

CHAPTER 12

CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEVELOPMENT

Henry Veltmeyer

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

- ◆ To be able to identify the agencies of change in the process of local- or community-based development.
- ◆ To understand the role of civil society organizations in the process of alleviating poverty and empowering the poor to act for themselves.

The idea of **civil society** has achieved prominence over the past two decades in connection with successive waves of democratization that began in Latin America and Eastern Europe and spread across the developing world. A principal feature of this democratization was not so much the restoration of the rule of law as the active engagement of people in the public policy formulation process and in the responsibility of governance. This democratization process paralleled a similar process at the economic level (turning over the responsibility for economic development to the private sector and the market, and a reduced role for governments with international co-operation and social participation). In this context of political and economic development, civil society has been widely seen as an agent for limiting authoritarian government, empowering popular movements, reducing the atomizing and unsettling effects of market forces, enforcing political accountability, and improving the quality and inclusiveness of governance, a term that denotes a particular set of interactions between civil society and governments.¹

Reconsideration of the limits of government intervention in economic affairs and a related neoliberal

attack on the welfare—and developmental—state (see Chapter 7) also have led to an increased awareness of the potential role of civic organizations in the provision of public goods and social services, either separately or in a synergistic relationship with state institutions. Indeed, it is possible to view the turn towards civil society in the provision of hitherto public goods and services as a form of *privatization*: turning over the economy to the ‘private sector’ (profit-oriented or capitalist enterprises) and responsibility for economic and political development to ‘civil society’.²

Recourse to the notion of civil society, and the construction of a civil society *discourse*, takes different forms. There are three different traditions in the use of the term, each associated with a particular conception of civil society. One of these, associated with a mainstream form of political science and economics in which politics and economics are treated as analytically distinct systems, can be labelled *liberal*.³

The liberal tradition is fundamentally concerned with ‘political development’—establishing a participatory form of politics and ‘good’, i.e., ‘democratic’, governance. Civil society, from this view, is rooted in the Anglo-American tradition of liberal democratic

theory in which civic institutions and political activity are essential components of 'political society' based on the principles of citizenship, rights, democratic representation, and the rule of law. On the ideological spectrum (left, centre, right), liberals see civil society as a countervailing force against an unresponsive, corrupt state and exploitative corporations that disregard environmental issues and human rights abuses (Kamat, 2003).

The second tradition, rooted in a more sociological view of the state-society relation and the ideas of Antonio Gramsci, is similarly concerned with the form of politics but sees civil society as a repository of popular resistance to government policies and the basis of a 'counter-hegemonic' bloc of social forces engaged in a process of contesting state and other forms of class power. It is based on a radical ideology—a shared belief in the need for radical change. Civil society is thus seen as a repository of the forces of resistance and opposition that can be mobilized into a counter-hegemonic bloc.

The third tradition is associated with international co-operation for development. In this tradition, civil society is viewed as an array of social organizations representing 'stakeholders' in a process of economic development, a strategic partner in the war against global poverty waged by the World Bank and other international development associations and agencies. Here, civil society is viewed as an agency for a *participatory* and *empowering* form of *development*. Proponents share a liberal ideology in terms of seeing in civil society the beneficial effects of globalization for democracy and economic progress. On the other hand, conservatives who hold this view of civil society see non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as 'false saviours of international development' (ibid.). The entire project of co-operation for international development (technical and financial assistance to poor developing countries) is seen as misbegotten, more likely to result in a stifling of initiative than to work as a catalyst for improvement in the physical quality of people's lives.

The purpose of this chapter is to deconstruct this civil society discourse. First, we review the origins and contemporary uses of the term. Then we turn towards the development dynamics associated with the contemporary discourse on civil society. This discourse is of two types, one associated with the dynamics of political development and the search for 'democratic

governance', the other with the search for alternative forms of development initiated from below and within 'civil society'—forms that are socially inclusive, equitable, participatory, and empowering. The chapter ends with a brief review of the role of different types of civil society organizations in the development process. The central focus of this review is on non-governmental organizations and **social movements**, elements of civil society conceptualized as agencies of anti-globalization—repositories of the forces of resistance against global capitalism in its current neoliberal form.

CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ITINERARY OF A CONCEPT

Definitions of 'civil society' are bewilderingly diverse, rooted in alternative social and political philosophies that are hard to reconcile. However, for our purpose it is important to come to some agreement about what it means in the context of current development discourse.

One definition is that of an intermediate realm between the state and the family, populated by organized groups or associations that have some autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to advance their interests, values, or identities. This definition excludes most highly informal associations of the personal network kind as well as families, since they operate in the private sphere. Civil society, by contrast, operates in the public, albeit non-state, sphere. But some kinship organizations above the level of the nuclear or extended family may constitute elements of civil society. Civil society, by this definition, generally excludes profit-oriented or capitalist corporations, although several caveats are in order. Certain types of firms, such as the media and non-profit enterprises, are often important elements of civil society. And when corporations and their CEOs combine to form business associations, these associations can also be regarded as part of civil society.

Civil society includes all manner of social organizations ranging between the family and the state—the state being an apparatus composed of institutions such as governments, the judiciary, the legislature, the armed forces, and any other institution used to determine 'who gets what'. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and other

such agencies of international development adopted the term 'civil society' in their discourse precisely because it was so inclusive, containing within its scope the 'private sector' (basically, capitalist or multinational corporations governed by the logic of capital accumulation or profit-making). The incorporation of the 'private sector' into the development process has been a fundamental aim of these international organizations since 1989 (Mitlin, 1998).

Another consideration is that civil society or non-governmental organizations are generally issue-oriented in their actions rather than class-based, raising questions about whether or not to include social movements. *Social movements* are generally concerned with disputing state power—with bringing about a change in government policies or, like political parties, in governments themselves (albeit in a different way—mobilizing the forces of opposition and resistance rather than participating in elections). In contrast to social movements, civil society in the form of NGOs (or in the voluntary sector) is generally concerned with more specific interest group issues such as the environment, the empowerment of women, human rights, development education, disaster and other forms of relief or emergency aid, or poverty alleviation. Some of these issues also are targeted by some social movements, which is to say that it is possible to mobilize forces for change around these issues. The distinction we make between social movements and non-governmental organizations applies to the development rather than the political sphere. In this context NGOs are fundamentally concerned with bringing about improvement in socio-economic conditions of the population by means of a change in policy or institutional reform. Social movements, in contrast, tend to have a more confrontational approach in challenging directly the holders and agencies of economic and political power.

The type of organization encompassed by 'civil society' is not the only issue. Social organizations generally take one of three forms: (1) *associations* or *associational* (sharing an organizational objective); (2) *communities* or *community-based* (held together by social bonds and a culture of solidarity, a shared sense of belonging); and (3) *interest groups* or *class-based organizations* (defined by a pursuit of economic interest or political power), such as capitalist enterprises, multinational corporations within the 'private sector' of the economy, and labour unions.

The size and strength of 'civil society' in this organizational context are usually measured in terms of the number of 'active' formally constituted social organizations, the density of the resulting social fabric, and the networks that bring people together to act collectively to achieve or in pursuit of their shared goals and common objectives. A major factor here is the degree to which people rely on governments as opposed to their own social organizations and networks to achieve their goals and objectives. Thus, from the 1940s to the 1970s, with the growth of the welfare and development state (in which governments assumed primary responsibility for both welfare and development), many societies increased their reliance on the government, with a corresponding weakening of 'civil society'. In the 1980s, in a new context involving the insertion of many countries into the system of global capitalism (see discussion below on this 'seismic shift'), there was a general retreat of the state, resulting in a corresponding growth and strengthening of civil society.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN CONTEXT

Social change can be analyzed in terms of three dynamic factors: *agency* (the strategies pursued and actions taken by diverse organizations and individuals), *structure* (the institutionalized practices that shape or limit action), and *context* (the specific 'situation' or historical conjuncture of objectively given and subjectively experienced 'conditions' of social or political action). In regard to the emergence, growth, and strengthening of civil society in the 1980s, at least five contextual elements, each taking the form of a variable but persistent trend, can be analyzed in terms of three critical dimensions: (1) the actions or policies that provide the driving forces of social change; (2) the social, economic, and political impacts of these actions and policies; and (3) the strategic and political responses to these impacts by different social groups and classes according to their location in the social structure and the broader system of global capitalism.

- *Globalization*. The integration of countries across the world into a new world order in which the forces of economic and political 'freedom' are allowed to flourish has had an ambiguous impact on civil society organizations. On the one hand,

the invasive pressures of global markets often compromise their autonomy or sovereignty. On the other, globalization—particularly in terms of freer flows of information and communication across national boundaries—has fostered the spread of ‘transnational communities’ (see also Chapters 6 and 23) and an incipient global civil society.

- **Democratization.** The spread of democracy, as an idea and value, has in recent years changed the political and institutional environment in which civil society organizations operate (see Chapter 16). In some cases (see Box 12.1), civil society has been the locus of active opposition to authoritarian governments, providing a breeding ground for alternative, participatory, or ‘democratic’ forms of political organization—and governance. In other cases, civil society is marginalized or weakened through state repression or withdrawal from active engagement in politics. Civil society in this context may constitute a locus in which civic values and norms of democratic engagement are nurtured, although greater political freedom can be exploited to advance narrow, self-interested agendas that can exacerbate political conflict and undermine good governance.⁴
- **Privatization.** The rapid economic growth experienced by many developing countries from the 1950s onwards was fuelled in large measure by growth of the public sector and a policy of nationalization—taking over from the ‘private sector’ (the multinational corporations, that is) and buying out firms in the strategic sectors of the economy (oil production, for example). In the 1980s, this policy was reversed with a privatization policy: turning over state firms to private enterprise under the guise of a presumed ‘efficiency’. This new policy allowed capitalist corporations—often multinational in form and foreign-owned—to acquire these enterprises at bargain-basement prices, greatly enriching their new owners (see Chapter 11).
- **Decentralization.** Until 1980 or so, many political scientists (and economists, for that matter) in both liberal and conservative traditions subscribed to the notion that democracy was not necessarily conducive to economic development—that authoritarianism provided a better agency (see Chapter 16). In the 1980s,

however, there was a sea change in this idea, leading to widespread calls for democracy and good governance in the form of a more participatory form of politics and development (see Chapter 9). To establish an appropriate institutional framework for these developments (also to reduce fiscal pressures on governments), the World Bank argued for the need for a policy of administrative decentralization, with a partnership approach to both local governments and civil society (Rondinelli et al., 1989; World Bank, 2004b).

- **Economic liberalization.** The improvement in socio-economic conditions in the 1950s and 1960s was based on the active agency of governments in redistributing market-generated wealth and incomes for the common benefit. In the developing countries of the Global South, it was also based on protectionism, a policy designed to protect fledgling industries from the forces of the world market, to give domestic companies a chance to grow by placing restrictions on foreign investment and the operations of multinational corporations in their countries. Under the ‘new economic model’ of free-market capitalism and **neoliberal globalization**, this policy was reversed.

Liberalization has had a number of contradictory consequences for civil society. In some contexts, it weakened predatory state structures and limited the scope for ‘rent seeking behaviour’ by political and bureaucratic elites. Some groups are better placed than others to exploit the opportunities created by liberalization for advancing their own economic agendas, and organizations representing their interests can wield considerable influence over decision-making. The removal of price controls and other restrictions on economic activity are often accompanied by growth of the informal economy and the emergence of a dense network of groups and associations geared towards the advancement of collective economic interests. The removal of safety nets and reduction in government welfare spending give rise to a proliferation of self-help groups and development associations with a mandate to provide relief and services to people marginalized or impoverished by market reforms.

CURRENT EVENTS BOX 12.1

APPO: POPULAR ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE OF OAXACA

All the Power to the People (website logo).
When a woman advances there is no man who will retreat (on a placard in a political march).

Oaxaca is the name both of a state in Mexico and of that state’s capital city. APPO (the Spanish acronym for an organizing body of diverse protest groups) is a coalition of organized social and political groups. APPO is nothing if not popular, bringing together broad sectors of the community and civil society organizations, including COMO, an organization of women—the Women of Oaxaca the First of August—formed in the wake of state repression of the teachers’ struggle. With the march of COMO on the radio and TV broadcasting facilities, the struggle was elevated to an entirely different level, broadened into a social movement for democratic transformation, as John Gibling (2006) reported:

On Tuesday, August 1, about 3,000 women marched through downtown Oaxaca City, banging metal pots and pans in an oddly melodious cacophony that served as the background for their chants and the ousting of governor Ulises Ruiz.

... and gathered in the central town square—where teachers and other protesters have been camping out since May 22—the women decided to take over the statewide television and radio company. . . . Some women walked, others hopped on buses. Thousands of them met at CORTV’s broadcasting headquarters outside the colonial town center, where they walked right in and took it over. Not a shot was fired. Not a punch was thrown. While the station’s director had fled, the women gathered the national cameras and demanded that they look in the rearview mirror at the broadcast outside the building, about 20 women and a handful of men with bats, ordered the

entrance. They would not let any men enter the building (with a few exceptions of well-known reporters who were escorted in by groups of women). When reporters from the national television station Televisa arrived on the scene, the men and women gathered at the gates marched them right back to their cars shouting: ‘Get them out!’ and ‘Liars!’ . . .

It took several hours of negotiation before the women were able to fix a live broadcast, during which—still clutching their pots and wooden spoons, dressed in aprons and work clothes—they set out to correct the mistakes in the station’s reporting on the violent June 14 attempt by state police to lift the teachers’ encampment and demand on the air that the press ‘tell the truth’ about the social movement that is taking over Oaxaca.

The women are all part of the Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxaca, or APPO, an organizing body that was created in the June 14 police raid with the objective of concentrating local residents’ outrage over the violence into the single demand that the governor step down, or get the book and the TV station take-over was only the latest in a series of in-your-face civil resistance tactics aimed at shutting down the state government.

On June 16, just two days after the raid, some 500,000 people marched to demand the governor’s resignation. . . . APPO also organized a boycott of the state’s largest tourist event, the Guelaguetza, and convoked an alternative, and free of charge. . . . that drew a crowd of 20,000. Throughout July. . . . APPO took over the coordination of the town square encampment and began to organize sit-ins at government buildings, which became permanent encampments on July 26.

- *Deregulation.* State-led development is predicated on government regulation of private economic activity and markets in the public interest. However, from the perspective of firms concerned with maximizing profit-making opportunities, this policy is viewed as an intolerable attack on freedom, resulting in 'inefficiency', a distortion of market forces that, if left unhindered, fails to produce an optimal distribution of society's productive resources, wealth, and income. In the 1980s, the perceived 'failure' of the state—in the form of a widespread fiscal crisis (an inability to finance costly social and development programs out of government revenues)—created political conditions for a reversal of this regulatory approach.

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Development means a combination of improvements in the quality of people's lives—marked by a reduction in or alleviation of poverty, an increased capacity to meet the basic needs of society's members, **sustainable livelihoods**, and empowerment—and the changes in institutionalized practices or 'structures' needed to bring about these improvements. The idea of development can be traced back to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment idea of progress—of the possibility of and necessity for a better form of society characterized by freedom from tyranny, superstition, and poverty (see Chapter 2) and social equality. But it was reinvented in 1948 in the context of (1) a post-war world order based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); (2) an emerging East–West conflict and Cold War; and (3) a national independence struggle by countries seeking to escape the yoke of colonialism—Pax Britannica in the pre-war period, and Pax Americana in the post-war period.

In this context, international co-operation for development—foreign aid, in official parlance—nation-building, capitalist industrialization, and modernization were designed as a means of ensuring that those countries emerging from colonialism would not fall

prey to the lure of communism. The active agent in this process was the state in the form of policies and programs designed to (1) increase the rate of savings and productive investment (capital accumulation); (2) invest these savings in new technology and industrial expansion (modernization); (3) redistribute market-generated incomes via progressive taxation and social and development programs; and (4) provide technical and financial assistance to developing countries in the South.

From the outset of this development process in 1948, signalled by Harry Truman's Point 4 Program of development assistance, to the early 1970s, when the world capitalist system ran out of steam and entered a period of prolonged crisis, these policies and this state-led form of development generated an unprecedented period of economic growth and societal transformation (see Chapters 1 and 7). Growth rates, fuelled by rising wages and a rapid growth of the domestic market as well as international trade, exceeded by a factor of two the economic growth rates of previous decades, resulting in an incremental but steady improvement in the physical quality of life and the social conditions of health, education, and welfare. Historians have dubbed these advances the 'golden age of capitalism'.

In 1973, at the height of an apparent crisis of overproduction, characterized by cutthroat competition, saturated markets and stagflation, sluggish productivity, and falling profits, the capitalist class in the rich countries, the CEOs of its multinational corporations, and governments in their employ or service abandoned the system that had served them so well. Or, to be more precise, they sought to renovate this system to resolve the crisis of capitalist production by (1) changing the relationship of capital to labour, favouring the former and weakening the latter; (2) incorporating new production technologies and constructing a new regime of accumulation and labour regulation (post-Fordism); (3) relocating labour-intensive industrial production overseas, thereby unwittingly creating a 'new international division of labour'; and, above all, (4) bringing about a 'new world order' in which the forces of 'economic freedom' were liberated from the regulatory apparatus of the welfare-developmental state. The policies that facilitated this process generated epoch-defining changes, a seismic shift in international relations—a new world order in which it was thought that the forces of freedom and democracy could prevail.

By 1990, most countries were aligned to this 'new world order' of 'globalization' and free-market capitalism. In the 1970s, in the first phase of neoliberal experiments, the implementing agency was a series of military regimes in the Southern Cone of South America—in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay (Veltmeyer and Petras, 1997, 2000). When these neoliberal policy experiments crashed in the early 1980s, a new crop of liberal democratic regimes, forced into line by the realities of a region-wide debt crisis of historic proportions, initiated a second round of 'structural reform'. They did so with the assistance of an emerging civil society in the so-called 'third sector' of non-profit voluntary associations and non-governmental organizations. These organizations, formed in response to the retreat of the state from its erstwhile responsibility for economic development, were enlisted by international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the international community of development associations and aid donors to mediate with the poor—to assist them in their self-development efforts in return for acceptance of their policy advice (market-friendly 'reforms' and 'good governance').

The literature on these issues is divided. Some see the development NGOs as 'false saviours of democracy',

enlisted to help rescue capitalism from itself (Hayden, 2002; Kamat, 2003). These authors do not see the role of NGOs as one of delivering economic assistance (through micro-development projects or poverty alleviation funds) but of promoting democracy, a 'new activity which the aid agencies and NGOs [originally] embarked [upon] with some trepidation and misgivings', but by the early 1990s this *raison d'être* '[came] of age' (Ottaway, 2003: vi). Others, however, see them as agents of global capitalism—a 'Trojan horse of neoliberal globalization' (Wallace, 2003)—to facilitate the entry of foreign investment and the domestic operations of multinational corporations and, in the process, to help some achieve their imperial dream of world domination.

THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF ANTI-GLOBALIZATION

The measures associated with neoliberal policies in the 1990s led to a dramatic increase in social inequalities—disparities in the global and North–South distribution




PHOTO 12.1 An informal street monument in Buenos Aires commemorating protestors killed during political demonstrations in Argentina, 2001.

Source: Paul Alexander Haslam

'capital', the sum total of society's wealth (or income-generating assets). Economists had formulated the theory that economic development was based on capital accumulation and advanced by increasing the rate of savings and productive investment. However, 'capital' in this theory was defined purely in economic terms—money invested in the design of new technology, the purchase of labour power, and the transformation of natural resources into commodities or tradable goods. Within the framework of the new paradigm, however, society's productive assets ('capital') are also conceived in social terms—that is, as the norms, institutions, and organizations that promote trust and co-operation among persons in communities and in the wider society. Initially advanced by several sociologists (notably James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu), this notion of 'social capital' was elaborated by leading development scholars such as Robert Chambers and Robert Putnam.

This was the thinking in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the concept of 'social capital' took on a new life, supported and advanced by all manner of scholars, international organizations, and policy-makers in their development discourse. At issue in this discourse was an alternative way of conceiving 'development' and fighting the war against world poverty (Durstan, 1999: 104). More specifically, the proponents of this approach claim that the accumulation of social capital based on norms of trust and reciprocal exchange, and a culture of social solidarity, can produce public goods, facilitate the 'constitution of sound civil societies', and constitute the poor as 'social actors', empowering them to act on their own behalf. As an asset that the poor have in abundance (their only asset, one could add, besides their capacity to labour), social capital promotes self-development of the poor in their localities and communities, alleviating the socio-economic (and psychological) conditions of their poverty.

Robert Putnam's book *Making Democracy Work* (1993) served as the catalyst for this interest in social capital as a research and policy tool. But the rapid spread and ubiquity of the notion in academe, and its wide-ranging applications in research, policy formulation, and practice, have been followed by serious questioning and several concerns. First, what is striking about the concept of social capital is not only the extent of its influence but its enthusiastic acceptance by both scholars and policy-makers. This

is evident in the World Bank's notion of social capital as 'the glue that holds society together', as the 'missing link' in an analysis of the development process (Solow, 2000).

Second, despite the plethora of survey articles that litter the intellectual landscape, the concept is notoriously difficult to define. Most recent contributions to the literature acknowledge this before adding a definition of their own to suit their purpose. The ambiguity of 'social capital' is reflected in the suggestion that it is merely a metaphor or a heuristic device and, with regard to the World Bank's formulation, based on 'a vicious circle of tautological reasoning without any basis in empirical fact (Portes, 1998).

Third, the concept of social capital is used to describe and explain virtually anything and everything, from the networks formed by the poor, the sick, the criminal, and the corrupt to the social dynamics of the (dys)functional family, schooling, community development, work and organization, democracy and governance, collective action, the intangible assets of the social economy, 'the analysis and promotion of peasant-level development', or, indeed, any aspect of social, cultural, and economic activity across time and place—everything, it would seem, except the norms, institutions, and social networks formed by those who constitute what the Australian documentary filmmaker and award-winning journalist John Pilger (2003) terms 'the new rulers of the world', the class that runs the global economy and makes its rules.

The final concern about social capital has to do with ideology and politics. What is missing in the analysis informed by the notion of social capital is any concern for the structure of economic and political power. The concept of social capital appears to serve analysts and policy-makers in the same way that postmodern social theory serves analysis: as a means of eluding in thought what for most people is all too real—the dynamic workings of the world capitalist system. The power relations that determine life for most people are inverted: what is essentially a class struggle over the allocation of society's productive resources, a matter of state and economic power, is transmuted into empowerment—a feeling of power gained by individuals through participating in decisions (such as how to spend the poverty alleviation funds that come their way) that affect their livelihoods and supposedly improve the physical quality of their lives. The point is that empowerment means changing oneself (how

one feels about one's self) rather than changing the system.

Another criticism is that the concept of social capital is ideologically all too convenient for the powerful and is politically demobilizing. In this connection, Harriss (2001) and others argue that making people responsible for their own development falsely implies that they were responsible for their problems, such as poverty, which draws attention away from the operating structures of the economic and social system. With its focus on 'civil society', social capital ignores the dynamics associated with the formal structures and institutions of society's political economy, particularly that of state power.

Critics argue that the way in which the concept of social capital is used has a demobilizing effect on the dynamics of radical change. Local development built on the basis of social capital brings limited improvements, with even more limited or no changes in the existing distribution of 'capital' in the form of land and related resources or money in the form of investment capital or credit. Access to these 'resources'—arguably the major factors of economic development—remains in the hands (and institutions) of the rich and powerful, while the poor and powerless are encouraged to exploit their own, rather limited resources and to do so without challenging the structures of economic and political power. Some critics regard social capital and empowerment as illusory—not that they are false assumptions but rather are a trick used by the rich and powerful to preserve their wealth and keep the have-nots at bay.

NGOS: CATALYSTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OR AGENTS OF OUTSIDE INTERESTS?

The major expression of civil society in the 1980s was the 'voluntary private association' or 'non-governmental organization', formed in what at the time was defined as the 'third sector' (as opposed to the 'private sector', composed of profit-making economic enterprises, and the 'public sector', organizations and enterprises set up by the government).

At the beginning of the decade, there were relatively few such organizations, most of them voluntary associations to provide poverty relief or to assist communities in their adaptation to the forces

of change. By the end of the decade, however, these non-governmental organizations had mushroomed, responding to the vacuum left by the retreating state, assuming responsibilities that it had hitherto fulfilled. While in 1970 there were barely 250 development NGOs working in Latin America, it is estimated that by the end of the 1990s the number had grown to tens of thousands, organized to assist poor communities in the quest for self-development as well as assisting citizens in the struggle to prevent the violation of human rights, advance women's equality, protect the environment, and take on other such concerns of the urban middle class. Political sociologists, armed with a postmodern political imagination, saw this development as the emergence of 'new social movements' (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992) concerned with a multitude of issues, not just with state power or transformative social change.

NGOs were enlisted by international organizations such as the World Bank as strategic partners in the war on poverty to act as intermediaries between the providers of financial and technical assistance and the poor communities ravaged by the forces of modernization and abandoned by their governments (at the behest of these same international organizations, it could be added). 'Development' here is conceived within the optics of a new paradigm that valorizes 'popular participation' and grassroots self-development initiated 'from below' with the support of civil society.

To create an appropriate institutional framework for an 'alternative' form of development, the development associations involved in 'international co-operation' promoted a policy of administrative decentralization in developing nations. This policy was incorporated into a new economic model, together with the structural reforms mandated as the cost of admission into the new world order: privatization, financial and trade liberalization, deregulation of markets and private economic activity, democratization, and good governance.

The NGOs were recruited not only to mediate between the aid donors and the poor communities but to promote the virtues of private enterprise and reform. By the 1990s, the marriage between capitalism (the free market) and democracy (free elections) had been consummated, with the NGOs preparing the bridal chamber. In the process, the NGOs helped to dampen the fires of revolutionary ferment among



PHOTO 12.3 Civil society can cross borders: a chieftaincy on the Mozambique–Zimbabwe border participates in community consultations with government and non-government development actors.

Source: Jessica Schafer

the rural poor, who were encouraged to turn away from the confrontational class politics of the social movements.

There are two fundamental theoretical perspectives on the NGOs in this context. One is to see them as catalysts of an alternative form of development that is participatory, empowering of women and the poor, equitable and socially inclusive, human in form, and sustainable in terms of both the environment and livelihoods. Other scholars, however, take a less sanguine view of these development NGOs, viewing many of them not as change agents but as the stalking horse of neoliberal globalization—a Trojan Horse for global capitalism—the paid if at times unwitting agents of US imperialism (Wallace, 2003). Proponents of this view argue that NGOs do not serve the interests of the rural poor as much as the interests of their masters, the new ‘rulers of the world’, a *transnational capitalist class* composed of corporate CEOs, financiers, and

major investors—the guardians of the new world order and its billionaire beneficiaries.

The argument of these scholars is that NGOs are enlisted as front-line soldiers in the war on poverty, in the localities and communities of the poor, to provide what assistance (poverty alleviation funds) might be available and, in the process, to instill respect for the virtues of capitalism and democracy. The war on poverty, it is argued, is simply a charade to mask the real agenda: to create a world safe for capital—to facilitate the entry of foreign investment and the multinational corporations. The implicit mandate of these NGOs, it is further argued, is to help turn the rural poor away from joining social movements and engaging in the confrontational politics of direct action against government policy: to encourage them to seek change and improvements in their lives not by challenging the power structure but by turning inwards—to change not the system but themselves (by ‘empowering’ them

to act on their own behalf)—and to seek improvements and change in the local spaces of the power structure rather than challenging the power itself. That is, NGOs are seen as unwitting agents of outside forces and interests, helping to depoliticize the poor in their struggle for change.

DEVELOPMENT BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE

The problem with the term ‘civil society’ is that it is so nebulous as to make analysis and prescriptions for action difficult. It includes all manner of social organizations, whose role in the development process must be carefully assessed. For the sake of this assessment, and to facilitate analysis, it is possible to break down ‘civil society’ into three sectors:

1. *A complex of associational-type organizations* (‘associations’ formed for a common purpose, such as environmental protection, to advance the status of women, or to promote development or respect for human rights). The ‘anti-globalization movement’ in the North is an amalgam of such organizations. For the most part, they are located in the cities and are middle-class-based.
2. *Community or grassroots organizations*, making up the ‘popular sector’ of civil society. The Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) in Brazil is an example of this type of ‘civil society organization’ (CSO).
3. *‘Private-sector’ interest groups or profit-oriented organizations*. This sector includes the capitalist economic enterprises and multinational corporations that until the 1990s were excluded because they were seen as a large part of the problem.

This chapter has already discussed the role of the first sector, which includes northern development NGOs, the main component of the middle-class sector of civil society activism. (In some contexts, as in India and Latin America, for example, ‘the new politics’ or the politics of the ‘New Left’ would be included in this grouping.) As for the third, these private-sector organizations are normally excluded from the discourse on development, primarily because as a rule they do not have a development agenda. But in 1989, the UNDP

launched a campaign to incorporate the private sector into the development process. For this effort, they used the ideological cover of a more inclusive ‘civil society’ discourse (Mitlin, 1998).

This leaves open for discussion the role of the second sector, namely, grassroots social organizations formed in the localities and communities of the poor. CSOs in this sector arguably have the greatest potential for constituting themselves as ‘actors’. They consist of organizations targeted by international donors and northern NGOs as the object of aid policies and poverty alleviation funding (micro projects). They include social movements, a more politically oriented form of popular organization concerned with bringing about social change through social mobilization and direct action.

The MST in Brazil is a good example of this type of organization. It is dedicated to improving the



PHOTO 12.4 Informal sector employment: a street barber, India.

Source: © Dominic Morissette

access of its members to the land, using the politically confrontational tactic of 'occupation', as well as organizing for agricultural production on the land, a concern that requires a working relationship with the state. Of course, there are less political, more social forms of grassroots organizations as well, such

as Via Campesina, a transnational grouping of some 88 peasant and indigenous organizations from at least 25 developing countries (Desmarais, 2007). For such organizations, some closely linked to the anti-globalization movement, their relationship with the state is critical, although it is characterized more

CURRENT EVENTS BOX 12.2

BRAZIL'S LANDLESS WORKERS' MOVEMENT

The Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) is a grassroots movement of rural landless workers (peasants) in Brazil formed to bring about land reform through direct collective action—by occupying land that is not in productive or social use and thus subject to expropriation under the 1988 constitution. Over the past two decades the movement has evolved into the largest and most powerful social movement in Latin America, allowing hundreds of thousands of landless small peasant farmers and their households to reclaim their connection to the land and their rural livelihoods.

Conditions for the emergence of the MST could be found in the late 1970s with the rise of liberation theology and pressure from the Catholic Church for the government to address a fundamental issue of land reform—a condition of landlessness for an estimated one million families headed by small peasant farmers. Isolated struggles occurred in rural areas as the impoverished peasantry grew more desperate and began to occupy state land. Officially born in 1984, the MST scored a major victory in 1988 when the constitution was changed to mandate land redistribution.

Over the course of the land struggle the MST evolved to encompass not only a strategy of social mobilization and direct collective action (land occupations) but a social organization of some 60 food co-operatives, a complex of small agricultural industries based on local production, and an organization committed to providing its members a system of alternative education and health services. The MST's literacy program involves 50 educators who work with both

adults and adolescents. The movement also monitors 1,000 primary schools in their settlements, in which 2,000 teachers work with about 50,000 children.

The MST opposes the government's neoliberal policy regime; gross corruption, and more generally the system that has resulted in an extreme concentration of wealth. Its alternative 'Popular Project' includes a program of agrarian reform focused on small, self-sufficient and environmentally friendly collectives and an end to IMF and World Bank debt repayments in favour of social spending at home. In general, the MST continues to challenge the tenets of neoliberalism: 'there is no economic or social reason that impedes every Brazilian having access to land, work, dignified housing, quality public schools, and food. But we need to have the courage to change our government, rethink economic policy and challenge the profits of the powerful' (Manifesto to the Brazilian People, Delegates of the 4th National Congress of the MST, 11 Aug. 2000).

With the support of Via Campesina, an international social movement of peasant farmers (*campesinos*) the MST has evolved into a powerful force of global and local resistance against the dominant model of agricultural production based on large-scale and capital-intensive corporate farming, leading the opposition to the neoliberal model used by the government both in Brazil and in many other countries to guide macroeconomic policy and advance capitalist global production. For its work in leading the global struggle against this model the MST has received a number of international awards, including the Right Livelihood Award and an education award from UNICEF.

by dialogue and co-operation than by the conflict that defines the relationship between most social movements and the state.

The relationship between the state and organizations such as the MST is characterized as much by conflict as by co-operation, because it tends to be marked by dispute and pressure rather than partnership and dialogue. To push for change and to increase pressure on the state, social movements—and the MST represents an excellent case study of this point—often form alliances with groups and organizations in other sectors of civil society. In the 1990s, for example, the MST expanded its ties to diverse solidarity and advocacy networks, such as the World Social Forum and Via Campesina, that make up what many regard as an emerging 'global civil society' (see Box 12.2).

As for the relationship between the state and grassroots CSOs, whether non-governmental or social movement in form and action, it is difficult to generalize. One pattern is for social movement-type organizations—such as the MST, Latin America's largest and most dynamic grassroots movement—to take on the central government in the demand for social change. Other grassroots social organizations, in contrast, tend to work with the state at the level of local governments. At this level, one can find many cases of 'good practice' as well as 'local development theory'.

GLOBALIZATION, THE STATE, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

A conclusion reached by some analysts of development is that neoliberal globalization is dysfunctional, unethical, and unsustainable (see Chapter 6). The benefits of neoliberal globalization are appropriated by the few, a small group of super-billionaires, while its social costs are borne by the vast majority, many of whom are dispossessed, excluded, or impoverished in the process. In the theory of globalization the benefits

of the economic growth generated by the free market will eventually trickle down to the poor. But this is evidently not the case. Apart from the super-rich the only apparent beneficiaries of the globalization process are the 'global middle class', who, on the basis of their education, are able to position themselves favourably in the world market and thus improve their 'life chances'. Most of the world's urban and rural poor have neither the opportunities nor the education of this middle class, and thus are socially excluded from any benefits of economic globalization.

Another conclusion, more directly related to the topic of this chapter, is the need for a better balance between the market and the state—to restore the capacity and authority of the state to regulate private economic activity and restrict the power of big capital, as well as the freedom of private interests, and to do so for the public good (Ocampo, 2007). This does not necessarily mean a return to the welfare and development state. Although the government and regulatory apparatus of the state needs to be reinstated, it is evident, too, that it needs to be given an entirely new form (see Chapter 7).

People need to assert their 'right to development' and to organize—both to empower themselves to act in their collective interest and to advance the local, regional, and national development of society as a whole. This means that the rights of private property need to be restricted, particularly regarding the appropriation of an excessive share of wealth and income. These resources should be shared and distributed more equitably. It also means the abolition of class rule—i.e., reducing the capacity and power of one class, by virtue of its property entitlement (ownership of the means of social production), to set the rules and control who gets what. Above all, it means that civil society should be strengthened and that the relationship between the state and civil society should be democratized.

SUMMARY

This chapter explored the notion of 'civil society'. In the 1990s the term 'civil society' was incorporated into development discourse as it sought to alleviate poverty and to effect social change and 'development' in the societies of the Global South on the periphery of the world capitalist system. In this discourse, 'civil society', a complex of non-governmental organizations, appears as a fundamental agency of social change, replacing the state in this regard. The NGOs, which make up part of 'civil society' and work within it, have become a major object of debate. Some see them as

agencies of democracy and participatory development in the struggle for progressive social change. Others, however, see them as agents of the World Bank and other international organizations (as well as of governments in the Global North), engaged in the project of 'international co-operation' for the purpose of economic and social development as defined by these major proponents of globalization. At the same time, grassroots social movements in the Global South, such as the MST in Brazil, have entered the discourse to work for a different, and more equitable, world.

QUESTIONS FOR CRITICAL THOUGHT

1. How is civil society constituted—in response to objective changing conditions and trends or as a means of bringing about these conditions?
2. What is the role of civil society in the social change and development process in mediating between donors (and outside forces) and the localities/communities of the poor? To facilitate or act as a catalyst of a participatory form of economic or social development? Or to contribute to the establishment of 'democracy' and 'good governance'?
3. Are NGOs a positive factor in the development process? Whose interests do they primarily represent—those of the donors and the guardians of the new world order, or the groups that are socially excluded, marginalized, and poor?
4. What is the best way to advance the interests of the socially excluded, marginalized, and poor—by joining (and encouraging the poor to join) anti-globalization movements for social change or to serve as strategic partners of overseas development associations and their so-called 'war on poverty'?
5. Is it possible for development NGOs to support or facilitate self-development of the poor outside the program of international co-operation—without serving as strategic partners of the development associations and without any funding from them?

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RELATED WEBSITES

- Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action
www.arnova.org
- Council of Canadians
www.canadians.org
- Union of International Associations (for Web resources on civil society)
www.uia.be
- Eldis
www.eldis.org
- Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
www.ids.ac.uk
- World Summit on Sustainable Development
www.un.org/events/wssd

NOTES

1. 'Good governance' is generally understood to mean an array of practices that maximize the common/public good. More specifically, it denotes a relation between social organizations and government that conforms to the following 'democratic' principles: transparency, effectiveness, openness, responsiveness and accountability, the rule of law, acceptance of diversity and pluralism, and social inclusiveness.
2. The term 'civil society' dates back to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, when moral philosophers such as Adam Ferguson invented the term to distinguish more clearly between 'society' and 'government' in their writings about 'progress'. But the term 'civil society' disappeared from the map of social scientific discourse until it was resurrected in the 1980s by a generation of social scientists concerned once again with creating a new and better form of society—this time liberated from Soviet authoritarianism as opposed to the class-based and elitist monarchy that was characterized by a ruling landowning aristocracy, serfdom, monarchy, and an all-powerful church.
3. 'Liberal' in academic discourse has both ideological and theoretical meanings. As ideology (belief in ideas used to promote action), liberalism concerns a belief in the need for progress (slow incremental change or reform) in the direction of individual freedom. As theory, it is associated with the notion that economic interactions among individuals are based on a rational calculus of self-interest by each individual.
4. Good governance implies a democratic regime in which the responsibility for human security and political order is not restricted to the government and other institutions of the state but is widely shared by different civil society organizations (UNDP, 1996; World Bank, 1994).
5. A study by Petras (2007) argues that Bill Gates and others who made their fortunes via technical innovations or wealth/job-generating industries or services are in a distinct minority. The vast majority of the world's billionaires used the money of others and speculation to build their fortunes. Many, as in Russia, built their fortunes by looting public assets, pillaging the state's accumulated assets, stealing, and speculative investment and commodity trading—in construction, telecommunications, chemicals, real estate, agriculture, vodka, foods, land, media, automobiles, and airlines.

CHAPTER 23

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Khalid Koser

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

- ◆ To understand the main trends, patterns, and processes of contemporary international migration.
- ◆ To discover the underlying causes of international migration.
- ◆ To appreciate the relationship between international migration and development.

To set the scene, this chapter begins with a brief overview of contemporary **international migration**. It then examines the relationship between international migration and development in two main ways. First, it demonstrates how international migration is inextricably linked with the process of globalization and specifically how **disparities** in development can be an incentive to migrate. Second, we consider the relationship in reverse, demonstrating how international migrants and the migration process influence development in their countries of origin. In the final sections, the chapter turns to the interactions between displacement—or involuntary migration—and development, and between internal migration and development.

CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The United Nations defines an **international migrant** as a person who stays outside her/his country of origin for at least one year (see Box 23.1). According to that definition, the UN estimated that in 2010 there were

about 214 million international migrants worldwide, with an additional 15 million **refugees**. The number of international migrants is closely equivalent to the population of the fourth most populous country on earth, Indonesia. About one in every 32 people in the world today is an international migrant. But migration also affects far more people than just those who migrate—it has important social, economic, and political impacts at home and abroad. This observation has led Stephen Castles and Mark Miller to suggest that we live in an ‘age of migration’.

The number of international migrants has more than doubled in just 25 years, and about 40 million have been added in the twenty-first century. Before 1990, most of the world’s international migrants lived in the developing world; today, the majority live in the developed world, and their proportion is growing. In 2010, there were about 72 million migrants in Europe (including the states of the former Soviet Union), 50 million in North America, 30 million in the Middle East, 27.5 million in Asia, 19 million in Africa, 7.5 million in Latin America, and 6 million in Oceania. Almost 20 per cent of the world’s migrants in 2010—about 43 million—lived in the US.

The Russian Federation was the second most important host country for migrants, with about 13 million, or nearly 8 per cent of the global total. Germany had 10 million migrants, followed by Saudi Arabia and Canada with between 6 and 7 million migrants each. It is much harder to say which countries most migrants come from, but it has been estimated by the Global Commission on International Migration that at least 35 million Chinese, 20 million Indians, and 7 million Filipinos currently live outside their country.

A second trend has been that the traditional distinction between countries of origin, transit, and destination for migrants has become increasingly blurred. Today, almost every country in the world fulfills all three roles—migrants leave, pass through, and head for all of them. The Mediterranean region is a good case study (see Box 23.3).

Besides the dimensions and changing geography of international migration, at least three trends signify an important departure from earlier patterns and processes. The first is feminization (see Box 23.2). Very nearly half the world's migrants were women in 2010—according to UN statistics, in 2005 there were more female than male migrants in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Oceania, and the former USSR. While women have comprised a significant proportion of international migrants for the past 50 years or so, they have traditionally migrated to join their male partners abroad, whereas an increasing proportion who migrate today do so independently; they are often the primary breadwinners for the families they leave behind.

A final trend of contemporary international migration is that, while most of the major movements that

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS BOX 23.1

WHO IS A MIGRANT?

Ostensibly, the answer to the question 'who is a migrant?' is straightforward: most countries have adopted the UN definition of someone living outside his or her native country for a year or more. In reality, however, the answer is more complicated. First, the concept 'migrant' covers a wide range of people in a variety of situations—for example, voluntary and forced migrants, low-skilled and high-skilled migrants, legal and illegal (or 'irregular') migrants. Second, it is very hard to count migrants and to determine how long they have been

abroad. This is especially the case for 'irregular' migrants. Third, just as important as defining when a person becomes a migrant is to define when that person stops being a migrant. One way for this to happen is to return home; another is to become a citizen of a new country, and the procedures governing that transformation vary significantly. Finally, it has been suggested that as a result of globalization, there are now new 'types' of migrants with new characteristics, at times described as members of transnational communities or diasporas.

CRITICAL ISSUES BOX 23.2

THE FEMINIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

For a number of reasons, women comprise an increasing proportion of the world's migrants and, in recent years, more are migrating independently than previously has been the case. The demand for foreign labour, especially in more developed countries, is becoming increasingly gender-selective in favour of jobs typically fulfilled by women—services, health care, and entertainment. Also, shifts in gender relations in some countries of origin have resulted in women's having greater freedom to migrate. In addition, and especially

in Asia, the growth in the migration of women can be attributed to overseas demand for domestic work (sometimes called the 'maid trade'), organized migration for marriage (sometimes referred to as 'mail-order brides'), and the trafficking of women, especially into the sex industry. Finally, an increasing number of countries have made family reunification a central part of their immigration policies—in other words, allowing the spouses and children of migrants to join them. Most often, these spouses are women.



PHOTO 23.1 A currency exchange house in rural central Mexico, established to facilitate the exchange of remittances from migrant family members working in the United States.

Source: Paul Alexander Haslam

took place over the past few centuries were permanent, temporary migration has become much more important today. Furthermore, the traditional pattern of migrating once and then possibly returning

home seems to be phasing out. An increasing number of people migrate several times during their lives, often to different countries or parts of the world, returning to their home countries in the intervening

CURRENT EVENTS BOX 23.3

ORIGIN, TRANSIT, AND DESTINATION COUNTRIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Perhaps no part of the world better illustrates the blurring boundaries among origin, transit, and destination countries than the Mediterranean. About 50 years ago, the situation was fairly straightforward. All the countries of the Mediterranean—in both North Africa and southern Europe—were countries of origin for migrants who mainly went to northern Europe to work. About 20 years ago, southern Europe changed from a region of emigration to a region of immigration as increasing numbers of North Africans arrived to work in their growing economies and at

the same time fewer southern Europeans had an incentive to head north for work anymore. Today, even with the recent unrest in this part of the world, North Africa is changing from being merely an origin area to become a transit and destination region as well. Increasing numbers of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa are arriving in such countries as Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Some remain; others cross the Mediterranean into southern Europe, usually illegally, where, again, some stay and others try to move on into northern Europe.

periods. Even those who are away for long periods of time return home at more and more frequent intervals, since international travel has become so much cheaper and more accessible.

DEVELOPMENT AND MIGRATION

International migration is an important dimension of globalization and has become increasingly embedded in changes in global economic and social structures. Growing developmental, demographic, and democratic disparities provide powerful incentives to move, as does the global jobs crisis affecting large parts of the developing world. The segmentation of labour markets in richer countries creates increasing demand for migrant workers there. A revolution in communication has facilitated growing awareness of disparities and opportunities for would-be migrants, while transformations in transportation have made mobility cheaper and more readily accessible.

Migration networks have expanded rapidly and further facilitate migration. New individual rights and entitlements allow certain people to cross borders and stay abroad more easily (although many more face growing restrictions). And the growth of a migration industry adds further momentum to international migration, even where it is not officially permitted. In this section, we examine why there are more reasons and additional means to migrate than ever before.

Growing Disparities

Development is a difficult concept to measure (see Chapter 1). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has produced a widely cited Human Development Index (HDI) which ranks countries according to a combination of three dimensions— income, health, and education. While the HDI has ranked countries across the developed world and most of the developing world for the past 20 years, during the past decade there have been unprecedented reversals in some of the very poorest countries. In 2005, 18 countries recorded lower HDIs than they had in 1990; 12 of them were in sub-Saharan Africa. Not only is human welfare in those countries deteriorating, but at the same time the gaps between them and

the rest of the world are increasing. It is expected that the long-term effects of the recent global and financial economic crisis may heighten these disparities between rich and poor countries.

Some of the statistics provided by the UNDP are very depressing indeed. Around 550 million of the people in work around the world earn less than one US dollar per day. More than 850 million people, including one in three preschool children worldwide, suffer from malnutrition. More than 1 billion people lack access to safe water, and 2.6 billion do not have adequate sanitation. Worldwide, about 115 million children are denied even basic primary education—most of them in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. On average, girls can expect to receive one year of education less than boys in African and Arab states and two years less in South Asia. In the developing world as a whole, only 58 per cent of women are literate, compared to 68 per cent of men.

A lack of development is compounded by growing population pressure. Almost 5 billion people, or about 80 per cent of the world's population, currently live in poor or at best middle-income countries. While many of the world's more prosperous countries have declining populations, populations are burgeoning in many poorer countries: virtually all of the world's population growth currently takes place in developing nations. The average woman in Africa today has 5.2 children, while the average European woman has just 1.4. These trends mean that the share of the world's population residing in developing countries will rise even further. And as a result of high rates of childbirth in the developing world, there is also a far higher proportion of younger people there than in the developed world, and they will need to be absorbed into the labour market or will have to migrate elsewhere to find work.

It is no coincidence that the democratic process is fragile, the rule of law is weak, and corruption is rife in a number of poor countries (although corruption is certainly not limited to poor countries). By migrating, people try to protect themselves and their families from the effects of a weak economy and volatile market and from political crises, armed conflicts, and other risks. In some cases, people are forced to flee as refugees because the state can no longer protect them from the impact of conflict or from persecution. In the very worst cases, the states themselves are responsible for these offences.

It is important to stress, however, that underdevelopment or overpopulation or poor governance per se is not necessarily the cause of migration; a more fundamental cause could be differentials between different parts of the world. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is 66 times higher in the developed world than in the developing world. A child born in Burkina Faso today can expect to live 35 years less than a child born in Japan, and somebody born in India can expect to live 14 years less than somebody born in the United States. Limited school enrolment and low literacy levels in poorer countries contrast with almost universal enrolment and full literacy in the richer ones.

The Global Jobs Crisis

One of the most powerful incentives to migrate is the need to find work. Although there are important variations, the overall trend has been towards declining unemployment in the developed world in recent

years. In contrast, unemployment has increased or remained at a stable but high level in large parts of the developing world. The highest incidence of unemployment in the world's major regions is in the Middle East and North Africa, at over 12 per cent, which in part may explain the popular uprisings of 2011 and the demands for regime change across this region. By comparison, unemployment averages about 6 per cent across the industrialized economies. The recent global financial and economic crisis has increased unemployment rates across the world, including in the developed world, but the broad disparity remains.

Being out of work is not the only dimension of the current global jobs crisis. Many people are underemployed. Usually, these people work in the informal sector where employment is unpredictable, opportunities come and go by the season and in some cases by the week or even day, and working conditions can be appalling. Even for those who are employed, wages




PHOTO 23.2 The wall separating Israel and Palestine.

Source: Alternatives/Michel Lambert

are often barely sufficient for survival. Another aspect of the global jobs crisis is the 12 million people who the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates are currently working in situations of forced labour.

Populations under particular stress in the developing world rely on agriculture for their income. They comprise about half of the entire labour force—some 1.3 billion people. Many have small farms that are threatened by commercial expansion and environmental degradation. They are also often taxed disproportionately because of their weak political position. The income gap between farming and non-farming activities in developing countries has increased dramatically in recent years (see Chapter 18). One result has been increasing rural–urban migration as farmers and their families head for towns and cities to try to find a better source of livelihood. For many of these people, internal migration to the city is the first step towards international migration out of their country.

The Segmentation of Labour Markets

High-income economies are increasingly becoming characterized by the segmentation of labour markets. This occurs when native workers eschew sectors of the labour market because the jobs provided are low-paying, offer little security, are of low status, and often involve dangerous work, and thus they have become dominated by migrant workers. These occupations are often described as '3D jobs', entailing work that is dirty, dangerous, or difficult—and often a combination of all three. They are concentrated in sectors such as agriculture, forestry, plantations, heavy industry, construction, and domestic services. Often, today, the migrants who work in these sectors

are undocumented or have irregular status, since they are the people most willing to work for very low wages and in insecure conditions.

The Communication and Transportation Revolutions

The communication revolution is a central element of the globalization process. Much of the academic literature on globalization has focused on the recent explosion in high-tech developments such as e-mail and the Internet, electronic bulletin boards, and satellite television stations, as well as cell phones (Box 23.4) and cheap international telephone calls. It has been estimated, for example, that between 1990 and 2000, the number of telephone lines worldwide increased from 700 million to 2.5 billion, while the number of Internet users increased from scarcely one million to more than one billion (a thousand-fold increase). This revolution has facilitated global linkages and, in effect, reduced the distance between different parts of the world. It is relevant to migration for two reasons. First, it makes people aware of disparities—of what life is like in other parts of the world. Second, it makes people aware of opportunities to move and to work abroad.

At the same time, it is possible to overstate the communication revolution. There is still a significant global 'digital divide'—the gap in access to information resources between poor and rich countries (see Chapter 25). This was most strikingly illustrated in a speech by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2000, who said that 'Half the world's population has never made or received a phone call', although this statistic has been widely debated ever since. Bridging the

CURRENT EVENTS BOX 23.4

THE CELL PHONE REVOLUTION IN AFRICA

It is estimated that worldwide there are 2.4 billion cell phone users and that 1,000 new customers subscribe every minute. Fifty-nine per cent of cell phone users live in developing countries, making cell phones the first telecommunication technology in which developing countries have more users than in the developed world. Cell phone usage in Africa is

growing faster than in any other region and jumped from 63 million users in 2008 to 152 million in 2010. There are 3.2 million cell phone customers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone, and 8,000 new cell phone customers sign up each day. This compares with just 20,000 conventional land lines there.

digital divide is nevertheless considered important for achieving global equality, increasing social mobility, encouraging democracy, and promoting economic growth.

Another 'revolution' often referred to in the globalization literature is in transportation, with an increasing range of options for international travel and decreasing costs. It has arisen particularly because of the proliferation of competition among airline companies. Once again, it would be a mistake to assume that this revolution has reached every part of the world, but it is nevertheless estimated that today it costs no more than US\$2,500 to travel legally between any two places in the world. As oil prices increase inexorably and oil supplies decline, however, this 'revolution' could be of short duration. It can be far more expensive—although still possible—to travel illegally (see Box 23.5). If the communication revolution has made many would-be migrants more aware of reasons to migrate, the transportation revolution, so far, has made migration more feasible. At the same time, travelling internationally is still prohibitively expensive for the majority of the world's population, and many face administrative obstacles such as the difficulty of obtaining passports and visas.

Migration Networks

Most migrants move to countries where they have friends or family already established, forming what is often referred to as transnational migration networks

or chain migration. It has been argued that these networks, which establish a self-perpetuating cycle, are one of the main reasons why migration is increasing today. The expansion of migration means that more people than ever before have friends or family already living abroad, and the changing geography of migration means that more often than previously, these networks link would-be migrants in poor countries with potential destinations in richer countries.

Migration networks have been shown to encourage migration in three main ways. First, they provide information, often taking advantage of the new communications technologies described above. Second, they finance trips by lending would-be migrants money. Third, they can play a crucial role in helping new migrants to settle by providing an initial place to stay, helping them find a job, and providing other economic and social assistance.

New Rights and Entitlements

A significant expansion of rights and entitlements has allowed certain people to cross borders and stay abroad far more easily than ever before. The dismantling of internal borders in the European Union (EU), for example, allows for the free movement of EU citizens within the region, while the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and regional economic agreements in other parts of the world, including Africa and South America, also contain some provisions for the free movement of workers. Furthermore,

CRITICAL ISSUES BOX 23.5

THE COSTS OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING

A 2005 review of more than 600 sources in which the costs charged to migrants by smugglers were reported yielded the following mean costs for movement between world regions:

Routes	Mean Costs (US\$)
Asia–Americas	26,041
Europe–Asia	16,462
Asia–Australasia	14,011
Asia–Asia	12,240
Asia–Europe	9,374
Europe–Australasia	7,400

Routes	Mean Costs (US\$)
Africa–Europe	6,533
Europe–Americas	6,389
Americas–Europe	4,528
Americas–Americas	2,984
Europe–Europe	2,708
Africa–Americas	2,200
Africa–Australasia	1,951
Africa–Africa	203

Source: Petros (2005: 4–5).

certain categories of people—such as business people, academics and students, sports and entertainment performers—often either do not require visas or can apply via fast-track procedures. Almost every country in the developed world allows long-term migrant workers to be joined by members of their immediate family. Furthermore, most countries in the world have signed the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, which guarantees protection and assistance to refugees outside their country (perhaps the most significant non-signatory is India).

Nonetheless, the extent of these new rights and entitlements can be exaggerated. The free movement of labour has not yet been realized in most regional economic agreements outside the EU. Applicants for family reunion face increasingly rigorous administrative processes. There are also increasing restrictions on the mobility of many other people—the low-skilled and asylum seekers, for example. In particular, the phenomenon of ‘irregular’ migration has risen quickly on political agendas worldwide (see Box 23.6).

The Migration Industry

Migration is facilitated by a wide range of individuals and agents, including labour recruiters, immigration

lawyers, travel agents, brokers, housing providers, remittance agencies, and immigration and customs officials, as well as by entire institutions such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an intergovernmental agency initially founded several years after World War II to help in the resettlement of displaced persons. Today, the IOM, with over 100 member countries, is often responsible for transporting migrants and refugees for official resettlement or return programs. In addition, numerous NGOs provide assistance and shelter to migrants and refugees. These individuals and organizations have been described by some analysts as forming a new migration ‘industry’ or migration ‘business’. There is also an illegitimate part of the migration industry, comprising human traffickers and migrant smugglers (see Box 23.7). The enormous profits that the immigration industry makes from migration, it has been argued, add considerable momentum to the process.

Explaining Migration

The factors that together provide increasing incentives and opportunities for people to migrate need to be reconciled with the fact that international migrants still make up only about 3 per cent of the world’s

CRITICAL ISSUES BOX 23.6

IRREGULAR MIGRATION

Irregular migration is a complex and diverse concept. There is not even common terminology—irregular migration is variously described as ‘illegal’, ‘unauthorized’, and ‘undocumented’ migration. It is also important to recognize that a migrant can become ‘irregular’ in many ways. Irregular migration includes people who enter a country without the proper authority—for example, by entering without passing through a border control or entering with fraudulent documents. It also includes people who may have entered a country perfectly legally but then remain there in contravention of the authorities—for example, by staying after the expiry of a visa or work permit, through sham marriages or fake adoptions, or as bogus students or fraudulently self-employed. The term also includes people moved by migrant smugglers or human traffickers and those who deliberately abuse the asylum system.

In addition, important regional differences exist in how the concept (or the ‘problem’) of irregular migration is dealt with. In Europe, for example, where the entry of people from outside the European Union is closely controlled, it is relatively easy to define and identify migrants with irregular status. That is not the case in many parts of Africa, where borders are porous, ethnic and linguistic groups straddle state borders, some people belong to nomadic communities, and many people do not have proof of their place of birth or citizenship.

A final complexity arises because migrants’ status can change, often quite literally overnight. For example, migrants might enter a country in an irregular fashion but then regularize their status, perhaps by applying for asylum or entering a regularization program. Conversely, migrants might enter regularly, then become irregular when they work without a work permit or overstay a visa.

CRITICAL ISSUES BOX 23.7

MIGRANT SMUGGLING AS A BUSINESS

The author spent some time in 2004 interviewing migrant smugglers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They reported that over time, not only had the amount they charge changed but the way they received payments had as well. About 10 years ago, migrant smugglers apparently insisted that payments be made in full in advance. The danger for migrants was that smugglers might take their money and disappear before moving them. In response to these fears, some smugglers changed their practice, asking only for a deposit in advance of movement, with the balance to be paid after

arrival in the destination country. The problem here was that some migrants were exploited by smugglers to whom they were indebted after they had arrived. In the past two or three years, smugglers have responded to their clients’ concerns and demands once again. Now payment is made in full in advance but is deposited with a third party rather than being paid to the smuggler directly. The money is released to the smuggler only after the migrant has called to confirm that he or she has arrived safely at the destination. What this amounts to is a money-back guarantee on migrant smuggling.

population. Given growing inequalities, widening awareness of opportunities for a better life elsewhere, and increasing access to transportation, a legitimate question to ask is why so few people migrate.

Some of the answers to this question have already been alluded to. The very poorest people, those most affected by global inequalities, simply cannot afford to move. Many people who do migrate in response to poverty move internally, normally from the

countryside to the city, and not internationally. There are far more unemployed or underemployed people in the poor world than there are jobs for them, and this is true as well in the segmented labour markets of the rich economies. The communication and transportation revolutions are not as far-reaching as some commentators believe, nor are migration networks. Rights and entitlements to move apply on the whole to the privileged few. And the migration industry depends




PHOTO 23.3 Surveillance on the US side of the wall that separates San Diego, California, from Tijuana, Mexico.

Source: Paul Alexander Haslam

on profit and therefore has an incentive to keep migration costs up.

At least three other reasons emerge from the literature. The most important is inertia. Most people do not want to move away from family, friends, and a familiar culture, so they tend to stay in the country where they were born. Another reason is that governments can control migration. Communist countries used to stop people from leaving—the Berlin Wall was concrete evidence of this—but since the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, this is rarely the case any more (Cuba and North Korea are notable exceptions). However, certain countries in Africa and the Middle East still require citizens to obtain permission before they can leave. Much more common today is migration control on the part of destination countries, although their efforts are not always effective. An additional reason is that as countries develop, emigration eventually declines, and despite the depressing statistics cited earlier, most countries in the world are developing, albeit sometimes at a painfully slow rate.

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Migration can have profound impacts on the development of countries of origin. On the positive side, migrants often send home vast sums of money and make other contributions from abroad too, and when they return they can bring home new skills, experiences, and contacts. On the negative side, migration can deplete countries of skills that are in short supply through the **brain drain**.

CURRENT EVENTS BOX 23.8

THE HAWILAAD SYSTEM

The *hawilaad* (or *xawilaad*) system is based on Somali traders. They collect hard currency from Somali migrants abroad, then use the money to purchase commodities that can be sold in Somalia. They return periodically to Somalia, sell their goods, and pay the equivalent in Somali currency to the migrants' families. Profits made on the sale of the goods effectively become the

traders' commission. This system of transfer is very common among Somali communities across the world. In the aftermath of 9/11, attempts were made to monitor it or close it down because of some evidence that funding for the attacks was channelled through Somalia. However, the system has proved hard to formalize and still appears to be widespread.

Remittances

The term 'remittance' usually refers to money sent home by migrants abroad, although over a century ago 'remittance men' in North America often were the younger sons of the European upper classes—those who did not inherit their fathers' estates but who were sent money from home. Today, the true scale of remittances worldwide is hard to gauge. While some money is sent home through banking systems and can thus be formally tracked, it is likely that more is sent home through informal channels. One reason is the high costs that are often charged by banks and agents. Channels for informal remittances include migrants taking home cash when they return for visits or sending home money with friends or relatives. Sometimes entrepreneurs and traders who travel regularly to and from home carry money back for migrants for a small commission—in Cuba, for example, these entrepreneurs are known as *mulas*. Perhaps the most elaborate mechanism for informal transfers, however, is the Somali *hawilaad* system (see Box 23.8). The point is that the scale of these informal transfers is simply not known. Furthermore, even formal remittances cannot always be accurately quantified, because banks are often unwilling or unable to release specific details about personal transfers.

These data problems notwithstanding, the World Bank produces annual estimates of the scale of remittances worldwide. The estimates for 2010 indicate that some US\$440 billion was sent home by migrants. The scale of remittances is staggering, and another striking feature is that there has been a 50 per cent increase in the flow of remittances in just five years—the main reason being the impact of

globalization. Transportation—particularly, cheap air transportation—has facilitated the movement of people to overseas employment, and tourism and family ties draw them back home to visit for a holiday, and many migrants carry home money when they visit. Finally, advanced telecommunications—cheap telephone calls and widening Internet access—mean that migrants and their families can stay in contact more regularly than previously, and friends and families can more easily request assistance, and migrants abroad can more readily remit money to their relatives.

The two leading countries for remittances, India and China, between them received about US\$106 billion in 2010 (\$55 billion and \$51 billion, respectively), while the next two largest remittance-receiving countries, Mexico and the Philippines, received \$22.6 billion and \$21.3 billion, respectively (Torres, 2011). For the Philippines, this inward cash flow represents 10 per cent of the national GDP, and people are said to be the country's most important export product because Filipinos working abroad remit such large sums to families back home.

The majority of remittances are sent to developing countries—about US\$325 billion in 2010, a 6 per cent increase in remittances to developing countries from 2009. The global economic crisis of recent years severely affected some poorer countries in this regard, however: between 2008 and 2009, remittances to Nigeria dropped nearly 20 per cent and Uganda saw a 40 per cent decrease. Many migrants in developed countries either lost their jobs or suffered wage reductions, and thus had less money to remit home. Even in 2009, however, when these flows of money to home countries diminished, remittances amounted to almost three times the value of donations through development assistance and charity.

There is still significant debate about the impact of remittances at home. It is clear that they benefit those who receive them directly—who are often among the poorest in society. Remittances can lift people out of poverty: it has been estimated that in Somaliland, for example, the average household income is doubled by remittances, while in Lesotho they represent up to 80 per cent of the income of rural households. Besides increasing incomes, remittances also diversify them, meaning that households are less reliant on a single source of income. In this way, remittances provide insurance against risk. In addition, they are often spent on the education of children and health care for the elderly.

The extent to which remittances benefit those outside the immediate family, however, largely depends on how the money is spent. If used to establish small businesses, for example, or invested in community-based enterprises such as wells, schools, or health clinics, then remittances can provide employment and services for people other than the direct recipients. On the other hand, if they are spent on consumer goods such as cars and television sets or on repaying debt, as is often the case, their wider benefit is limited. Nonetheless, the money still enters the local economy. In addition, when some households receive remittances and others do not, disparities among households can be exacerbated and communities undermined. It is also worth remembering that migrants tend to originate in certain parts of source countries, which means that their remittances can increase regional disparities. There is also some evidence that receiving remittances can create a 'culture of migration' in source countries, whereby young people see the apparent rewards of migrating and have unrealistic expectations about moving abroad. Alternatively, relying on remittances can be a disincentive for some people at home to work at all.

Diasporas

The term **diaspora** is used to describe migrants (and their descendants) outside their country who maintain a relationship—from psychological to material—with their country of origin. They often come together in formal organizations, such as professional associations that bring together migrant doctors, lawyers, or teachers from the same origin, or in organizations based on common interests such as sport, religion, charitable work, and development. Another type of organization is the hometown association (HTA) that brings together people from the same town or city who direct their activities towards development in their hometown (see Box 23.9).

These diaspora organizations commonly collect donations from their membership and send them back to the country of origin for specific purposes, including ongoing development and emergency assistance (this is on top of remittances sent home on an individual or family basis by migrants). Diaspora organizations rallied quickly to send home money, medical equipment, tents, and food in response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the 2010 floods in

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS BOX 23.9**HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS**

Mexican hometown associations have a long history—the most prominent were established in the 1950s. There are currently more than 600 Mexican HTAs in 30 cities in the US. They support public works in their localities of origin, including constructing public infrastructure (for example, new roads and road repairs), donating equipment (for example, ambulances and medical equipment), and promoting education (for example, establishing scholarship programs, constructing schools, and providing school supplies).

Pakistan, for example. As well as making economic contributions by sending home money and material goods, diaspora organizations can also participate in the political, social, and cultural affairs of their home country and community. A good example can be seen in Somalia, where Somali diaspora organizations largely paid for the construction of the University of Hargeisa and Amoud University in Boorama.

While diasporas can contribute to development, they also can contribute to war. Remittances from Ethiopian and Eritrean diaspora organizations helped fund the conflict between these two countries from 1998 to 2000, for example, and the US-led 'war on terror' has focused on the siphoning of remittance funds from and to organizations considered to be supporting terrorist activities. In addition, diaspora organizations often are dominated by a particular religious or ethnic group, and their contributions can target those particular groups, thus exacerbating disparities. An associated point is that diaspora organizations frequently are comprised of the educated and elite, and their contributions reflect this. Building a university, for example, probably does not directly benefit poor rural peasants.

Return

Besides sending home individual remittances and making a collective contribution through diaspora organizations, a third way migrants can potentially contribute to development is by returning. Migrants can bring home savings from abroad to invest at home when they return, often establishing small

businesses, for example. They may come home with a good network of contacts abroad that can form the basis for small-scale trade and import-export activities. They also may bring back new ideas that can spur entrepreneurial attitudes and activities among the people with whom they settle on return.

Once again, it is important not to overestimate the impact of return. Some people return because they have not succeeded abroad—they may come home with no savings and no new skills and return to whatever they did before leaving. Often, migrants go home to retire, having spent their working lives abroad. While they may take home money and experience, they are not economically active themselves upon return. Also, the extent to which return has an impact really depends on conditions at home. If there is no access to land, or taxes are too high, or there is an inadequate supply of skilled labour, for example, return migrants with good intentions to set up a new business can easily become frustrated and have their plans thwarted.

The Brain Drain

When there are high levels of unemployment at home, emigration can make a contribution to economic development in that it reduces competition for limited jobs. This is one reason why the government of the Philippines, for example, positively encourages emigration; another reason, as we have seen, is the money that these migrants send home.

Migration, however, can be selective, and those who leave are at times among the most entrepreneurial, best educated, and brightest in society. The immigration policies of developed countries in the Global North encourage this type of selective migration. If their particular skills are readily available in the society, this need not be a problem. India, for example, can afford to have computer experts and technical workers emigrate in substantial numbers, since so many young people in India today have these skills. It is more usually the case, however, that these movements deplete the country of origin of skills that are scarce. This process is usually referred to as the brain drain. Besides removing skills, the brain drain also means that countries do not see any return on their investment in educating and training their own citizens.

Of special concern is the migration of health personnel—nurses and doctors—from countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the figures are startling: since 2000, for example, nearly 16,000 nurses from

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS BOX 23.10**WHO IS A REFUGEE?**

According to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), a refugee is someone who is 'outside his own country, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion'. There are regional variations on this basic formula, and it has been criticized as being out-of-date; yet it remains the most commonly accepted definition. There are two defining characteristics of this definition. First, it only covers people who have been displaced outside their own country—many more people have been forcibly displaced within their countries. Second, it focuses on people who are displaced by persecution and conflict—not those who flee natural disasters, climate change, or extreme poverty.

with the highest ranking on the Human Development Index were the least likely to experience population displacements, whereas those with the lowest ranking had the highest propensity to generate large movements of refugees. The same broad correlation remains true today.

It is difficult, however, to establish a causal relationship. Many poor countries have not generated refugees—Tanzania is a good example. Conversely, some wealthier countries have, the best recent example being the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, many recent refugee movements have been provoked by events such as conflict, which are not necessarily directly linked with economic development—the recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are examples.

The second main focus of literature considering interactions between refugees and development considers the developmental implications of refugees in host countries. It is often assumed that refugees have a negative impact, and there is a particular focus in the literature on the environmental impacts of refugees. Refugees often need wood for cooking and construction, and significant deforestation can occur around their settlements, resulting in the longer term in deteriorating soil quality. The water table may also be lowered and groundwater polluted. Their potentially negative

sub-Saharan Africa have registered to work in the UK alone. Only 50 out of 600 doctors trained since independence are still practising in Zambia. It has been estimated that there are currently more Malawian doctors practising in Manchester, England, than in the whole of Malawi. Although it has attracted less attention, the brain drain of teachers from Africa is generating growing concern.

Reactions to the brain drain are divided. It can be argued that this represents people moving in order to improve their lives and realize their potential, and that there is nothing wrong with that. In addition, if their own countries cannot provide adequate employment, career opportunities, and incentives to stay, then the problem lies with those countries. On the other hand, there has been criticism of the richer countries to which skilled migrants head, especially when these countries actively recruit those skills. Furthermore, many migrants fail to find jobs commensurate with their skills, a phenomenon often referred to as 'brain waste'.

DISPLACEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

So far, this chapter has focused mainly on voluntary migrants—people who by and large choose to move abroad. This final section briefly considers the interactions between involuntary migration—or displacement—and development. Most people who are forced to leave their own countries are described as refugees, although in fact the legal definition of a refugee is very specific (see Box 23.10). The majority of the world's 15 million or so refugees are currently located in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

The literature on links between refugees and development focuses on three specific interactions. The first is between development—or lack of development—and displacement. The second is the developmental impacts of refugees in host countries. And the third link involves the implications of the return of refugees for development in their home countries.

There is considerable debate about the extent to which a link exists between refugee displacement and poverty or underdevelopment in their home countries. In 1995, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) conducted a basic analysis comparing refugee numbers and development indicators. It found that countries

impact on the environment has been cited recently by several countries (for example, Honduras, Pakistan, and Turkey) as one reason to turn refugees away. In this light, it is important to place the environmental impact of refugees in proper context. It varies according to the number of refugees and the length of time they stay. It is likely to be more severe when they settle on marginal land, when they live in camps rather than within local settlements, and when their movement is restricted. And recent evidence suggests that even where environments are damaged, they can rebound quickly once refugees have gone home.

A more limited literature considers various other impacts that refugees can have. Because they receive aid, they can sometimes undercut the wage rates of local people, thus introducing an element of competition that benefits some and disadvantages others within the local community. Social tensions can arise between refugees and the local community. As well, sometimes refugee camps can become the focus for political activities.

Perhaps the clearest example of a positive impact of refugee settlement is the 'integrated zonal

developments' that emerged in several East African countries during the 1960s and 1970s. Rural refugee settlements were planned and deliberately integrated into the local economy, and in some cases they formed the focus for the growth of new villages and even towns. The reasons these developments succeeded were, first, that there were relatively few refugees involved and, second, that host governments had a largely positive attitude towards them.

The final interaction to consider is the implications of the return of refugees for development at home. The first thing to bear in mind, however, is that refugees often return to countries that have been affected by conflict for long periods of time (for example, Afghanistan or Mozambique), and in this context it may be premature to talk of development, at least in the short-term. It also needs to be noted that there is a significant shortage of research on what happens to refugees after they return, at least in part because they no longer fall under the institutional responsibility of any international organization.

The limited literature, nevertheless, indicates that return can pose significant obstacles for refugees.



PHOTO 23.4 Afghani internally displaced persons in a refugee camp near Kandahar.

Source: © Catherine Pappas

Recurrent physical problems include the presence of landmines and the destruction of housing. Economic activity largely depends on access to key resources such as land, labour, working capital, and skills. And social confrontation can often arise in the context of the reintegration of returnees with the internally displaced, with those who never fled, and also with demobilized soldiers.

The conditions in refugee settlements in exile and, specifically, the extent to which refugees have been allowed to gain a degree of self-reliance are among the most important variables that can influence the reintegration process. Other variables include the type and management of settlements for returnees and the extent and type of assistance made available to them.

A recent extension of the literature considering the links between refugee return and development at home focuses on situations in which refugees do not return but instead remain in host countries permanently and form a 'refugee diaspora'. This situation probably only applies to that very small percentage of refugees who move long distances and settle in richer countries. Yet, despite their small numbers, they can have a significant impact on development at home. They often send home remittances and invest in land or property. They can participate in elections from abroad. And they can contribute to intellectual debate via the Internet. Clearly, however, the desire and ability of refugees to contribute in these sorts of ways vary over time and cannot always be taken for granted.

INTERNAL MIGRATION

This chapter has focused almost exclusively on international migration—both voluntary and involuntary. This topic has been the subject of far more research and writing than internal migration and has attracted far more political and media attention and public discourse. Yet the number of internal migrants—both voluntary and involuntary—is far higher than the number of international migrants.

Worldwide, far more people choose to move within their own countries than to cross an international border. It is estimated that in China alone, there are 140 million internal migrants, compared to 200 million international migrants worldwide. What is more, internal migration appears set to grow at an even faster rate than international migration over the next few years. In the next 20 years, a further 300 million

Chinese citizens are expected to migrate within their country.

Like international migration, internal migration is both a symptom and a cause of development processes. Most people who move within their country move from the countryside to towns and cities, normally in search of work, better incomes, and greater opportunities. Internal migration also can contribute to development. It has been estimated that internal migration has contributed up to 16 per cent annually to the growth of China's GDP in recent years, primarily because this is one way of relieving unemployment in certain areas and filling labour market gaps in other areas. Limited research indicates that internal migrants also send home significant remittances. According to one estimate, the equivalent of over US\$30 billion is sent home each year by Chinese internal migrants—mainly to rural areas by workers who have moved to the city. Their remittances have helped to reduce the rural-urban income gap in China, decrease regional disparities in wealth, reduce rural poverty, pay for education and health care, and promote consumption and investment.

Similarly, far more people have been displaced inside than outside their own countries. Many of these people have been affected by 'development-induced displacement', particularly in the context of dam construction. In such development schemes, planned reservoir areas can necessitate the relocation of entire settlements. The scale of these displacements is hard to assess, but the World Bank estimates that in the past decade more than 100 million people have been affected. Particular controversy surrounds the construction of the Three Gorges dam on the Yangtze River in China, which has inundated two cities, 140 towns, and 1,350 villages and necessitated the resettlement of more than one million people.

CONCLUSION

Today, there are more international migrants than ever before recorded, and their numbers are likely to continue to increase for the foreseeable future as a result of uneven development, conflicts, and globalization and its discontents. At the same time, international migration and migrants can contribute towards development, especially in source countries, and may become one factor that eventually begins to even out global disparities. Migration and development will remain inextricably linked.

SUMMARY

Contemporary international migration is characterized by rapidly growing numbers, changing geographical patterns, and new processes, including the feminization of migration. These changes are likely to accelerate in the future. International migration is inextricably linked with globalization. Among the main underlying causes of international migration are disparities in development and democracy; a global jobs crisis compounded by the recent financial and economic crisis; the segmentation of labour markets, especially in more advanced economies; revolutions in communications and transportation; the momentum associated with migration networks; new rights and entitlements that allow certain people to cross borders more easily; and a burgeoning migration industry, including migrant smugglers and human traffickers.

Migrants and migration can have significant impacts on development in the countries where they work and settle and in source countries. Migrants send home hundreds of billions of dollars each year, and these remittances help lift people and communities out of poverty. Diaspora organizations also make significant contributions to countries of origin through economic transfers and through political, social, and cultural interventions. Returning migrants can become a catalyst for local development. On the other hand, large-scale migration of skilled people can deprive their countries of needed talent and skills. While this chapter mainly focused on the relationship between international migration and development, it also considered the relationship of internal migration and displacement to development.

QUESTIONS FOR CRITICAL THOUGHT

1. Who is an international migrant?
2. What are the main causes of migration?
3. Why are there not more international migrants?
4. How do international migrants and migration contribute to development?
5. Under what circumstances do remittances benefit poor countries?
6. What is the 'brain drain' and why does it matter?
7. What are the links between displacement and development?
8. What are the links between internal migration and development?

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RELATED WEBSITES

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www.gcim.org
- International Organization for Migration
www.iom.int

Migration Policy Institute
www.migrationinformation.org

UN High Commissioner for Refugees
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