2002, as has disposable income (Goldman 2013). However, severe inequality remains a major problem. The 2009 measure of inequality by the World Bank, made South Africa the most unequal society in the world (Calland 2013). According to the World Bank, inequality (measured by the GINI coefficient) has increased overall since 2000, with only a slight decrease since the Mbeki period ended (see Table 18.1).

Moreover, while the middle class grew on the whole in South Africa since transition, the amount of people dependent on social grants has also seen a notable increase (Booysen 2015). Unemployment also continued to increase since transition, with one quarter of the labor force unable to find a job in 2013 and 66 percent of those unemployed being youth and young adults between the ages of 15 and 34 (Goldman 2013).

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| **Table 18.1**[[4]](#footnote-4)South Africa GINI Coefficient Trend |
|  | **2000**  | **2006**  | **2008**  | **2011** |
| World Bank Estimate | 57.77 | 64.79 | 63.01 | 63.38 |
| Goldman Sachs Estimate |  | 72 |  | 69 |
| South Africa Presidency Estimate |  |  |  | 65 |

In 2016, unemployment hit a 13 year high with 27.1 percent, bringing the total amount of people out of work in South Africa to 5.9 million (“South Africa: GDP” 2017). The protest over rising university fees beginning in 2015 and escalating in 2016, have also highlighted inequalities in South Africa with university fees often being prohibitive for black students, continuing the cycle of inequality in access to education (“South Africa: Tuition” 2016b).

**Pragmatism, the Private Sector and Moderate Economic Growth**

Figure 18.2 displays, GDP per capita continued to rise in South Africa since 2000. However, growth slowed to a large extent after the Mbeki era. Growth rates continued to fall at the end of 2016, with the country under threat of a credit rating downgrade (“South Africa: GDP” 2017). Certain sectors have grown, while other traditional sectors have hit hard times. The mining sector, which is of vital importance to the South Africa economy, for instance, had a difficult period in recent years. Johnson attributes much of the blaime for this to bad government policies that detered new investment (Johnson 2015).

Down from its peak, the mining sector accounted for only 8.3 percent of GDP in 2012, as opposed to 21 percent in 1970. Data from the Chamber of Mines shows that employment for miners in the gold sector, which employed 32 percent of all labor in mining in 2010, dropped from around 200,000 in 2001 to 131,591 in 2013 (South Africa Chamber of Mines 2011, 2012, 2014). Overall, the productive sector has lost a third of its workforce due to mechanization and closures. Platinum, which was on the rise in South Africa for a time, has also let workers go and closed mines amid lower demand for the metal. In contrast, the tobacco, brewing and telecommunications industries have seen much growth in South Africa over the recent decade (Calland 2013). Therefore, there is a changing landscape to the private sector as well.

There is also the question of who is gaining from the increase in GDP per capita. South Africa’s economic inequality has been characterized (famously by Mbeki) as wealth being divided between rich white populations and poor black populations. This is for the most part true with the majority of low-income households being black. Over the democratic period (1996-2011) black household incomes increased 210 percent, while white household incomes increased 235 percent. However, African holdings on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) increased from 16 to 25.8 percent from 2000 and 2010. White ownership declined over this period, most likely as a consequence of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) initiatives (Calland 2013). Africans are also increasingly making it into the top 20 percent of earners in the country, where they made up only half of this category in 1995 but represented well over two thirds by 2009 (National Planning Commission 2011).

**Figure 18.2**[[5]](#footnote-5)

The state has played a role in promoting business in several ways in South Africa. Most obviously is the promotion of BEE and Broad-Based BEE (BBBEE). One of the consequences of these policies is the push for more black directors and board members of companies. While many of these directors are sourced from the private sector, 41.4 percent of black company directors for the top twenty firms on the JSE were sourced from the ANC, government, or parastatals (particularly, the NEC and cabinet), thus, displaying the characterization of the revolving door between the public and private sector in South Africa (Calland 2013).

Moreover, while BEE has increased black ownership of business, this has not been equally distributed. In the mining sector, Johnson (2015) argues, BEE shares are often given out based on the minister’s recommendation and licenses are granted to favored companies with the BEE beneficiaries in mind. Madi (2016) argues that BEE has actually undermined black enterprise, particularly in townships and rural areas. It has also been used as a cloak for many “tenderprenuers” who attempt to get rich though their political connections or politicians who have private sector investments. This “tenderprenuers” phenomenon will be further discussed below in terms of its institutional effects.

The notion that only elites are benefiting from BEE means that, “BEE is fast becoming a national security and social stability issue... White economic security is inextricably intertwined with black economic advancement: the more black people are economically engaged and viable, the more peacefully each of us will sleep at night” (Madi 2016, p.xxxiv). There is some evidence that employees, women, and communities are benefiting somewhat from revised Broad-Based BEE, which seeks to expand participation beyond elites. However, the authors of these findings themselves acknowledge the lack of research on this issue as well as the many nuances of the policy (Patel & Graham 2012).

The rent seeking behavior and socialist ideology of many in government, Johnson argues, also led to a stagnation of private sector investment (and thus economic growth) during the Zuma period. The implications of this were masked during the economic boom of 2002-2008, but the crisis in 2009 led to a collapse of tax revenues. The rise of the EFF, promoting populist measures to weaken property rights and reduce private sector autonomy, threatens private investment in many ways. For example, bankers see political interference as their biggest risk. Moreover, uncertainty over water and land reform has led to a lack of investment in agriculture and persistent poverty in rural former Bantustans (even with their vast amounts of unused arable land) (Johnson 2015).

The bloated state bureaucracy and inflated public sector wage budgets also represented a problem for the economy in the Zuma era. In 2010, public sector wages were 43.6 percent higher than private sector ones on average, while unemployment was soaring. Citing social and political tensions, corruption and worsening governance, and an inability to deal with inequality, standards of living, and unemployment, Fitch followed other ratings agencies in downgrading South Africa’s credit rating to BBB in 2013, dissuading investment (Ibid; England 2013).

There are some differences between the Mbeki and Zuma administrations with regards to business. Mbeki set up formal business-government councils, bringing organization to the relationship between the public and private sector. The Zuma administration’s approach, as with other endeavors, was characterized as organic and chaotic (Calland 2013). Moreover, while not a new practice, Zuma greatly expanded the use of taking business delegations with him on foreign state visits in order to promote business relations abroad. While any company could request to accompany the president on state visits, and the companies included are often chosen on a first come first serve basis, host countries and South African missions play a role in determining which companies join.

Emerging from the unpopular Mbeki era of the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, the ANC declared a “hybrid development state” at the 2007 Polokwane conference, bringing together the European welfare state and the East Asian developmental state. This meant that “The continuous postponement of the socialist revolution [was] hence easily explained through the continuous incomplete development of capitalism” (Booysen 2011, p. 458).

 However, much like the Mbeki regime, while rhetoric was often aimed at a development state, neoliberal practices were followed. As Satgar (2012, p. 44) argues, “The ‘mode of authority’ of the Afro-neoliberal state [was] remade as it …retreated from and …re-regulated various aspects of state—market relations. In this process, the Afro-neoliberal state … remade national capitalism into a transnational capitalism. South Africa's production [was] driven by an externalized logic.” Thus, South Africa placed itself on growth path driven by foreign direct investment and comparative advantage. Even the parastatals, Satgar (2012, p. 52) argues, were “not operating in accordance with national priorities and a coordinated development strategy.”

Zuma created a National Planning Commission in 2010 that presented the long-term visions of the National Development Plan (NDP) in 2012 to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030 (National Planning Commission 2012a, 2012b). The plan came to cover all policy domains but offered more policy framework rather than policies themselves and was labeled by some in COSATU as recycled GEAR. It was another example of the ANC’s radical rhetoric followed by neoliberal action, showing compromise on the populist promises articulated in Zuma’s rise to power. Gradually, NDP narratives were quieted (Booysen 2015).

**Foreign and Trade Policy**

The ANC in exile had long had socialist sympathies and, sometimes below the surface, has still not aligned fully with the globalism and market competition. According to Johnson (2015, pp. 194-195), “One only had to talk to ANC MPs to realise that they saw the US and the West in general as the enemy. Under Mbeki this vision found expression in a series of initiatives”. Many of these initiatives were aimed at promoting an “African Renaissance” and a non-aligned movement. However, most of these initiatives collapsed with the overthrow of the Mbeki administration and, as he left power, the ANC still had no clear foreign trade policy agenda.

Under Zuma, an ambivalence to an anti-western stance and an insular focus on Africa (Soko 2015) largely continued to be a part of foreign policy. Landsberg (2014, p. 157) comments that the “second layer of the concentric circle [after national interest] under the Zuma administration’s emerging foreign policy [was] that of ‘continued prioritisation of the African continent’,” including being a player in conflict resolution and integration of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The non-alignment agenda is also illustrated, for example, with Zuma’s lobbying to join the “BRICS” countries. South Africa was admitted to the group in 2010, even if some deemed it an inappropriate fifth member. Zuma also sometimes displayed a pro-China rhetoric, wanting to move closer to them economically and politically and away from the Breton Woods institutions. However, as of yet, the BRICS have failed to provide a viable alternative for South Africa in terms of international financial institutions and any chance of aid remains very dependent on China (Johnson 2015). Some suggest that with this move towards relations with the BRIC countries, South Africa has moved away from the policies of Mandela, focused on promoting human rights and democracy towards an Asian model of decision-making. This has been reflected in UN voting patterns (Anthony, Tembe & Gull 2015).

Moreover, the ANC as a party released a document in 2015 again pushing a strong anti-US sentiment. While Zuma tried to walk back the strong language with the press, he also blamed western countries for the refugee crisis and seemingly sided with Assad and Russia on the Syria questions, again moving away from Western backed foreign policy and moving closer to less democratic states (Allison 2015). The denial of a visa to the Dali Lama, while allowing the President Al-Bashir of the Sudan, under indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and mass rape in Darfur, to visit South Africa (and allowing him to get away)[[6]](#footnote-6), also speaks to this trend of disregarding western led institutions (“Clueless and Immoral” 2015). The announcement of a formal withdrawal of South Africa from the ICC in October 2016 added to this concern (“South Africa to Withdrawl” 2016c). This is a decision which will continue to be debated in the new Ramaphosa government (du Plessis 2018).

Carrying over opinions from the Mbeki regime, Zuma, in an interview with a British newspaper in 2006, indicated that he had sympathy with Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and blamed the Zimbabwe problems on Britain. He defended the policy of “quiet diplomacy” with the country (Bevan 2007). However, overall Zuma’s policy “approach to the continent has been unstructured, haphazard and unpredictable” (Soko 2015). South Africa cannot necessarily claim to be the hegemon within the region that it often sees itself as. Its pivotal-ness for decision making on the continent and its economic dominance in the region are no longer a given (Black& Hornsby 2016).

**“Things Fall Apart”**

**The Politics of Patronage and Hints of Repression**

The extreme intermingling of the public sector with the private sector in South Africa also represented an avenue for corruption under Jacob Zuma. As Southall (2011, p. 624) states:

The merging of party and state under the ANC… provided for the increasing criminalization of authority and power, a tendency which has gained serious momentum under Jacob Zuma…. the formal operations of government [were] eroded by the private interests of individuals and businesses which trade on their political presence within, and connections with, the ANC and the government itself.

Paulus Zulu highlights several forms of corruption in South Africa, one being the abuse of supply chain management by manipulating state tender processes. A tender is advertised but either the selection process is manipulated or the selection criteria is written so as to benefit a company where public servants have interests. Public servant interest in a company bidding for a tender either comes in the form of being a contractor to that company in addition to a public servant, owning interests directly in the company or having expectation of future employment under the government contract. This can occur at all levels of government. As we have noted, this form of corruption was so prominent in Zuma’s South Africa that the term “tenderpreneurs” was coined by the press and commentators about the process (Zulu 2013).

Politicians also engage in corruption through demanding bribes in return for contacts, “creating” work for money laundering purposes, or embezzlement. The ANC acknowledged the problem of the connections between business interests and public servants. Along these lines, the General Secretary of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe, argued in 2009 that “The biggest threat to our movement is the intersection between business interests and holding public office” (“Move from Rhetoric” 2012, p. 10). A 2008 Auditor General’s Report indicated that over 2,000 government employees or their spouses were involved in government contracts, with a total value of approximately R600 million and 2,319 government officials had an interest in companies that had business with the government (Public Service Commission 2010).

BEE also represented an avenue for corruption and patronage and what is sometimes called the “tendertariat system” of preferential access to government contracts. Moeletsi Mbeki (2009) commented on the reparations ideology behind BEE stating that,

One of the most destructive consequences of the reparations ideology is the black elite's relationship with, and attitude to, the South African state. As the state is said to have been party to the disadvantaging of the PDIs [Previously Disadvantaged Individuals] it is therefore also perceived to owe them something. By way of reparations the state must therefore provide PDIs with high-paying jobs. By extension, the assets of the state are seen as fair game. The approach of the black elite to the state is, therefore, not that of using the state to serve the needs of the people but rather of using it, in the first instance, to advance the material interest of PDIs.

Because of this ideology, BEE has only benefited a small number of people in South Africa as well. Cronyism, in general, became a key feature of the transformation in South Africa from the beginning (Calland 2013).

**The Triumph of Corruption**

According to an important critic of the Zuma regime, “The ANC [was] being consumed by three demons – corruption, factionalism and a leadership without credibility.”[[7]](#footnote-7) The previous sections have discussed the last two (as well as Zuma’s personal corruption), but corruption within the government remained a major issue in South African under Zuma. Transparency International (2016) gave South Africa a score of 44 out of 100, ranking the country 61 out of 168 in their control of corruption in 2015. As Figure 18.3 displays, the perception of the control of corruption within the country in South Africa has declined fairly steadily over the past two decades both in terms of absolute score and compared to other countries (percentile rank).

Robert Southall (Southall 2011, pp. 617-626) states that, “In Zuma, powerful elements within the party saw a man who would not be overly troubled by ethical or legal concerns when it became time to cash in their cards for supporting him in his conjoined struggle for political survival and to stay out of jail.” While the Zuma administration initially made anti-corruption calls, many who were accused under Mbeki of corruption were seen as the “persecuted” alongside Zuma.

The Directorate of Social Operations (Scorpions), an organization, focused on high crimes and long criticized by many for their biased attention to the activities of Zuma, was disbanded a year after Polokwane. The replacement unit, The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI or Hawks) was also found to be unconstitutional for its lack of independence from the National Prosecuting Authority. Generally, corruption investigations have often failed to come to a conclusion and organizations tasked to counter corruption have lacked independence. The judiciary, meant to rule over cases of corruption, was also undermined by the threats to judges presiding over Zuma’s cases as well as the breech of executive influence on judicial appointments by the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) (Booysen 2011).

**Figure 18.3**[[8]](#footnote-8)

Moreover, the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie,” those who man the public service, benefited most of all from ANC rule. Increased interests in farming and business led to frantic rent seeking by many. With that, there was a vast expansion of the public sector in order for more well-placed people to access these benefits. While this type of corruption is not unique to South Africa, in comparison to other countries, South Africa’s bureaucratic bourgeoisie is highly unionized, they maintain a Marxist rhetoric, and, because South Africa is more economically developed than most other African countries, rent seeking opportunities are in higher supply. Therefore, the criminalization of the state is a growing concern in South Africa (Johnson 2015).Southall (2016 pp. 73-88) argues that,

The political ‘deployment’ of people to posts… translated into an extensive network of ANC patronage, the rise of ‘big men’ (and not a few women) across the state at all levels (national, provincial and local) who allocate[d] political goods to followers in return for their support. Further, with ‘political connectivity’ having become critical for individuals to access employment, opportunities and state resources, the boundaries between party and state have become comprehensively blurred.

The Zuma administration made some headway in promoting the Executive Ethics Codes, requiring disclosure of financial interests for cabinet members and their families, as well as the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) to unearth police, Department of Public Works, and local government corruption. However, these instances of corruption often went unpunished. Zuma controlled the SIU and therefore could direct efforts away from those whose support he needed (Booysen 2011). Zuma himself also neglected to disclose his own financial interests on time and his government refused to release the names of member of the National Executive who did not disclose their conflicts of interest.

The public money spent on Zuma private home, the ANC’s media election spending, or Winnie Mandela’s personal debts are another examples of a failure to properly sanction misuse of power. And while corruption is not purely a product of the Zuma administration, by allowing a person who many believed should be facing charges of corruption to rise to the highest office in the land, a precedent was set that is not easily overcome (Johnson 2015; Calland 2013). Southall (2016, p. 85) writes that, “Not only have patterns of patronage been further entrenched, but the independence, integrity and accountability of key state institutions have been systematically undermined as Zuma has fought continuing battles to save his own skin.”

A more general tendency for less accountability existed under Zuma. His efforts to avoid personal accountability in the courts aided his effort to avoid political accountability. The government passed a series of laws aimed at limiting public access to state information and right to protest, even undermining and ignoring the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000. More proactively, the government (unsuccessfully) attempted to pass a Protection of State Information Bill and merged intelligence structures in order to deal with political intelligence, among other things, possibly resulting in increased monitoring of journalist, trade unionists, and political activists (Ibid).

Corruption also remained endemic at provincial level during the Zuma administration and was central to the country’s reputation for corruption at the international level. Provincial political leaders seemed bent on accumulating state paid luxury transport and housing and extracting financial remuneration from their position (Kirk 2001). As long as they stay loyal to Zuma, party and government leaders at the provincial level were given a license to plunder. By 2010, virtually all of the provinces suffered from financial mismanagement, human resource problems, chronic staff shortages, fraud, corruption, and theft. Furthermore, ethnic identity played a role in the structure and motivations of corruption and patronage. The KwaZulu-Natal region was often at the center of patronage tactics and, in spite of the standard ANC factionalism, they remained loyal to the first Zulu president. Loyalty in the region was not only driven by tribalism but also by the tangible rewards the province receives because they were central to Zuma’s support (Johnson 2015).

The proliferation of corruption can be argued to be directly related to fact that the transition to a post-apartheid state remedied political disenfranchisement, while doing very little about entrenched economic disenfranchisement. Leaving corruption and patronage as the major avenue for historically (and well–placed) disadvantaged South Africans to accumulate wealth. Regardless, the corruption that has plagued South African governments and the ANC since apartheid has real and direct consequences for the people of South Africa as well. Tens of billions of dollars, allocated to public funds aimed at developing the economy and improving lives of South Africans, have disappeared (into ANC leader’s pockets) since 1994. In a country where inequality is on the rise, along with service delivery protest, the tendency to lower accountability (as seems to have been the case under Zuma) only serves to further entrench the social and political problems the government faces (Onishi & Gebrekidan 2018).

**Resurgence of Ethnic Identity**

Mandela had attempted to maintain a balance between the two major black ethnic groups, Zulu and Xhosa, in the ANC thus, supporting Zuma as the deputy president. However, with the ousting of Zuma in 2005, the presidency’s cabinet to some of its critics became overly Xhosa dominated and ethnicity returned as a central issue. Zuma capitalized upon these feelings, motivating the Zulu block of the party to support him in the 2009 elections. However, strong anti-Zuma sentiment existed in the Xhosa dominated regions of the Western and Eastern Cape and the multiethnic province of Gauteng. Both men who challenged Zuma, Sexwale and Mothanthe, were Sotho speakers. While ethnicity certainly played a role here, because of the history of the use of “tribalism” in the apartheid era, Bantustan policy, and the ANCs long struggle to repress ethnic identity, it was not often commented upon directly within the party.

The power centers changed in this period within the ANC as well. Since 2006, power moved away from provincial structures to regional structures within the ANC. This lessened the power of the Provincial Executive Committees within the ANC (Calland 2013). However, in many ways regional and local leaders were given license to do what they wanted as long as they stay loyal to Zuma, hence the new characterization of the ANC as a system of warlords. The emerging power of the Kwazulu-Natal region within the ANC was also critical for Zuma support and was reflective of the increasing predominance of the Zulu ethnic block in the ANC. Moreover, the nature of ANC support shifted from urban populations to an increasing dependence on the rural vote. With this, the ANC took on socially regressive features of the old Bantustan parties (Johnson 2015).

**The “Zuma Must Go” Movement**

Public outcry against Jacob Zuma gathered pace as his presidency continued. His faction changed since he pushed out Mbeki in 2007 and he lost much support on the left with the break down in relations with the ANCYL in 2010. Much like Zuma’s rise to power, this break down of relations on the left was not necessarily related to policy, but to a rivalry perceived by Zuma between him and the Youth League’s leadership (Cooper 2015).

Scandal surrounding the president also continued. In December 2015, in what many saw as a prime example of Zuma’s tendency for cronyism, Zuma fired well-respected finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene, after clashes with an ally of Zuma, and replaced him with David van Rooyen, a man with no experience in finance. After strong public criticism of this choice, Zuma reappointed a former minister to the post (Pravin Gordhan), resulting in the county having three different finance ministers within a week. This sent the economy into flux, hurting the currency and placing the country at risk of a credit downgrade, and made many question the president’s judgment (Onishi 2015a, 2016b).

Opposition also mounted and became more outspoken. According to *The Economist*, Zuma’s public approval for his performance dropped from 64 percent in 2011 to 36 percent in 2016 (“After Zuma, another Zuma?” 2016). Even amid pledges to better manage the economy and cut excessive government spending, President Zuma was unable to make it through his state of the nation address in early 2016 without disruption from opposition party members demanding his resignation (Onishi 2016b).

In 2016, the ANC was said to be “on the defense” (Mkentane 2017). In March 2016, in a case brought to court by ANC opposition, the EFF and DA, judges of South Africa’s constitutional court ruled that Jacob Zuma used his position to benefit himself and his family improperly and that he, “failed to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the land”[[9]](#footnote-9) Opposition anger came from the excessive public spending used on Zuma’s private home, Nkandla, and the lengths to which he went to avoid being held to account for his improper actions by going around the findings of the public protector (Gevisser 2016). Eventually, Zuma was ordered to pay back close to R8million for his security upgrades. Additionally, in April 2016, the Gauteng High Court ruled that the 783 corruption and fraud related charges dropped against Zuma in 2009 could be reviewed. This once again opened the door for Zuma to be prosecuted and face jail time.

The results of 2016 municipal elections, discussed in more detail in the next section, also raised many questions about the issue of Zuma staying in power and divided the ANC to an extent not seen earlier during the Zuma period. Those within the ANC were rightly worried about Zuma’s ability to garner ANC support in urban areas and some critics within the party wanted him to step down. Results of the local government election confirmed his unpopularity, with the ANC losing the three metro areas of capital city, Tshwane, Johannesburg, and Nelson Mandela Bay to opposition parties as well as dropping their overall percentage of the vote to 54 percent (Mkentane 2017).

In October 2016, the chief whip of the ANC, Jackson Mthembu, called for all ANC leadership, including Zuma, to step down. Mthembu compared Zuma’s administration to the apartheid state in that it was using state instruments to suppress people. Ranks continued to be broken within the ANC, notably in 2016 with deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa siding against Zuma and with the finance minister Gordhan standing up to Zuma and his alleged corrupt associate (he was later brought up on criminal charges) (“ANC Turmoil” 2016). The evidence of disunity within the ANC was evident in Zuma speech during events celebrating 105th anniversary of the ANC in January 2017. Acknowledging that the party had made mistakes, Zuma made a call for unity, an indication of how problematic the divisions within the party were becoming (“Jacob Zuma Calls” 2017).

However, all of these move and criticisms failed to push Zuma out, with him repeatedly surviving no-confidence votes, despite waves of protests to remove him. But after bitter party in-fighting, including a push for Zuma’s ex-wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, to be nominated (and, as many believed, continue patronage politics as usual), Cyril Ramaphosa was elected ANC party leader in December 2017. With this, the process to remove Zuma hastened. In light of the official change in party leadership, ANC strategists were able to bring their concern about party popularity as general election in 2019 crept closer to the forefront. As looming legal charges against Zuma resurfaced, the ANC was rightly concerned about their image to the public and a continuation of the downwards trends in 2014 and 2016 elections. Faced with certain defeat in a scheduled no-confidence vote in parliament, Jacob Zuma final resigned February 14, 2018 (Burke 2018; Campbell 2018; “Why Jacob Zuma” 2018; “South Africa: Secret” 2017).

**The Durability of South Africa’s Institutions and Processes**

**A State without a Core**

Thabo Mbeki personally crafted the institutions of the presidency and personnel deployment and positioned himself inside of it. This placed the presidency at the center of the management and coordination of government business. Mostly, this resulted in a centralization of power. It was not as much the centralization of power in the presidency, as the centralization of power away from the party that concerned many in the ANC. More so than dismantling the institutions, therefore, Zuma merely redeployed those within the institutions, cutting off Mbeki loyalists.

Under Zuma, the Presidency was downplayed in favor of party structures, but he largely kept up the apparatus and policies of the Mbeki administration. However, under the Zuma administration, the ANC and the state came to represent a more integrated center of power. As Booysen (2011, p. 418) states, “The Mbeki process-institutional imprint was undeniably large, and the Zuma administration merely adjusted the template.” However, the ANC infighting affected institutional capacity as well, with an impact on government and state operations due to the paralysis and turnover that redeployment caused. This lowered institutional capacity and distracted from governance (Booysen 2011). In the years after 1994, South African policy makers have not moved towards a devolved state at either the provincial or local levels. While the stated goal of the ANC was to be a less centralized, local governance models, the collapse of the center, and the negative patterns of command planning and mobilization encouraged the worst aspects of a soft, ineffective state system.

**State Failure?**

While the South African state, at a broad level, continues to function amid political and social crises, “There are elements of a failed state here” (Booysen 2015, p. 95). The perceptions of corruption in state institutions rose alongside declines in support for the president, core institutions, and the ANC. Protest over service delivery and dissatisfaction with government signaled the decreasing capacity of the state in South Africa. Dissatisfaction with governance in South Africa stems from the fact that while incomes and standards of living are rising generally in South Africa, so too are unemployment and inequality. The unmet expectations of those who are continually disadvantaged in the new South Africa, and can view those that were formally disadvantaged, sparks frustration (Booysen 2011).

 It is more a question of relative deprivation and insufficient, compromised, or mismanaged services, rather than no services in protest prone areas. Moreover, while protests were often aimed at the government, Booysen argues that they were more of a platform for airing grievances with the governing party (in this case the ANC), rather than a move against the party. People continued to vote for the ANC (albeit by smaller margins) in spite of increased protests. The ANC margins shrunk more in protest communities compared to non-protest communities between the 2009 and 2014 elections, but the opposition breakthroughs were still limited (Booysen 2015).

According to data from the Civic Protest Barometer, around 63 percent of protest between 2007 and 2014 could be categorized as service delivery protests (including grievances with municipal services and governance (52 percent) and non-municipal services (11 percent). Protests are on the increase, with an all-time high of 218 recorded protests in 2014. More than half have been in heavily urban areas, with Gauteng’s share of the protests rising more rapidly than anywhere else and the most protests taking place in Cape Town and then Johannesburg, eThekwini, Tshwane, and Ekurhuleni. Protests are also increasing violent, with less than half of protests being violent in 2007 and almost 80 percent being violent in 2014 (Powell, O’Donovan and De Visser 2015).

Over the last decade, protests have varied in focus, usually building on the focus of the previous protest, rather than replacing it. The protest period between 2004 and 2005 was focused mostly on local issues, even if they were in the context of national poverty and unemployment. In 2007, the focus became more national and provincial. The service and poverty protests in 2008, alternatively, heavily linked these issues to xenophobia. The post-election period of the Zuma administration in 2009-2010 saw more protest than the last three years of the Mbeki administration combined. These protests were aimed at holding the new administration to the promises made during the campaigns and were framed as promoting the issues as socio-economic rights of the citizens.

The Zuma administration appeared to be taking these community expectations into account with urgency. However, in 2011, protest reemerged in response to the failures of the Zuma administration to deliver on government promises. Moreover, in 2011, protests were focused on ANC internal issues and ANC selected candidate-revolts in local government elections. Related were the Youth League protests, after the disciplinary hearing of the leader, Julius Malema (Booysen 2011).

During the Zuma years, there was also a clear and increased hardening of views towards labor, both in government and the private sector, especially in the mining sector. This led to a split between labor and the ANC and represents an aspect of the current state failure. Botiveau argues that, “the continuing labour unrest represents the most significant internal crisis that has faced the ruling Tripartite Alliance composed of the ANC, COSATU, and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – since it came to power twenty years ago” (Botiveau 2014, pp. 128-137). Killing of civilians by the police has become quite common.

The massacre at Marikana on August 16, 2012 demonstrated in a tragic way the conflict between labor (and within labor – the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) tension with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)), the government/police, and the private sector (the mining company, Lomin Plc). The Labour Relations Act granted bargaining rights only to the majority union at a mine, in this case the NUM, of which many workers felt the union leaders were on the side of mining bosses. AMCU presented itself at that time as an alternative union that was apolitical and, it has been argued, they played a role in organizing the strikes against Lomin. Hence, the fatal protests were organized while unprotected by the majority union (Harvey 2015; Botiveau 2014). The events became international news and continued to shape the Zuma government throughout its tenure.

In comparison to other situations where the Zuma government attempted to avoid accountability, so appalling were the events at Marikana that the government had little option but to investigate in the open and release the findings publically. Thus, the Farlam Commission was established to examine the killings (Southall 2016). However, many, including the families of the 44 miners killed (34 of which were killed by police), feel that, while the commission did condemn the police, Lomin, and the NUM and AMCU, the commission was not able to hold those responsible to legal account. Furthermore, the commission did not hold the Executive to account for the pressure it put on the police to calm the matter (Harvey 2015).

South Africa’s current President, Cyril Ramaphosa (then a ANC heavyweight), for instance was accused of pressuring the police to deal with the strike, while also holding a financial interest in the mining company, Lomin, creating a major conflict of interest (Botiveau 2014). As Satgar (2012, pp. 33-62) states, “The Marikana massacre affirms…the willingness of ruling elites to go beyond market mechanisms to the point that state violence is utilised to maintain and manage a deeply globalised economy.”

Moreover, as University of Witwatersrand researchers explained, people in Marikana feared being interviewed about the event, indicating that many did not feel safe speaking in the post-Marikana environment. As one Marikana widow recounted, “I blame the mine, the police and the government because they are the ones who control this country” (Alexander, Lekgowa and Mmope 2013, p. 20). The incident portrayed to a large extent the feeling of worker violation, or at least non-protection, by the government. The Marikana Judicial Commission of Inquiry in many ways did not take into account the living conditions or account of those directly affected by the strike and its violent aftermath (Alexander, Lekgowa and Mmope 2013).

There has also been a decline in the performance of many of the 400 parastatals in South Africa. While the government has maintained that state owned enterprises are vital to the economic development of South Africa, critics say that they are merely mechanisms for BEE and affirmative action experiments (Madi 2016). Mostly, they remain dependent on the Treasury.No parastatal agency’s failures have more of a direct effect on the average South African than the electric supplier Eskom. As Southall (2016, p. 76) comments, “Eskom, the state-owned electricity supplier, is struggling desperately to keep the nation’s lights on.” Investment cuts led to a power crisis in 2008 and effected industrial production as well as consumers. Without raising the price of electricity, something the government has hesitated to do, Eskom remains unable to build new power stations to deal with rising demand. Political infighting has thus reigned supreme within the state-run company (Southall 2016). A report from the Southern African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) displays the political nature of many of these failures, beginning with the replacement of well-trained white engineers, managers, and technicians in the company and the buying of poor quality coal from small black-owned mines in the name of BEE. Moreover, ANC party ideology is said to have inserted itself into the business (Madi 2016).

Moreover, South African Airways has continued to run at a huge loss and the South African National Roads Agency faced public anger when it installed its expensive e-tolling system in Gauteng. The postal system failed to find a new role with the emergence of private couriers and internet technologies and faced strikes after cutting costs in 2014 (Southall 2016). It is mostly those parastatals that represent monopolies or dominate the sector they are in that have had the most problems, thereby amplifying the perception that most are in dire states. In addition to the agencies mentioned above, serious problems have been cited with the Passenger rail agency of South Africa (PRASA) and The Petroleum, Oil and Gas Corporate of South Africa (PetroSA) (Madi 2016). It is only examples such as Telkom that seem to have adapted fairly well by restructuring to deal with emerging technologies.

Finally, freedom of information and the presence of media oversight of government became an increasingly concerning topic under Zuma. Zuma’s attacks on the media came on top of an increasingly hostile relationship between the ANC and the South African press at a time when policy debates by the press were both lacking and vital, according to anti-apartheid journalist Max du Preez (2006, p. 14). As Booysen (2015, pp. 304-305) argues, “The ANC exercise[d] creeping control over information – in multiple forms… more sophisticated than outright coercion and high-level policing of the media… Some media houses [were] unabashedly pro-Zuma and ANC… Some purportedly independent community publications [were] under ANC influence or control.”

Moreover, there was also an attempt at “Zuma-fication” of the South African Broadcasting Company (SABC). Scandal surrounded the appointment of pro-Zuma Hlaudi Motsoeneng as Chief Operating Officer of the company, despite having no appropriate qualifications, and the issue was taken to the Public Protector and the High Court. The post-2014 election period also witnessed the emergence of a new Department of Communications which critics claimed would only pursue “good news” (Southll 2016).

**The Resilience of the Liberal Center**

**The Democratic Alliance, Liberalism**

**and Julius Malema’s EFF**

Opposition to the ANC gained traction on both the left and the right during the Zuma administration. While they still have their identity as the party of white interest to shed, (Paret 2016) similar to the ANC, the Democratic Alliance (DA) increasingly has had a wide range of interests to combine. Calland (2013, p. 227) argues that there is a “centrist, moderate heartbeat [to the DA],” but it is unclear whether this will survive. Moreover, the growing diversity of leadership in the DA has become a strength in that they have a broader political language to engage with the electorate. This could explain their ability to attract many black middle-class voters who have left the ANC because of either disgust with Zuma and corruption or the extreme left and right-wing fractions (Calland 2013). The DA lessened their focus on classic liberalism to some extent in an attempt to recruit black politicians and voters and continue to reinvent themselves as “more-ANC-than-the-original-ANC” for elections. The installment of Mmusi Maimane, the first black official opposition leader, to replace Helen Zille as party leader, reflected this push to recruit black members.

The DA saw a steady increase in voter turnout with 12 percent of the vote overall in the 2004 national elections, rising to 24 percent in the 2011 local elections and 22 percent in 2014 national elections (Electoral Commission of South Africa 2014). The increase in support came from the black-African vote, mainly in urban and middle class areas, but across all the country’s wards. They took control of the government in the city of Cape Town and the Western Cape provincial government but moved beyond the Cape as well in their influence. Because of this rise, as well as the rise of other opposition parties, “Parliament is no longer a secure rubber-stamping zone for the ANC but has become more of forum where opposition voices are asserted” (Booysen 2015, p. 194).

The EFF became an increasingly important opposition party on the left during the Zuma administration as well. The party has nationalist-populist support, high profile leadership, and strong media coverage. Through their presence and attempts to put ANC scandals and weaknesses at the top of the public agenda, they made Parliament an increasingly insecure zone for the ANC (Ibid). Emerging in July 2013 out of the expelled members of the ANCYL and led by the popular Julius Malama, they secured 6 percent in the 2014 elections (See election tables in following section). They have become a home for liberation struggle activists and, as Paret (2016, p. 423) articulates, “The EFF is also significant in that it bridges historical divisions within the liberation movement, drawing support from former ANC members, the Pan African Congress (PAC), September National Imbizo (SNI), the Black Consciousness Party, and the National Congress of Trade Unions (NACTU).”

Julius Malema, and his dismissal from the party, is the product of what author Achille Mbembe terms the “permanent carnival” that Zuma put in place within the ANC (Forde 2011, p. 143). In 2010, Zuma denounced Malema’s support of the Mugabe regime and his performance of a song, “shoot the farmer, shoot the boar,” declared to be hate speech by the courts. This, along with comments about the need for regime change in Botswana, provided the excuse the ANC needed to bring Malema and five of his ANCYL associated up on charges of disrepute and invoke ANC disciplinary procedure. The ANC suspended Malema and associates in November 2011 for 5 years. This suspension was later increased to expulsion from the ANC. These events created fractionalization within the ANCYL, leading to the emergence of the EFF in 2013 (Cooper 2015).

Nieftagodien points out, however, that the rise of the EFF was also a product of the political situation at the time, including the Marikana massacre, the miner’s strike, and conflicts between unions and the ANC, as well as the service delivery protest of the poor. This represented a first substantial left spilt from the ANC since 1994 and the most significant youth movement since the 1990s (Nieftagodien 2015). The EFF’s success has become a sign that the usefulness of the Tripartite alliance is waning and the “SACP’s days (are) all but over” (Johnson 2015, p. 99).

The new party associated itself with the victims of Marikana and was appealing as a grassroots party in light of the fact that, as Booysen explains, “Many saw the massacre of August 2012 as a symbol of how the ANC leadership had come to elevate itself above ordinary citizens’ conditions and concerns.” While the EFF may not actually be that much more left of center than the ANC, it grassroots mobilization approach may keep it more on the leftist track compared to the ANC (Booysen 2015, pp. 228, 233, 242).

Malema has criticized the Zuma administration for ignoring of the poor and used the EFF as a radical rallying point for empowering impoverished South African. The party reported 99 percent black membership (Gaffy 2016). Their popularity rose quickly, winning over a million votes in the 2014 elections, only nine months after their founding (Nieftagodien 2015). The EFF describes itself as a “Marxist-Leninist Fanonian organization,” believing that “it is only through a socialist revolution that we will end the suffering of our people” (Shivambu 2014, p. 166). Finding inspiration in places like Zimbabwe and Venezuela, land redistribution, nationalization of the mines, banks, and other strategic sectors (all without compensation), free education, healthcare, housing and sanitation, protected industrial development with a minimum wage, economic development with a move from reconciliation to justice, and building government capacity with open, accountable, and corrupt free government are among the foremost issues for the party (Shivambu 2014).

After his expulsion from the ANC, Malema and the EFF were very loud voices in the continual criticism of the president and calls for Zuma to step down. Malema called for accountability surrounding the Nkandla scandal and acknowledgment of the corrupt relationship between Zuma and the Gupta family. Additionally, Malema and the EFF severely disrupted Zuma’s state of the nation address two years in a row calling for the president’s resignation (Gaffy 2016).

Yet, Malema faced his own set of criticisms for his seemingly lavish lifestyle while preaching the merits of socialism and claiming to be a voice for the poor. He also faced charges of corruption and racketeering (Onishi 2015b). Moreover, the EFF faces criticism from the right as a fascist and attention seeking movement, and on the left, as a populist movement with undemocratic practices. The EFF sees itself as a working-class vanguard, but instead of emerging from the working class itself, the movement has a hierarchical and militarist structure a top of which sits Malema. The movement also claims a return to Mandela’s ANC roots, while ignoring the capitalist policies Mandela’s ANC put in place (Nieftagodien 2015). Finally, as Booysen (2015) argues, the biggest threat to the EFF is internal factioning and fracturing due to many factors such as internal contests, fights over the degree of radicalization, members returning to the ANC, politics taking dominance over the grassroots movement, or running off course in local election. Therefore, it remains to be seen how long the party and movement can maintain its upward trajectory.

**The Impact of Elections 2014 and 2016**

While the ANC still holds a special place with the people of South Africa as liberator, popular ridicule of the regime has continued to increase and the ANC is no longer seen as infallible. As opposition party options also increased on the both the left and the right, the ANCs image of occupying the left of the political spectrum has been challenged. Even with the tactic of revitalizing their image as liberator before every election, the ANC under Zuma experienced decline in every national and provincial election.

In the 2014 election, there were already many calls made to the public to vote for opposition parties or spoil ballot papers in order to teach the ANC a lesson (Melber 2014). According to Booysen (2015, p.163), “Election 2014 offered a microcosm of insights into how the ANC maintains power in South Africa… The ANC’s victory showed how skilled strategists in a well-resource campaign of long duration, well support[ed] by the state, and shrewd in the use of media and information can help build a victory of note in circumstances of attitudinal discontent and budding voter realignment.”

Relying on the steering of mass media and the celebrations surrounding the 20-year anniversary of democracy in South Africa, the ANC managed to hold on to 62 percent of the vote in the 2014 national elections (Electoral Commission of South Africa 2014). However, opposition parties gained ground in urban and metropolitan areas, even if the ANC maintained overwhelming support in rural areas. South Africa is increasingly urbanizing and urban voter turnout rates are rising, while rural turnout rates are declining, thus, this will continue to be a problem for the ANC (Booysen 2015).

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| **Table 18.2**[[10]](#footnote-10)2014 National Election Results by Party and Province (%) |
|   | **Total** | Eastern Cape | Free State | Gauteng | KwaZulu-Natal | Limpopo | Mpumalanga | North West | Northern Cape | Western Cape |
| **ANC** | 62.15 | 70.75 | 69.72 | 54.92 | 65.31 | 78.97 | 78.80 | 67.79 | 63.88 | 34.00 |
| **DA** | 22.23 | 15.87 | 16.24 | 28.52 | 13.35 | 6.60 | 10.05 | 12.60 | 23.36 | 57.26 |
| **EFF** | 6.35 | 3.78 | 7.89 | 10.26 | 1.97 | 10.27 | 6.15 | 12.53 | 5.06 | 2.32 |
| **IFP** | 2.40 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.82 | 10.17 | 0.06 | 0.30 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| **NFP** | 1.57 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.49 | 6.43 | 0.034 | 0.67 | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| **UDM** | 1.00 | 5.29 | 0.23 | 0.56 | 0.19 | 0.29 | 0.14 | 0.96 | 0.11 | 0.60 |

The election was different from previous elections as well due to the emergence of the EFF party led by the ANC-ousted Julius Malema (discussed in detail above). The ANC had never before had to deal with serious opposition on the left. Policy and governance issues as well as leadership scandals and community and labor protests all emerged as controversies in the election. Due to this, Zuma’s appearances as the key speaker at rallies were minimized and focus was instead on articulating the work of Mandela and mobilizing state resources in order to associate the party with government outreach and handouts from national and provincial departments (Booysen 2015).

However, while the ANC maintained control of government, evidence from exit polling in impoverished and protest affected urban townships around Gauteng indicated deepening competition. Protests in communities and workplaces *were* correlated with individual motivation for voting for opposition parties in the 2014 election (in contrast to Booysen’s arguments about the use of protests to hold the ANC to account rather than actually give support to another party). The unemployed and those in their late 20s to early 30s were more likely to vote EFF, although the party seems unpopular among women. The DA was most popular among colored and Indian/white/other race voters. The ANC held onto isiZulu speakers and the young and old. As well as those who benefited from social grants (particularly because the ANC used state resources in conjunction with campaigning). Therefore, race and access to benefits sponsored by the sitting government were pertinent factors in voting choice. But, 51 percent of ANC supporters also indicated they wanted Zuma to resign (Paret 2016).

The question also remained as to whether increased Zulu support could compensate for an overall loss of ANC support (Zulus now represent that largest faction of the ANC vote). The party lost 292,265 voters in Gauteng and 116,654 in Limpopo, but gained 274,579 voters in KwaZulu-Natal. The EFF overall registered 6.35 percent of the vote in the 2014 election. What the Gauteng vote of only 54.92 percent showed was that the ANC was losing the urban black middle-class vote, a trend which could continue with major consequences in the 2019 election (Johnson 2015).

Since 1994, support for the ANC has increased 33.3 percent in KwaZulu-Natal, while it has declined everywhere else except the Northern and Western Cape. However, tracking polls indicate that the ANC surge in KwaZulu-Natal has hit its peak, which does not bode well for the ANC in future elections. What the results also showed was that the ANC failed to attract the more than four million “born-free” voters in South Africa (Booysen 2015).[[11]](#footnote-11) Moreover, there has been a significant drop in voter turnout since 1994. One quarter of those registered to vote did not go to the polls in 2014. This means the ANC lost about 10 percent of its 2009 votes (Melber 2014).

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| **Table 18.3**[[12]](#footnote-12)2016 Municipal Election Results (Ward and Province) by Party and Province (%) |
|  | **Total**  | Eastern Cape | Free State | Gauteng | KwaZulu-Natal | Limpopo | Mpumalanga | North West | Northern Cape | Western Cape |
| **ANC** | 53.91 | 65.31 | 61.53 | 45.86 | 57.48 | 68.75 | 70.74 | 59.36 | 58.26 | 26.22 |
| **DA** | 26.9 | 19.7 | 20.38 | 37.21 | 15.16 | 8.06 | 12.93 | 15.02 | 24.85 | 63.33 |
| **EFF** | 8.19 | 5.81 | 9.69 | 11.36 | 3.46 | 16.73 | 9.39 | 15.54 | 8.6 | 2.81 |
| **IFP** | 4.25 | 0 | 0.04 | 0.96 | 18.39 | 0.02 | 0.27 | 0.03 | 0 | 0.01 |

There was a continuation of these trends in the August 2016 municipal elections. The ANC suffered defeats in the Western Cape and Eastern Cape provinces and lost its majorities in Johannesburg and the municipality that is home to the capital, Pretoria (See Table 18.3) (“South Africa: ANC” 2016a). Even in rural areas the ANC lost ground with their percentages down by 13.34 in Free State, 19 in the North West, 14.7 in Limpopo, and 7.67 in the Northern Cape. Continuing the downward trend of voter turnout, 42.28 percent of registered voters did not turn out for the election. Moreover, the non-voters were disproportionately the urban poor (Ryklief 2016).

The poor ANC showing in the 2016 local government elections caused further fragmentation within the parties with many calling for the resignation of Zuma and then members of the NEC (“South Africa: ANC” 2016a). The defeats in South Africa’s major cities also put pressure on the ANC alliance. As one reporter noted, “The vast ANC consensus was based on its anti-apartheid legacy, which is now wearing thin in the face of unswerving economic and social deprivation, and gross displays of greed and corruption from within the political elite and their corporate allies” (Ryklief 2016). No longer enjoying the safe monopoly on black voters that it once had, the ANC would be forced to yield to the pressure to relinquish support for the Zuma administration. Even in the wake of Zuma’s exit, the party remains divided in many ways and “increasing alienated from its tradition based in urban townships and among the rural poor” (Campbell 2018).

**Conclusion**

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The 2016 elections in South Africa showed that popular support for the ANC is decreasing, even as it holds on to a slim majority in the country. Moreover, the ANC no longer holds the same hegemonic power in Parliament or among the voters that it once did. The increasing popularity of the DA and the substantial left flanking of the ANC by the EFF displayed an increased dissatisfaction with the Zuma administration and Zuma’s ANC, eventually calling for his dismissal. In losing urban and middle class black voters on one side, and the disenchanted youth on the other, the ANC has found itself in a precarious position. The inability to deal with rising racial inequalities, poverty, and unemployment, even if wealth is rising on the whole, and the seemingly constant uncovering of corruption scandals continues to damage ANC’s public approval even with Zuma out of office. Noting the enormous job that President Ramaphosa has ahead of him, South Africa political expert Richard Calland remarked that the “[departure of Zuma from office would give Ramaphosa] the chance to rebuild government and the party at the same time”. Whether this will be enough to bring voters back, will be seen in the 2019 elections.

However, the rise of opposition on the left does not necessarily bring with it calls for liberal democracy. The EFF often has looked to populist but illiberal leaders for inspiration, taking the slogan “Mugabe, not Mandela, was the true liberator,” for the 2014 election (Johnson 2015, p. 224). Moreover, along with the decreased support for the ANC is a concerning trend in decreased participation in elections and increased spoilt ballot papers (Melber 2014). This could indicate an increasing jadedness among South Africans to the merits or power of liberal democracy.

As Booysen (Booysen 2015, p. 307) states, “The ANC battles with choices between multiparty liberal democracy and invoking the great nationalistic-patriotic struggle to override constitutionalism and rule of law – and dictating people’s judgments.” The party is in conflict between playing within the rules of the democratic institutions it helped to put in place and using the institutions of the state to benefit of the party itself and to make sure that it holds on to power and defends itself from criticism. The later was a priority of the Zuma administration. Whether an ANC, declining in electoral popularity, embraces multiparty democracy and works with opposition parties, or doubles down on efforts to control the state and public opinion remains to be seen under Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency. Noting the enormous job that President Ramaphosa has ahead of him, South Africa political expert Richard Calland remarked that the “[departure of Zuma from office would give Ramaphosa] the chance to rebuild government and the party at the same time” (Burke 2018). Whether this will be enough to bring voters back will be seen in the 2019 elections.

1. Southall (2011, pp. 617-626) reports that, “‘Zuma Inc.’, which in 2010 was reported as involving Zuma himself, along with 15 adult members of his family, own[s] some 134 company directorships or memberships of close corporations, at least 83 of which had been registered in the period after the ANC’s 52nd National Conference at Polokwane at which Zuma won the ANC leadership, and are linked to industries in which the state plays a key role.” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Hogan was seen as promoting improved HIV treatment and prevention compared to her predecessor who denounced ARVs as poison and promoted more herbal or traditional treatments (“South Africa Emerges” 2008; Specter 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The World Bank, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The World Bank 2016; Goldman 2013; Booysen 2015. Booysen explains that the differences in reported GINI numbers are probably due to the Presidency factoring social grants for the poorest populations into the equation. Without manipulation, the GINI coefficient for 2013 is 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The World Bank, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. While the ICC condemned South Africa inaction in arresting Al-Bashir in 2017, they stopped short of referring the government for punishment in the UN (Killingsworth 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Comment from Prince Mashele, analyst and co-author of “The Fall of the ANC: What Next?”, as told to AFP. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Statement made by Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng (Gevisser 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. “Born Free” are those born after 1990 (or for some 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2016 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)