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HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Mrs. Jellyby ... is a lady of very remarkable strength of character [who] is at present (until something else attracts her) devoted to the subject of Africa, with a view to the general cultivation of the coffee berry—and the natives—and the happy settlement, on the banks of the African Rivers, of our superabundant home population.

Charles Dickens, *Bleak House*

"Why," she said, "it's natural to the folks here to be indolent. . . . They just haven't got any hustle in them."

Agatha Christie, *Murder on the Orient Express*

Today it is hard to believe that, as late as 1947, the Union Jack still flew over more than a quarter of the human race.

Christopher Booker, *The Neophiliacs*

A Half Millennium of Imperialism

Those who write about foreign aid usually assume that it is a post–World War II development. Stephen Browne, for instance, argues that overseas assistance "grew out of several processes unfolding in the immediate postwar era, and is thus about half a century old."[1] The view here differs, assuming a much longer legacy.

Antecedents of foreign aid, prior to 1948, are important. The history of international assistance provides an understanding of definitions, purpose, assumptions, motivations, and methods of government-to-government, government-to-business sector, and business-to-business assistance as they evolved since the 1950s. As we will see, use of public resources for humanitarian relief began in the eighteenth century. Development funds for European colonies began between the two World Wars, and the United States, partially in response to the Nazi influence in the Western

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Hemisphere, began to assist its de facto Latin American dependencies in the 1930s.

European empires defined foreign aid after 1500. The Spanish and Portuguese, and later the French, British, and Dutch, followed by the Germans, Belgians, Italians, and even the Americans, all dabbled in empire building. All found themselves financially responsible for wide swaths of territory around the globe which would, though all tried to be parsimonious, drain the exchequer.

In this chapter we examine the legacy of 500 years of colonialism on international relief, foreign aid, and technical assistance. The terms "colonialism" and "imperialism" are so overused and abused by both dependency theorists on the left and religious nationalists on the right that it is easy to forget these real transnational systems of government were in place, though fading, when today's baby boomers were born. The year 1960—when many less developed countries (LDCs) became independent and Prime Minister Harold MacMillan made his "winds of change" speech in South Africa announcing the end of European dominance in Africa, and the imperial order—is significant.[2]

Several threads characterize imperial and financial history: state-to-state power relationships, state-to-nonstate concessional arrangements, and the evolution of humanitarian NGOs. Imperial systems required money, and in part, this money had to come from the "mother country." Though Europe has a history separate from the United States and other European settler countries, its history is an important factor in the evolution of the international system and US foreign aid policy, and overseas territories financial policy in the nineteenth and twentieth century.

Critics of foreign aid make three claims about the origins of foreign aid. First, development policies originated in the colonial systems that ruled most of the world prior to 1948. Second, foreign aid and international charity are an industry, as a component of organized religion and, ultimately, a commercial self-serving system. Third, no LDC ever transformed from starvation to food self-sufficiency through international charity. To the critics of international assistance, implications of this legacy were clear: "charity and development work are political [and] doing relief and development work in the context of oppression is counter-productive."[3] Promotion of development, if it is to transform systems, could well threaten political leaders of donor and recipient countries. Undertaking development work, moreover, can and to some should be a subversive activity! Thus, there are internal contradictions within the constructs of the international assistance system as it has evolved out of the last two

centuries. Those advocating foreign assistance have to grapple with that dilemma.

The Missionary Factor

Historical processes and values of foreign aid go back to religious and cultural expansion. In 1095, Pope Urban II called for a crusade of Christian nations to wrest Asia Minor and the Levant from the Muslim Arabs. The Crusades ended in 1291 with the expulsion of the West from the Near East. This was the first phase of a religious and imperial struggle that, to some, continued down to and through the twentieth century. Some suggest that the conflict continues today, pitting the West against East.[4]

Religious conversion motivated the Crusaders and their descendents—seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century missionaries. Furs, food, minerals, and trade goods were also targets of opportunity. Moreover, during the Crusades in the twelfth century, Europeans plundered Islamic holy sites and massacred Muslims in the name of God, pocketing the wealth they found.[5]

Conversion remained at the heart of the missionary influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America from the beginning. But by 1700, Christians also saw themselves as agents of virtue, and in the 1800s, they tried to save Africans from slavery, give Asians access to health and education, and encourage subsistence farmers to move away from subsistence agriculture to commerce.

"Humanistic service and the philosophy behind it," as Ian Smillie notes, "is neither new, nor does it emerge from a particular place and time."[6] Historically, there were several components to the religious origins of international assistance and eventually foreign aid, including, for example, tithing—the requirements for charity and religious involvement in the organization of schools and hospitals. The tithing issue has resurfaced symbolically in the foreign aid debate of the late 1990s, when UN administrators asked developed countries to tax themselves even more to assist poor nations.

Tithing goes back at least 3,000 years in Jewish law; and in the Middle Ages, European churches, using parishioners' donations, became the dispenser of charity, provided hospitals, schools, and general welfare. Islam prescribes charity as one of the five pillars of wisdom.

The mission became part of overseas expansion of Europe in the fifteenth century. Many European NGOs trace their origins to missionary organizations and antislavery movements. One of the oldest was Les Soeurs de la Congregation de Notre-Dame, founded in 1653.[7] Sulpicians

opened up North America for the French, and the Jesuits much of Asia. Overseas missions of the great European powers helped to define imperialism throughout its 400-year history.

Values and processes of international assistance, as opposed to subsidies and exchange, probably go back more than 300 years. Historically, for more than 200 years, voluntary organizations played a role in technical and humanitarian assistance. In both Europe and the United States, voluntary agencies date back to at least the 1830s and began to operate internationally by the 1850s. with one of the first efforts being that of Henry Dunant, founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the Battle of Solferino in the Austria-Sardinia War in 1859.

Voluntary organizations, antislavery societies, and religious groups defined the need and scope for international voluntary and social action groups from the late 1700s. In continental Europe, many NGOs became involved in international welfare efforts by the mid-nineteenth century, focusing on humanitarian and war relief, social reform, and charity.

Humanitarianism and relief efforts were important in time of war. Florence Nightingale, Mary Seacole, and Clara Barton led groups of volunteers to nurse the wounded in the Crimea and the American Civil War,[8] along Henry Dunant in the wake of the Crimean War. Dumont's ICRC, "dating from 1863, has through its disaster relief operations indirectly contributed to the spread of technical [and] administrative methods" of international assistance throughout the world.[9]

Impacts of Imperialism on International Assistance

More than in any other empire, the British Raj defined colonial rule and international development, eventually becoming a model for the United States.[10] In the British Empire—with Imperial India as the jewel in the British crown—international assistance began in the early 1800s, "with a handful of humanitarians driven by urges often half hidden from themselves."[11]

Abolitionist and missionary movements' efforts to end slavery were major forces in the imperial system. In much of Europe and North America, origins of international humanitarian involvement in Africa, the Americas, and the Indian Ocean reside in the antislavery movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Reformers in England founded the Anti-Slavery Society in 1787. This occurred as part of a set of missionary impulses that ironically would stimulate colonial expansion. European empires justified this as part of a "moral mission, with antislavery as its flagship."[12] To the abolitionist movement, ending the Atlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades rationalized European intervention in Africa and elsewhere.[13]

From the early 1800s, the missionary "of the old breed [was] an edu-
cator, not an evangelist, someone who had come to Africa to serve, to call
it home, and to die in the bush."[14] Moreover, colonial missionaries were a
nineteenth-century phenomenon with implications for the twentieth
century. The educator, medical missionary, and humanitarian worker
reflected the softer side of foreign policy.

Both the French and British sent missionaries to North America by the
end of the eighteenth century. At the end of the Victorian period,
European countries argued that colonialism was a beneficial process and
would help to bring a backward world into the light of the modern age.[15]
There were built-in contradictions to colonialism, however. The reality for
French critics was that colonizers saw this humanitarian romanticism as a
serious mental illness threatening the French empire.[16]

Throughout much of the 1800s, British colonial policy placated the
ever-increasing demands of liberal missionaries, cloaking their Victorian
social change policy in religion.[17] Imperial historians, pre–World War II,
often ascribed philanthropic motives to British colonialists in the 1800s.
Colonial administrators, in the 1800s Exeter Hall[18] tradition, "protected"
the African population from European settler greed and avarice.

The Exeter Hall liberals of the Aborigines Protection Society, Society for
the Extinction of the Slave Trade, and Civilization of Africa group
challenged customary traditions of slavery from the Cape to the Caribbean
and questioned the foundations for segregation and later apartheid in
South Africa that would define the British imperial custom by the
twentieth century. Nineteenth-century missionary schooling provided the
"oppressed" with the skills "to put forward a refined political argument in
English."[19]

Nineteenth-century missionary societies were the aid organizations of
the Victorian period, "the old ladies of Clapham."[20] However, as the
Economist puts it, looking backward, "The brave souls who spread the
Lord's word in the 19th century often found the natives uncomprehend-
ing and hostile."[21] These misunderstandings have their counterparts in
twentieth century international assistance.

By the mid-1800s, David Livingstone, as Niall Ferguson only partly
tongue in cheek points out, "had become a one-man NGO: the nineteenth
century's first medicin sans frontieres."[22] Albert Schweitzer and the
American medical missionary Dr. Tom Dooley played a similar role at the
dawn of the foreign aid era.[23]

There were more than 12,000 British missionaries in the field through-
out and beyond the British Empire in 1900, representing more than
360 missionary societies and other organizations. One hundred years later,
they and their counterparts from other counties were still there. At the

start of the twenty-first century, the "modern equivalents of the missionary societies campaigned earnestly against 'usages' in far-flung countries that they regard as barbaric: child labour, [human trafficking] and female circumcision."[24], Victorian NGOs were not that different from their twenty-first-century counterparts.

Europeans and North Americans traveling to Africa and elsewhere in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century often "were instilled with a sense of technological and moral superiority as they worked with indigenous peoples."[25] Some missionaries thought little of conversion but focused instead on health and education. Others used social services as bait to convert patients, students and their parents.

Missionaries often severely disturbed traditional social values in once socially and economically self-sufficient communities. This was so deftly demonstrated in Nigeria by Chinua Achebe in his acerbic novel, *Things Fall Apart*.[26] The wreckage of this community collapse resulted from incompatibility between stable, closely integrated folk cultures and an ever-changing machine civilization represented by the trader, soldier, and missionary.

The missionaries' goal was to save natives of the tropics, though many had few converts. Instead, missionaries taught by example, accepted as different by Christians, Moslems, Hindus, and Animists alike. In Africa, as in many other parts of the world, the seed of the European missionary had "not sprouted, and now it was decayed and moribund."[27]

Legacy of Colonialism

As late as 1947, Britain governed 25 percent of the world's population. Large chunks of Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean fell under the French, Dutch, and Belgians. The United States boasted a considerable de jure and de facto empire of its own. Along with the empire, many British settlers, missionaries, and colonial officials aspired to export their culture overseas.

Governance in the British and the other empires was only possible by co-opting the leadership of the oppressed. The key to creation of an Indian elite was British education. There were contradictions between metropolitan values and settlers and colonial officers in the field. Imperial beliefs at home had "paternalistic liberalism" embedded in them because the Victorians believed all men should have equal rights, regardless of skin color.

The Anglo-Indians and white settlers in Africa, however, "preferred a kind of apartheid, so that a tiny white minority could lord it over the mass of 'blacks.'"[28] Colonialism perpetuated under the great trading companies, the Dutch East Asia Company, British South Africa Company, and others that dominated colonial trade in the 1700s and 1800s. Settlers

managed trading companies throughout the empire, engaging in agriculture, trade, and manufacturing production in the process.

The Empire divided people in Britain and those in the colonies into a class-based pyramid, with the upper classes in both countries having more in common with each other than with fellow countrymen. Links between elites among the colonizers and colonized, characterized by a common love of court fashion, uniforms, medals, pith helmets and other claptrap, has been described by one apologist for imperialism as "ornamentalism."[29]

International relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as directed toward the non-Western world, reflected the strange logical convolutions of Social Darwinism.[30] Racial and cultural imperialism were never far from the surface in imperial views of the non-Western world. Historically, both European and American policymakers found it difficult to overcome a black-and-white view of Asia and Africa.[31]

This colonial view of non-Western society remained with many Westerners as they interacted with the developing world throughout the twentieth century. Frances FitzGerald, writing about Southeast Asia explains:

> Unable to understand the natives, the French colonialists of the nineteenth century, along with their American counterparts in the rest of Asia [as well as the rest of the non-Western world] invented all of the racist clichés that have passed down into the mythology of the American soldier: that Orientals [and Africans and Arabs] are lazy, dirty, untrustworthy, and ignorant of the value of human life.[32]

Until the 1950s, most British policymakers, as well as those in continental Europe and the United States, carried "the prevailing attitude toward subject peoples. . . . Regardless of their history, they were not considered 'ready' for self-rule until prepared for it under Western Tutelage."[33] The League of Nations confirmed this, in that most former colonial dependencies of Germany, because they were located in Africa, were considered second-class mandates and not worthy of preparation for independence.

Throughout the colonial period, attitudes toward people in Asia and Africa were reflected in such words as "nigger," "wogs," "kaffers," "slopeys," and "gooks."[34] And yet, at the heart of the imperial system, was a claim that colonial officials, settlers, traders, and missionaries all had a "civilizing mission" in the dependent territories. More than anything else, no doubt because of these racial attitudes, one of the patterns of aid administration inherited by developed countries from the colonial period was an unofficial policy of benign neglect.

Victorious powers after World War I, at least temporarily, found they administered much of Europe, more permanently the Middle East, virtually all of Africa, and the Pacific, topped up by de facto control of Asia, the rest of Africa, and especially Latin America. At the same time, many of the post–World War I leaders—and most clearly Woodrow Wilson—feared leaving a poisoned legacy unfulfilled nationalism in their wake.

The World War I Allies promoted changes throughout Central Europe and, to a lesser extent, parts of the Middle East (though not in Asia and Africa) where a "modern ethnic nationalism superimposed itself on an older, different world" of land-based imperialism.[35] Ethnic and religious nationalism were legacies of the imperial world of the 1800s, which would plague the twenty-first century.

In their memoirs, whites in sub-Saharan Africa often perpetuated an image of the "dark continent" and a "heart of darkness," suggesting gloom and alienation. In the view of some imperialists and missionaries, Africa symbolized the dark passions of the human soul of sinners in contrast with the efficiency and technology produced by rational and scientifically advanced Europe.

Colonialism's image etched itself in the memory of the generation that grew prior to World War II, and because "aloneness is the human condition, a stark example of the perfect stranger was the white man in black Africa, alone at his post, odd man out."[36] African savagery represented victory of passion over reason. In turn, indigenous peoples absorbed this hostility and returned it. The words "faranji" or "Aferingi," meaning the foreigner, describe the alien nature of the European presence in North Africa and the Middle East.[37]

The colonial model of foreign intervention initially concerned the notion of an "external protectorate." For their own well-being, indigenous peoples were barred from managing their own affairs to protect them from themselves and their neighbors. Dependence, and a sense of inadequacy, resulted from colonialism but was not its cause. In the end, colonial intervention destroyed and distorted indigenous institutions and left many colonized societies out of the mainstream in ideas, technology, and economic progress. It then became a challenge for foreign aid and technical assistance to put colonized peoples back into the mainstream.

"Cultural comfort," representing this mainstream, being culturally safe for language, custom, and dress—thus having indigenous peoples adopt Western behavior—was important both to missionaries and other Western officials, including aid workers. African women in Victorian dress and men in dark suits and ties (the Worried Oriental Gentlemen of memoirs and aspersion) in the tropics became symbols of Westernization. The first line of defense of the colonized was to change the dress, lighten the skin, or in some

way change the physical appearance to become more like the colonial model. Such an image of cultural comfort fits well for aid workers, technical assistance specialists, and even in some cases Peace Corps volunteers.

From the beginning Europeans tended to interact with those they could trust, who were honest and trustworthy, and above all who could speak English or the other colonial languages.[38] What began as a search for cultural comfort ended by spreading European languages, particularly English, and Christianity. Resentment within administrative and settler communities was also a legacy of colonialism. Those in expatriate and settler communities who believed in empire saw it collapse first with horror, then with apathy.

In the immediate post-colonial period, Europeans and the United States looked to wield influence in their former colonies, neocolonies and protectorates. Many ex-colonial officers went into international development work after 1960. North-South relationships became institutionalized in the post-war period, and at the end of the colonial period, these institutions determined the role of the colonized and their relationship with the colonizer. Colonial society tended to be a managing/controlling law-and-order society and worked hard to give that appearance.

Much of the admitted stereotypes of Westerners, fitting into theories of modernization and development, have dominated foreign aid during the past sixty years. In the territorial unit, the colony had a limited recruiting ground from which to draw administrators. Those officials chosen to maintain the system contributed more vigor to its defense and often transformed themselves into foreign aid administrators when colonialism finally ended, reinforcing long-standing institutionalized North-South relationships.

Impacts of Imperialism on International Assistance

Origins of empire lay not in missionary or colonial impulses alone. The intersection of economic and commercial motives, political imperatives, and international relations combined to create the British and European empires—and Japanese and American empires—in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This is not the place to review that history. Suffice it to say that in the British and other empires seeds were sewn for theories of modernization and developmentalism that would raise international assistance to national policy by the late 1930s.

International assistance to ex-colonies or neocolonies was a by-product of colonialism. Foreign aid policy and processes, including voluntary NGOs, was a product of the systems of empire that governed the non-Western world prior to 1960. "The Victorians had . . . elevated aspirations," according to Niall Ferguson, "and they dreamt not just of

ruling the world, but of redeeming it. . . . Like NGOs today, Victorian missionaries believed they knew what was best for Africa."[39] The reality of superiority and inferiority, defined during the colonial period, remains prevalent today.

From the 1850s, it was common practice among Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, and even the United States to transfer money on concessionary terms to their colonies, protectorates, and dependencies. By the 1920s, the British and French used public funds for expansion of infrastructure, development of health services, and funding of education in their colonies. Treasury departments in home countries, of course, often resisted concessions because they drained the bank. Terms used to describe this process prior to 1940 were "infant colony subsidies," "grants-in-aid," and "budget supplements." As revealed in the next chapter, the United States developed similar patterns of financial intervention in its spheres of influence, particularly in Central and South America.

International assistance in part evolved out of de facto and de jure colonialism. Foreign aid and technical assistance schemes had antecedents in British, French, and other colonial rule. The British developed their Colonial Development and Welfare Fund in 1929, and France had similar programs in its Asian and African Empires. Even smaller and less developed colonial systems—Belgium, Holland, and Portugal—gave lip service to developmentalism in their colonial areas. The United States, as we will see Chapter 4, had foreign aid and technical assistance programs for its de jure and de facto colonies by the 1920s.

From the beginning, colonialism's goal was one of modernization and Westernization, because, according to one early advocate of development, in traditional society all desire for modernization was lacking. Traditional, underdeveloped societies were rural and poor. Developed societies were urban, industrial, and rich. Barbara Ward described what she called the positive elements of imperialism, "colonial rule abolished local wars and . . . modern medical science and modern sanitation began to save babies and lengthen life."[40] For Ward the next step was a Keynesian approach to economic development in the non-Western world.[41]

Institutionally, there was nothing apart from a few river commissions that could properly be called international administration until after the 1850s. Prior to World War I, however, some fifty public international organizations carried out development administration in many fields.[42] Organizations required the services of only a few hundred people and cost relatively little. Costs and personnel involved in international activity multiplied several-fold between the two world wars. Much of this

international administration was indirect, however, funneled through colonial systems and, after 1918, the League of Nations mandates established after the War.

Conclusion

Government and administration "in most of the countries of Asia and Africa and more distantly, Latin America, [were] conditioned by their colonial pasts."[43] There was seldom significant delegation of authority or significant local self-government.

Colonialism defined authority in most of what we call the developing world until well after the 1960s and much of the practice of foreign aid and technical assistance grew out of that heritage. Understanding that legacy is important in any attempt to define the mixed legacy and the moral ambiguities that frame international assistance after 1960. These values remain an important factor in influencing foreign aid.

It is our contention that many of the characteristics of the colonial period—in terms of administration, development policy and normative values, some for better, many for worse—carried over to both bilateral and multilateral aid programs.

Our book does not argue that a history of colonialism and imperialism is the only driver of aid, security, and diplomacy in the twenty-first century. Much would occur in the evolution of foreign aid policy that was not a product of that history. Yet, to reiterate: three components of international assistance—economic exchange, commercial development, and religion-based humanitarian impulses—converged in the 1850s as the European powers, along with Japan and the United States, created worldwide empires. To what extent this convergence continues to define world governance is a focal point here.

Also at issue is to what extent there are similarities between Britain in the early twentieth century and the United States since 2000. In the latter case, the United States was overloaded with misused foreign aid and was made a pawn of its "attempts to secure that indefinable and ultimately unattainable thing [called] 'national security.'"[44] We will revisit this issue at various points in this book.

Notes

1. Stephen Browne, *Beyond Aid: From Patronage to Partnership* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 1999).

2. Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1994), pp. 615–616.

3. Michael Maren, *The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity* (New York: Free Press, 1997), p. 88.

4. See Anthony Nutting, *The Arabs: A Narrative History from Mohammed to the Present* (New York: Mentor Books, 1965), pp. 171–180.

5. For an interesting perspective see Paul Theroux, *Dark Star Safari: Overland from Cairo to Capetown* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2003), p. 104. See also Robert Fisk, *The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East* (New York: Knopf, 2005).

6. Ian Smillie, *The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire: Non-Profit Organizations and International Development* (London: IT Publications, 1995), pp. 22–23.

7. Sisters of the Congregation of Notre Dame.

8. A.N. Wilson, *The Victorians* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003).

9. Walter R. Sharp, *International Technical Assistance* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1952), p. 8.

10. Niall Ferguson makes this argument. See his *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

11. Deborah Scroggins, *Emma's War: An Aid Worker, A Warlord, Radical Islam, and the Politics of Oil—A True Story of Love and Death in the Sudan* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002), p. 18.

12. Ibid., p. 45.

13. Michela Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo* (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), p. 39.

14. Theroux, *Dark Star Safari*, p. 288.

15. Joseph N. Weatherby, *The Other World: Issues and Politics of the Developing World* (New York: Longman, 2000), p. 23.

16. Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), p. 21.

17. The Victorian mission saw nineteenth-century Victorian England as an ideal model for a civilized society for Asia and Africa. See A. N. Wilson's wonderful book, *The Victorians*.

18. Exeter Hall was the celebrated gathering place in the Strand for the missionary and humanitarian societies that represented liberal thought in Britain. See for example, C. W. de Kiewiet, *The Imperial Factor in South Africa: A Study in Politics and Economics* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1937).

19. See also Antjie Krog, *Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa* (New York: Random

House-Times Books, 1998), pp. 46–47. Also personal communication. Letter from Professor D. A. Kotze, then Professor, Department of Development Administration, University of South Africa, to one of the authors (Picard), June 28, 1985.

20. Clapham was the area in London where the various antislavery movements were located.

21. "The Missionaries' Position," *The Economist,* (April 24, 1993), p. 36.

22. Ferguson, *Empire,* p. 131.

23. Schweitzer established a hospital in Gabon, while Dooley worked in Vietnam.

24. Ferguson, *Empire,* p. 131.

25. David E. Apter, *Ghana in Transition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. xv. Paul Theroux in *The Mosquito Coast* (New York: Penguin, 1982) vividly captures this process.

26. Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart* (London: Heineman, 1962).

27. Theroux, *Dark Star Safari,* p. 320.

28. Ferguson, *Empire,* p. 204.

29. David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* (Oxford, UK, and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

30. Richard Hofstadter discusses the links between Social Darwinism and American imperialism in his *Social Darwinism and American Thought* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 170–200.

31. See Wu Xinbo, "To Be an Enlightened Superpower," in *What Does the World Want from America? International Perspectives on U.S. Foreign Policy* Alexander T. J. Lennon, ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), p. 4.

32. Frances FitzGerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam* (New York: Vintage, 1972), p. 371.

33. Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 235.

34. Ibid., p. 241.

35. Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 240.

36. Theroux, *Dark Star Safari.* See his prescient "Tarzan Is an Expatriate," republished in Paul Theroux, *Sunrise with Seamonsters: A Paul Theroux Reader* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985).

37. William Easterly, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good* (New York: The Penguin Group, 2006).

38. Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, John Clarke Adams, *The Overseas Americans* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 34.

39. Ibid., p. 116.

40. Barbara Ward, *The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), p. 42.

41. Ibid.

42. Quincy Wright, "Forward," in William C. Rogers, *International Administration: A Bibliography* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1945), p. iii.

43. Edward W. Weidner, *Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1964), p. 7.

44. Caleb Carr, "William Pitt the Elder," in *What If? America—Eminent Historians Imagine What Might Have Been,* ed. Robert Cowley (London: Pan Books, 2005)